ImageMagick CVE-2026-109275

Exploitation requires that ImageMagick be built and invoked with a PostScript renderer (a Ghostscript delegate) and that the processed MVG actually reaches the RenderPostscript text-rendering path - the vulnerable code builds a PostScript stream from a draw_info->font value, so a crafted MVG must set a malicious font name containing PostScript-control characters. This precondition is reflected by AT:P in the vector. Limiting factors: if ImageMagick renders text via FreeType instead of the PostScript delegate, or if no Ghostscript delegate is configured, the path is not reached; no authentication (PR:N) or user interaction (UI:N) is required otherwise, and the patch's alphanumeric-plus-'-_.' font-name whitelist is what closes the injection.

This is a medium-severity issue (vendor CVSS 4.0 base 6.3) that should be treated as a moderate, conditional priority rather than an emergency. The positive signals are AV:N (network reachable) and PR:N/UI:N (no authentication or user interaction needed), which fit the common pattern of ImageMagick processing attacker-supplied images in web upload pipelines. However, several factors pull real-world risk down: the 4.0 vector carries AT:P (a specific attack requirement must be present - here, that a PostScript renderer/Ghostscript delegate is actually used for rendering), and impact is explicitly limited to VI:L and VA:L with VC:N (no confidentiality impact and only low integrity/availability impact), not full RCE. There is no EPSS score provided, the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV, and no public proof-of-concept is referenced, so exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' Note a signal tension worth verifying: the description frames this as 'code injection into the PostScript rendering path,' which colloquially suggests command execution, yet the vendor scored only low integrity/availability and no confidentiality - likely because modern Ghostscript sandboxing (-dSAFER) and the alphanumeric font-name whitelist in the patch constrain the achievable impact. Treat the low impact scores as vendor-assessed, and verify achievable impact against your specific Ghostscript/delegate configuration before downgrading.

An attacker uploads a crafted MVG file to a web application or service that uses ImageMagick with a PostScript renderer (Ghostscript delegate) to rasterize or convert images. When ImageMagick decodes the MVG and renders text, a malicious font name is injected unsanitized into the generated PostScript stream, allowing the attacker to influence the PostScript rendering path. No public exploit code is referenced in the provided data, and exploitation only succeeds when the PostScript rendering path is actually invoked.