GNOME Nautilus CVE-2026-111802

Exploitation requires: (1) a local authenticated desktop session running Nautilus, (2) the attacker delivering a crafted removable drive or disk image whose trash directory paths are symbolic links, (3) the victim mounting that attacker-controlled volume, and (4) the victim actively confirming Nautilus's 'empty the trash' prompt shown on unmount/eject. Limiting factors that reduce realistic risk: the attack is local only (no remote exploitation), depends on social engineering to get the malicious volume mounted, and cannot proceed without explicit user confirmation of the prompt. Impact is bounded to files the victim user can delete.

This is a genuine but moderate-priority issue, not a top-tier emergency. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H, base 6.6) accurately captures a locally-exploitable, user-interaction-dependent flaw: an authenticated local user (PR:L) must be socially engineered into mounting an attacker-crafted removable drive or disk image and then confirming an 'empty trash' prompt (UI:R). There is no confidentiality impact (C:N) - this is a CWE-59 symlink-following flaw that enables arbitrary deletion of files accessible to the victim user, hence I:H and A:H. Critically, no EPSS score, no KEV listing, and no public exploit (POC) are present in the provided data, so there is no evidence of active or automated exploitation. The combination of local vector plus required physical/social delivery of a malicious volume and an explicit user confirmation makes real-world mass exploitation unlikely; realistic risk is limited to targeted scenarios. No key signals conflict with the description, but note the input 'Information Disclosure' tag contradicts the CVSS vector's C:N - this is a data-integrity/availability (deletion) bug, not disclosure.

An attacker prepares a USB drive or disk image whose trash directory paths are symbolic links pointing at the victim's own files, then persuades the victim to mount it (e.g., a 'shared' USB stick or downloaded ISO). When the victim unmounts or ejects it, Nautilus offers to empty the trash; if the user confirms, Nautilus follows the planted symlinks and deletes the linked files the user can access. No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis, and exploitation hinges on both local access and user interaction.