CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:H/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionNVD
AgentClient#handle_method (lines 264-303) processes every NATS reply. It calls inject_compile_log (line 273) on every response, which reads response['value']['result']['compile_log_id'] (line 332-338) and passes it to download_and_delete_blob. Separately, any response containing 'exception' goes through format_exception (lines 308-325), which reads exception['blobstore_id'] and also calls download_and_delete_blob. That helper (lines 344-349) calls ResourceManager#get_resource(blob_id) and, in an ensure block, ResourceManager#delete_resource(blob_id). ResourceManager (resource_manager.rb:62-70) calls blobstore.delete(id) on the single shared Director blobstore with no UUID-format check, no ownership check, and no namespace prefix.
Affected versions: BOSH Director: All versions prior to v282.1.12
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary blobstore deletion in BOSH Director allows a compromised, high-privileged BOSH-managed VM to delete any object from the shared Director blobstore by injecting crafted NATS reply messages. All BOSH Director versions prior to v282.1.12 are affected, with the root cause being a complete absence of UUID-format validation, ownership checks, and namespace prefixing in ResourceManager before executing blobstore.delete(). …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-32108
GHSA-mhvf-vxjh-cwwp