CVE-2026-34969

Description

# Refresh Token Leaked via URL Query Parameter in OAuth Provider Callback ## Summary The auth service's OAuth provider callback flow places the refresh token directly into the redirect URL as a query parameter. Refresh tokens in URLs are logged in browser history, server access logs, HTTP Referer headers, and proxy/CDN logs. Note that the refresh token is one-time use and all of these leak vectors are on owned infrastructure or services integrated by the application developer. ## Affected Component - **Repository**: `github.com/nhost/nhost` - **Service**: `services/auth` - **File**: `services/auth/go/controller/sign_in_provider_callback_get.go` - **Function**: `signinProviderProviderCallback` (lines 257-261) ## Root Cause In `sign_in_provider_callback_get.go:257-261`, after successful OAuth sign-in, the refresh token is appended as a URL query parameter: ```go if session != nil { values := redirectTo.Query() values.Add("refreshToken", session.RefreshToken) redirectTo.RawQuery = values.Encode() } ``` This results in a redirect like: ``` HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://myapp.com/callback?refreshToken=a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890 ``` ## Proof of Concept ### Step 1: Initiate OAuth login ``` GET /signin/provider/github?redirectTo=https://myapp.com/callback ``` ### Step 2: Complete OAuth flow with provider ### Step 3: Auth service redirects with token in URL ``` HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: https://myapp.com/callback?refreshToken=a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890 ``` ### Step 4: Token is now visible in owned infrastructure and services: **Browser History:** ``` # User's browser history now contains the refresh token ``` **HTTP Referer Header:** ``` # If the callback page loads ANY external resource (image, script, etc.): GET /resource.js HTTP/1.1 Host: cdn.example.com Referer: https://myapp.com/callback?refreshToken=a1b2c3d4-e5f6-... # Note: modern browsers default to strict-origin-when-cross-origin policy, # which strips query parameters from cross-origin Referer headers. # Additionally, the Referer is only sent to services integrated by the # application developer (analytics, CDNs, etc.), not arbitrary third parties. ``` **Server Access Logs:** ``` # Reverse proxy, CDN, or load balancer logs on owned infrastructure: 2026-03-08 12:00:00 GET /callback?refreshToken=a1b2c3d4-e5f6-... 200 ``` ### Step 5: Attacker uses stolen refresh token ```bash # Exchange stolen refresh token for new access token curl -X POST https://auth.nhost.run/v1/token \ -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \ -d '{"refreshToken": "a1b2c3d4-e5f6-7890-abcd-ef1234567890"}' # Note: refresh tokens are one-time use, so this only works if the # legitimate client has not already consumed the token and if the attacker has # compromised your infrastructure to get access to this information ``` ## Impact 1. **Session Hijacking**: Anyone who obtains the token before it is consumed by the legitimate client can generate new access tokens, though the refresh token is one-time use and cannot be reused after consumption. 2. **Leak Vectors**: URL query parameters are visible in owned infrastructure and integrated services: - Browser history (local access) - HTTP Referer headers (mitigated by modern browser default referrer policies; only sent to developer-integrated services) - Server access logs (owned infrastructure) - Proxy/CDN/WAF logs (owned infrastructure) 3. **Affects All OAuth Providers**: Every OAuth provider flow (GitHub, Google, Apple, etc.) goes through the same callback handler. ## Fix Implemented PKCE (Proof Key for Code Exchange) for the OAuth flow. With PKCE, the authorization code cannot be exchanged without the `code_verifier` that only the original client possesses, preventing token misuse even if the URL is logged. See: https://docs.nhost.io/products/auth/pkce/ ## Resources - OWASP: Session Management - Token Transport: "Session tokens should not be transported in the URL" - RFC 6749 Section 10.3: "Access tokens and refresh tokens MUST NOT be included in the redirect URI" - CWE-598: Use of GET Request Method With Sensitive Query Strings - CWE-200: Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor

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