Typebot CVE-2026-48759

Exploitation requires the attacker to (1) hold an authenticated, non-guest membership in at least one Typebot workspace on the target instance (PR:L) and (2) know or guess a themeTemplateId belonging to a different workspace, which the advisory notes can be observed via shared typebots or network traffic. No user interaction by the victim is needed (UI:N), no special server configuration toggles are required (the vulnerable handlers are part of the default API surface of Typebot ≤3.15.2), and the attack works over the network against any reachable Typebot instance. The practical limiter is account availability: on closed self-hosted deployments where workspace creation is restricted to trusted staff, the prerequisite of a non-guest account meaningfully reduces the attacker population.

The CVSS 3.1 vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L (7.1 High) accurately reflects a network-reachable, low-complexity flaw requiring only a low-privileged authenticated account (any non-guest workspace member), producing high integrity impact (arbitrary modification of other workspaces' theme templates), low availability impact (deletion of those templates), and no confidentiality impact. CISA KEV status is not indicated and no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and EPSS data was not provided; SSVC fields were also not supplied. Real-world risk is moderate-to-high for multi-tenant SaaS deployments of Typebot (e.g., shared/community instances) where account signup is cheap, because exploitation is trivial once a Template ID is observed, but risk is materially lower for single-tenant self-hosted instances where all workspace members are already trusted. The narrow impact (theme templates, not bot logic or user data) and absence of confidentiality impact temper the severity despite the high CVSS integrity score.

An attacker registers or already holds a low-privileged non-guest member account in any Typebot workspace, then harvests a victim workspace's themeTemplateId from a shared typebot page or by observing network traffic. They invoke handleSaveThemeTemplate with their own workspaceId (which passes the membership check) but the victim's themeTemplateId in the body, overwriting the victim's theme - or invoke handleDeleteThemeTemplate to destroy it. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the bug is trivial to weaponize given the low CVSS attack complexity.