EUVD-2026-21000CVSS Vector
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N/E:U/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
3Description
web3.py allows you to interact with the Ethereum blockchain using Python. From 6.0.0b3 to before 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2, web3.py implements CCIP Read / OffchainLookup (EIP-3668) by performing HTTP requests to URLs supplied by smart contracts in offchain_lookup_payload["urls"]. The implementation uses these contract-supplied URLs directly (after {sender} / {data} template substitution) without any destination validation. CCIP Read is enabled by default (global_ccip_read_enabled = True on all providers), meaning any application using web3.py's .call() method is exposed without explicit opt-in. This results in Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) when web3.py is used in backend services, indexers, APIs, or any environment that performs eth_call / .call() against untrusted or user-supplied contract addresses. A malicious contract can force the web3.py process to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations, including internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. This vulnerability is fixed in 7.15.0 and 8.0.0b2.
Analysis
Server-Side Request Forgery in web3.py 6.0.0b3 through 7.14.x and 8.0.0b1 enables malicious smart contracts to force the library to issue HTTP requests to arbitrary destinations via CCIP Read (EIP-3668) URL templates without destination validation. The vulnerability affects all applications using web3.py's .call() method against untrusted contract addresses, as CCIP Read is enabled by default, allowing attackers to target internal network services and cloud metadata endpoints. …
Sign in for full analysis, threat intelligence, and remediation guidance.
Priority Score
Share
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today