JeecgBoot CVE-2026-108615

Exploitation requires a valid authenticated session on the JeecgBoot application at any privilege level (CVSS PR:L) - unauthenticated anonymous users cannot reach the flaw. The specific prerequisite is access to the AI-RAG / AiragExtData feature: the attacker sends a DELETE request to the /airag/extData/delete endpoint with any id value, and the AiragExtDataController delete handler performs no owner or tenant ownership check before deleting. The limiting factors are: valid low-privileged credentials are mandatory, and impact is confined to deletion of AI evaluator and test-tracking records (no confidentiality exposure, no code execution). In multi-tenant deployments the missing tenant check is the key risk amplifier, allowing cross-tenant record deletion.

This is a genuine but moderate-severity access-control flaw, not a high-urgency emergency. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) confirms the attack is remote, low-complexity, and needs no user interaction, but critically requires PR:L - the attacker must already hold a valid low-privileged authenticated account, which meaningfully narrows the exploitation population to insiders or attackers who have obtained/registered credentials. Impact is limited to integrity and availability of AI evaluator / test-tracking records (VC:N, VI:L, VA:L); there is no confidentiality loss and no code execution, consistent with the CWE-862 Missing Authorization classification. Exploitation status: publicly available exploit code exists (a POC script is referenced), reported by VulnCheck, but there is NO CISA KEV listing and NO EPSS score was provided in the input, so there is no evidence of active real-world exploitation - POC availability and active exploitation are distinct signals and should not be conflated. No conflicting signals were found between the CVSS vector and the description: both agree on network-reachable, authenticated, low-impact data deletion. Overall this warrants routine patching prioritization for JeecgBoot operators (especially multi-tenant deployments where cross-tenant record deletion breaks the tenancy model), rather than out-of-band emergency response.

A low-privileged but authenticated JeecgBoot user (or an attacker who has registered/obtained such an account) discovers or enumerates record IDs belonging to other users or tenants. Because a public POC (poc_airag_extdata_delete.py) exists, they simply issue DELETE requests to /airag/extData/delete supplying arbitrary id values, deleting other users' AI evaluator and test-tracking records with no owner or tenant ownership check. The attack is network-based and low-complexity, requiring only a valid session and no victim interaction.