Vitest CVE-2026-47429
CRITICALCVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
3Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 22 npm packages depend on vitest (8 direct, 14 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 4.1.0.
DescriptionNVD
Summary
Arbitrary file can be read on Windows when Vitest UI server is listening, especially when exposed to the network.
Impact
Only users that match either of the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vitest UI server to the network (using
--api.hostorapi.hostconfig option) - running the Vitest UI or Browser Mode on Windows
Details
The API handler for /__vitest_attachment__ uses the deprecated isFileServingAllowed incorrectly. https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/ui/node/index.ts#L77 The function expects the passed value to use cleanUrl after the check before file system related operation. Because of this, it is possible to bypass the check by \\?\\..\\. This is not possible on Linux as Linux errors if a directory named ? does not exist.
A similar problem exists in other places as well.
- https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts#L103-L105
- https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts#L119-L121
- https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/browser/src/node/commands/fs.ts#L10-L11
- https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/browser/src/node/plugin.ts#L194-L196
- https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/browser/src/node/rpc.ts#L115-L121
That said, this isFileServingAllowed check does not actually prevent the API to be abused. Since the API has rerun feature and file write feature, it's possible to run arbitrary script by writing a script as a test file using saveTestFile and running it using rerun. This means exposing the API / Vitest UI is equivalent to giving script execution access. On the browser mode side, there're readFile / writeFile / saveSnapshotFile. So exposing the browser mode is equivalent to giving file read / write access.
PoC
- Run Vitest UI
- Get the API token by
curl http://localhost:51204/__vitest__/ - Run
curl "http://localhost:51204/__vitest_attachment__?path=C:\\path\\to\\project\\?\\..\\..\\secret.txt&contentType=text/plain&token=$TOKEN"(TOKEN is the API token) - curl shows the content of
secret.txtthat is outside the project directory
Mitigations
Vitest now ships two configuration flags, allowWrite and allowExec, that gate the privileged operations exploited by this vulnerability. Both are disabled by default whenever the API server is bound to a non-localhost host, ensuring that exposing the server to the network no longer implicitly grants write or execute capabilities to remote clients.
When these flags are disabled, the UI also enters a read-only mode: in-browser code editing and test file execution are turned off, removing the attack surface that allowed remote code execution. Many Browser Mode features are also disabled, like attachments, artifacts or snapshots. See browser.api.
Users who require the full interactive UI on a networked host must explicitly opt in by setting allowWrite and/or allowExec to true.
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary file read and remote code execution in Vitest versions prior to 4.1.0 allow remote unauthenticated attackers to read files outside the project directory on Windows and execute arbitrary scripts when the Vitest UI or Browser Mode API server is exposed to the network via the --api.host flag or api.host configuration option. The flaw stems from incorrect use of the deprecated isFileServingAllowed check, which can be bypassed using Windows-specific path syntax (\\?\\..\\), and is compounded by API features (saveTestFile + rerun, readFile/writeFile/saveSnapshotFile) that effectively grant script execution to anyone who can reach the API. …
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RemediationAI
24 hours: Audit all Vitest installations for --api.host flag or api.host configuration exposure to untrusted networks; disable API server access unless restricted to localhost or trusted internal networks. 7 days: Inventory all development and CI systems running Vitest; plan upgrade to Vitest 4.1.0 or later; implement network segmentation restricting API server to internal networks only. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp