Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from NVD.
CVSS VectorNVD
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionNVD
Summary
Arbitrary file can be read on Windows when Vitest UI server is listening, especially when exposed to the network.
Impact
Only users that match either of the following conditions are affected:
- explicitly exposes the Vitest UI server to the network (using
--api.hostorapi.hostconfig option) - running the Vitest UI or Browser Mode on Windows
Details
The API handler for /__vitest_attachment__ uses the deprecated isFileServingAllowed incorrectly. https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/ui/node/index.ts#L77 The function expects the passed value to use cleanUrl after the check before file system related operation. Because of this, it is possible to bypass the check by \\?\\..\\. This is not possible on Linux as Linux errors if a directory named ? does not exist.
A similar problem exists in other places as well.
- https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts#L103-L105
- https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts#L119-L121
- https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/browser/src/node/commands/fs.ts#L10-L11
- https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/browser/src/node/plugin.ts#L194-L196
- https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/blob/eb1abf08573032a532015b999ad3501c5e89e3bb/packages/browser/src/node/rpc.ts#L115-L121
That said, this isFileServingAllowed check does not actually prevent the API to be abused. Since the API has rerun feature and file write feature, it's possible to run arbitrary script by writing a script as a test file using saveTestFile and running it using rerun. This means exposing the API / Vitest UI is equivalent to giving script execution access. On the browser mode side, there're readFile / writeFile / saveSnapshotFile. So exposing the browser mode is equivalent to giving file read / write access.
PoC
- Run Vitest UI
- Get the API token by
curl http://localhost:51204/__vitest__/ - Run
curl "http://localhost:51204/__vitest_attachment__?path=C:\\path\\to\\project\\?\\..\\..\\secret.txt&contentType=text/plain&token=$TOKEN"(TOKEN is the API token) - curl shows the content of
secret.txtthat is outside the project directory
Mitigations
Vitest now ships two configuration flags, allowWrite and allowExec, that gate the privileged operations exploited by this vulnerability. Both are disabled by default whenever the API server is bound to a non-localhost host, ensuring that exposing the server to the network no longer implicitly grants write or execute capabilities to remote clients.
When these flags are disabled, the UI also enters a read-only mode: in-browser code editing and test file execution are turned off, removing the attack surface that allowed remote code execution. Many Browser Mode features are also disabled, like attachments, artifacts or snapshots. See browser.api.
Users who require the full interactive UI on a networked host must explicitly opt in by setting allowWrite and/or allowExec to true.
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary file read and remote code execution in Vitest versions prior to 4.1.0 allow remote unauthenticated attackers to read files outside the project directory on Windows and execute arbitrary scripts when the Vitest UI or Browser Mode API server is exposed to the network via the --api.host flag or api.host configuration option. The flaw stems from incorrect use of the deprecated isFileServingAllowed check, which can be bypassed using Windows-specific path syntax (\\?\\..\\), and is compounded by API features (saveTestFile + rerun, readFile/writeFile/saveSnapshotFile) that effectively grant script execution to anyone who can reach the API. Publicly available exploit code exists in the GHSA advisory PoC; no public exploit beyond that is identified at time of analysis.
Technical ContextAI
Vitest is a JavaScript/TypeScript test runner (pkg:npm/vitest) widely used in Node.js projects, shipping an optional UI server and Browser Mode for interactive test execution. The root cause is CWE-862 (Missing Authorization): the /__vitest_attachment__ handler in packages/ui/node/index.ts and similar handlers in packages/vitest/src/api/setup.ts and packages/browser/src/node/{commands/fs.ts,plugin.ts,rpc.ts} call Vite's deprecated isFileServingAllowed without first normalizing the input via cleanUrl. On Windows, the NT object namespace prefix \\?\\ behaves as a directory traversal escape because the filesystem tolerates the literal ? segment, whereas Linux rejects the non-existent ? directory. Beyond the file-read bypass, the API surface itself (saveTestFile + rerun on the UI side, and readFile/writeFile/saveSnapshotFile in Browser Mode) was implicitly trusted as localhost-only, meaning network exposure converted the test harness into a remote code execution endpoint.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade vitest to 4.1.0 or later, which introduces the new api.allowWrite and api.allowExec configuration flags (both default to false when the API server binds to a non-localhost host) and puts the UI into read-only mode disabling in-browser code editing, test execution, attachments, artifacts, and snapshots when those flags are off; see https://github.com/vitest-dev/vitest/security/advisories/GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp and the api.allowWrite / api.allowExec / browser.api documentation at vitest.dev/config/api.html. If upgrading is not immediately feasible, the strongest compensating control is to stop binding the Vitest UI or Browser Mode to any non-localhost interface - remove --api.host from invocations and unset api.host in config so the server stays on 127.0.0.1, accepting that remote/team access to the UI is lost. As a network-layer mitigation, restrict access to the Vitest UI port (default 51204) with host firewall rules or only expose it over an authenticated reverse proxy or SSH tunnel; do not rely on the API token alone since it is readable from the unauthenticated /__vitest__/ endpoint. Operators who genuinely need full interactive UI on a networked host after upgrading must explicitly opt back in by setting allowWrite and/or allowExec to true and should understand this restores the original RCE-equivalent exposure.
Same weakness CWE-862 – Missing Authorization
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Important| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP7 | Affected |
| SUSE Manager Client Tools 15 | Affected |
| SUSE Manager Client Tools for SLE 15 | Affected |
| SUSE Multi-Linux Manager Client Tools for SLE 15 | Affected |
| SUSE Manager Proxy LTS 4.3 | Affected |
| SUSE Manager Proxy Module 4.3 | Affected |
| SUSE Enterprise Storage 6 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| SUSE Manager Proxy Module 4.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Manager Proxy Module 4.2 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.3 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.4 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
| SUSE Multi Linux Manager Tools SLE-15 | Affected |
| ses/7.1/ceph/prometheus-server ses/7/ceph/prometheus-server suse/multi-linux-manager/5.2/x86_64/monitoring-prometheus | Affected |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-44391
GHSA-5xrq-8626-4rwp