How to fix or mitigate CVE-2025-71380?

24 hours: Inventory all n8n deployments and audit user access; disable Execute Command node capability or restrict it exclusively to named trusted operators with documented justification. 7 days: Revoke excessive workflow-editing permissions; enable centralized logging and monitoring for unexpected command execution from n8n hosts. 30 days: Subscribe to n8n security advisories; evaluate workflow redesign to replace command execution patterns with API-based or connector-driven alternatives.

n8n CVE-2025-71380

Q: What is the CVSS score of CVE-2025-71380?

CVE-2025-71380 has a CVSS 4.0 base score of 8.7 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.4%.

EUVD-2025-210426 HIGH

Improper Access Control (CWE-284)

2026-07-04 VulnCheck

GHSA-38pj-jv2x-mgcw

Authentication Bypass N8n

8.7

CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: VulnCheck

Severity by source

Vendor (VulnCheck) PRIMARY

8.7 HIGH

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

vuln.today AI

8.8 HIGH

Network-reachable web UI (AV:N), trivial abuse of a documented node (AC:L), requires an authenticated editing user (PR:L), no scope change to other systems (S:U), full host CIA impact.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).

CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck

CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Jul 04, 2026 - 02:26 vuln.today

Blast Radius

ecosystem impact

† from your stack dependencies † transitive graph · vuln.today resolves 4-path depth

2 npm packages depend on n8n-nodes-base (2 direct, 0 indirect)

Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 1.113.0.

DescriptionCVE.org

The Execute Command node in n8n allows authenticated users to execute arbitrary commands on the host system where n8n runs. Attackers with user access or compromised credentials can exploit this node to run malicious commands, potentially leading to data exfiltration, service disruption, or complete system compromise.

AnalysisAI

Arbitrary command execution in the n8n workflow automation platform lets authenticated users abuse the built-in Execute Command node to run OS commands directly on the host running n8n. Any user with workflow-editing access or stolen credentials can leverage this by-design node to exfiltrate data, disrupt the service, or fully compromise the underlying host, and CWE-284 (Improper Access Control) reflects that command execution is not restricted to trusted operators. Reported by VulnCheck; no public exploit identified at time of analysis and the flaw is not listed in CISA KEV.

Technical ContextAI

n8n is a source-available workflow-automation/orchestration tool (fair-code licensed) commonly self-hosted to connect APIs and services. The Execute Command node is a native node that shells out to the underlying operating system, so any workflow that can include this node inherits the full privileges of the n8n process (frequently a container or service account with broad filesystem and network reach). The root cause is CWE-284 (Improper Access Control): the ability to invoke this powerful node is granted to ordinary authenticated users rather than being gated behind a stricter privilege or disabled by policy, turning intended functionality into a privilege-escalation-to-host primitive. The single CPE, cpe:2.3:a:n8n:n8n:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*, indicates all versions are considered in scope absent an explicit fixed version.

RemediationAI

No vendor-released patch version was identified in the provided data, so review the n8n GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-365g-vjw2-grx8 (https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-365g-vjw2-grx8) and the VulnCheck advisory (https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/n8n-arbitrary-command-execution-via-execute-command-node) for the fixed release and upgrade to it once available. As the primary compensating control, disable the Execute Command node entirely by setting the environment variable NODES_EXCLUDE to include '@n8n/n8n-nodes-base.executeCommand' (side effect: any legitimate workflows relying on shell execution will break and must be re-architected). Additionally, restrict who can create or edit workflows using n8n's RBAC/user-management so only fully trusted operators hold that privilege, enforce strong credential hygiene and MFA to reduce account-takeover risk, and run n8n as an unprivileged user inside a hardened, network-segmented container so that command execution cannot readily reach sensitive data or lateral targets (trade-off: tighter isolation and reduced node availability may limit automation flexibility).