Azure VM Inspector CVE-2026-110063

Exploitation requires the attacker to influence a link (symbolic link or junction) that the VM Inspector for Azure Virtual Machines component resolves before accessing a file, per CWE-59; the specific product feature, protocol, or configuration that exposes this link-resolution path is not described in the available sources. Per the vendor CVSS vector (PR:N/UI:N/AV:N) no authentication or user interaction is required and the attack is reachable over a network, with a scope change (S:C) indicating impact beyond the initially vulnerable component. A limiting factor to note for defenders: CWE-59 link-following conditions normally depend on the attacker being able to place or control a link on a filesystem the service accesses, which the AV:N/PR:N vector does not reconcile in the supplied data - verify reachability assumptions with Microsoft.

Signals are strongly aligned toward high priority. The vendor-assigned CVSS 3.1 base vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) rates this 10.0 - network-reachable, no privileges, no user interaction, with a scope change and total confidentiality/integrity/availability impact - and the vuln.today decision label is act_now with an official fix available (RL:O) and confirmed report confidence (RC:C). However, the temporal metrics temper the urgency somewhat: E:U means exploit code is Unproven, and no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no PoC reference are present in the input, so this is not confirmed as actively exploited. The result is a maximal theoretical severity (perfect base score for a scope-changing, unauthenticated network EoP in an Azure service) paired with no evidence of real-world exploitation yet - consistent with a freshly disclosed, vendor-reported (Microsoft) flaw that warrants prompt patching but is not yet weaponized. One tension to verify: CWE-59 ('link following') typically involves local filesystem symlink/junction manipulation, yet the vector marks AV:N/PR:N ('unauthorized attacker... over a network'); the available sources do not describe the trigger, so how a network-positioned, unauthenticated attacker reaches the link-resolution path in this Azure service is unexplained and should be confirmed with Microsoft.

An unauthorized attacker interacts with the network-exposed VM Inspector component for Azure Virtual Machines and causes it to resolve an attacker-influenced link (symlink/junction) during a file-access operation, redirecting that access to a privileged target and elevating privileges across a security boundary (scope change). No public exploit code is identified at time of analysis (CVSS temporal E:U, Unproven), and the exact trigger is not described in the available sources.