Eclipse CSI PIA CVE-2026-14336

Exploitation requires network reachability to PIA's unauthenticated POST /v1/upload/sbom endpoint and that PIA use the vulnerable Jenkins OIDC issuer allowlist (the is_issuer_known prefix check in pia/models.py:139), which is the shipped/default logic. The attacker must supply a token whose issuer string begins with https://ci.eclipse.org but resolves to a host they control, using either the userinfo trick (https://ci.eclipse.org@evil.host) or the suffix trick (https://ci.eclipse.org.evil.host), and must stand up an attacker-controlled OIDC discovery/JWKS endpoint plus a JWT signed with their own key. Per CVSS PR:N/UI:N there is no authentication or user-interaction requirement; the practical limiting factors are reaching the endpoint (network placement) and the deployment actually running the SSRF-vulnerable issuer validation.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N, score 8.2) is internally consistent with the description: the vulnerable endpoint POST /v1/upload/sbom is explicitly unauthenticated (PR:N), network-reachable (AV:N), needs no user interaction (UI:N), and the exploitation technique is a simple string trick (AC:L). Integrity is rated High because accepting an attacker-signed JWT breaks the trust/authentication boundary, while Confidentiality is Low (SSRF can expose responses/metadata from reachable internal services) and Availability is None. There is no EPSS score, no KEV listing, and no POC referenced in the provided data, so exploitation is not confirmed in the wild - the risk is driven by ease of exploitation rather than observed activity. The main mitigating factor for real-world priority is deployment scale: this is niche Eclipse Foundation tooling, not broadly deployed enterprise software, so despite the high base score the aggregate real-world exposure is limited to organizations running PIA. No conflicting signals were identified in the input; the primary unknown is patch availability, which the provided references do not establish.

An unauthenticated attacker sends a crafted SBOM upload to POST /v1/upload/sbom with a token whose issuer is https://ci.eclipse.org@attacker.example or https://ci.eclipse.org.attacker.example, which passes PIA's prefix allowlist. PIA then fetches OIDC discovery and JWKS documents from the attacker's server and accepts a JWT the attacker signed with their own key, granting forged token acceptance and forcing outbound SSRF requests. Given AV:N/AC:L/PR:N, this requires only network reachability to the endpoint and no credentials; no public POC is currently referenced.