Red Hat OpenShift
CVE-2026-15584
HIGH
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Authenticated edit-role tenant (PR:L) execs over the API (AV:N) into pods that must already exist (AC:H); pod-to-node host root crosses the isolation boundary (S:C) with full C/I/A impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorVendor: redhat
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
A privilege escalation vulnerability was found in the incluster-checks tool for OpenShift. The tool creates privileged debug pods with host filesystem access in the shared default namespace, where any user with the standard edit role can exec into them and obtain root access on cluster nodes.
AnalysisAI
Privilege escalation in Red Hat OpenShift's incluster-checks diagnostic tool lets any authenticated user holding the standard 'edit' RBAC role escalate to root on the underlying cluster nodes. The tool provisions privileged debug pods with host-filesystem access inside the shared default namespace, so a low-privileged tenant can simply exec into an existing pod and break out to the host. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and no CISA KEV listing; EPSS data was not provided in the source intelligence.
Technical ContextAI
The affected component is the incluster-checks tooling that runs inside Red Hat OpenShift (an enterprise Kubernetes distribution). The root cause maps to CWE-250 (Execution with Unnecessary Privileges): debug pods are created as privileged containers that mount the node's host filesystem, and they are placed in the default namespace which is broadly accessible to ordinary tenants. In Kubernetes RBAC, the built-in 'edit' role grants create/exec permissions on pods within a namespace, so any such user can kubectl exec into these privileged pods. Because the pod already holds host mounts and privileged capabilities, code run inside it operates against the node's real filesystem, collapsing the container/namespace isolation boundary and yielding node root.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch version is identified in the available data - track the Red Hat advisory at https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-15584 and Bugzilla 2499647 (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2499647) for the fixed build and apply it once published. As immediate compensating controls: stop running incluster-checks so that privileged host-mounting debug pods are not left in the default namespace, and delete any existing debug pods it created (trade-off: loss of that diagnostic capability). Restrict or revoke the 'edit' RBAC role in the default namespace and avoid using the default namespace for tenant workloads (trade-off: may break users relying on broad default-namespace access). Enforce Pod Security Admission at 'restricted' or 'baseline' to block privileged/hostPath pods, and add admission policies (OPA/Gatekeeper or Kyverno) to deny privileged containers and host mounts outside tightly controlled namespaces (trade-off: legitimate privileged tooling must be explicitly allowlisted).
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Same weakness CWE-250 – Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
View allSame technique Privilege Escalation
View allVendor StatusVendor
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External POC / Exploit Code
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