Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L
Local-only ACL abuse (AV:L) exploitable by any local account including Everyone (PR:N), low complexity; high integrity impact from tampering with shared trusted files, limited confidentiality/availability.
Primary rating from Vendor (0beee27a-7d8c-424f-8e46-ac453fa147e6).
CVSS VectorVendor: 0beee27a-7d8c-424f-8e46-ac453fa147e6
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
In BRAIN2 versions prior to 3.09, the application LogPathConfig.exe is executed during setup. As a result, the Windows group Everyone is granted full control over %ProgramData% instead of being restricted to %ProgramData%\Bizerba\BRAIN2\.
Starting with BRAIN2 3.09, the setup no longer executes this tool.
However, the optional component Bizerba ScriptService still executes it.
Bizerba ScriptService is being deprecated and will no longer be included starting with BRAIN2 version 3.11.
AnalysisAI
Local privilege escalation in Bizerba BRAIN2 before version 3.09 stems from the setup routine invoking LogPathConfig.exe, which misapplies an overly broad ACL granting the Windows 'Everyone' group full control over the entire %ProgramData% directory rather than the intended %ProgramData%\Bizerba\BRAIN2\ subtree. Any local user can therefore read, modify, or plant files that other applications and services trust, enabling tampering and potential escalation. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not listed in CISA KEV; the flaw is fixed in 3.09, though the optional, soon-to-be-deprecated Bizerba ScriptService component reintroduces the misconfiguration.
Technical ContextAI
BRAIN2 is Bizerba's Windows-based management software for retail weighing, labeling and scale devices. The root cause is CWE-276 (Incorrect Default Permissions): a helper utility, LogPathConfig.exe, is intended to configure logging paths and set permissions on the application's own ProgramData subfolder (%ProgramData%\Bizerba\BRAIN2\), but instead applies a full-control grant for the built-in 'Everyone' security principal at the %ProgramData% root. %ProgramData% (the CSIDL_COMMON_APPDATA location) is a shared, machine-wide directory used by many applications and services to store configuration, state, and executable content that privileged processes read at startup; loosening its ACL breaks a foundational Windows trust boundary. The problem is not a code-execution bug in BRAIN2 itself but an insecure filesystem ACL left behind by the installer/tooling.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to BRAIN2 3.09 or later, where the setup no longer executes LogPathConfig.exe. Because the optional Bizerba ScriptService component still runs the vulnerable tool even on 3.09, uninstall or disable Bizerba ScriptService where it is not required, and plan to move to BRAIN2 3.11 or later where ScriptService is removed entirely. As an immediate compensating control on already-affected hosts, manually correct the ACL on %ProgramData%: remove the 'Everyone' full-control entry at the %ProgramData% root and restrict the grant to %ProgramData%\Bizerba\BRAIN2\ only (e.g., via icacls), inheriting the default restrictive permissions on the parent - verify afterward that BRAIN2 logging still functions, as over-tightening the Bizerba subfolder could break log writes. Consult the vendor advisory Bizerba SA-2026-0003 (https://www.bizerba.com/downloads/global/information-security/2026/bizerba-sa-2026-0003.pdf) for authoritative guidance and confirm the exact fixed build.
Same weakness CWE-276 – Incorrect Default Permissions
View allSame technique Privilege Escalation
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-45902
GHSA-r977-vhwm-4c47