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Allstar Reviewbot CVE-2025-61926

MEDIUM
Insecure Default Variable Initialization (CWE-453)
2025-10-09 security-advisories@github.com
4.6
CVSS 4.0 · Vendor: github
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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain

  1. Access
    Locate exposed Reviewbot webhook endpoint
  2. Exploit
    Forge webhook signed with hard-coded secret
  3. Execution
    Bypass signature verification
  4. Impact
    Trigger unauthorized reviews and manipulate repository checks

Vulnerability Assessment

Weakness
CWE
Exploitation Conditions

Exploitation requires that the operator has enabled and exposed the Allstar Reviewbot component's webhook endpoint so it is network-reachable; in that state the endpoint is vulnerable by default because it validates inbound webhooks against the hard-coded secret 'FooBar' compiled into the binary, which cannot be changed at runtime (only by editing source and rebuilding - an undocumented, easily missed step). No authentication is needed (CVSS PR:N) and the known secret removes any signature barrier. The key limiting factors are: Reviewbot is not enabled in standard Allstar setups (rare, non-default deployment), the endpoint must be externally reachable, and impact is confined to repository-workflow integrity (triggering reviews/comments/checks) with no confidentiality or availability impact; deployments on v4.5+ or without Reviewbot exposed are not affected.

Impact

This is a genuine but low-to-moderate priority issue whose real-world risk is heavily gated by deployment conditions. The vendor CVSS 4.0 base score is 4.6 (medium), driven by AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N (network-reachable, trivially exploitable, unauthenticated) but tempered by AT:P (an attack requirement - the Reviewbot endpoint must actually be deployed and exposed) and an impact profile of VI:H with VC:N/VA:N (integrity-only, no confidentiality or availability loss). EPSS is low at 0.40% (32nd percentile), there is no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit (POC) was identified - all signals point away from widespread active exploitation. However, these signals are consistent rather than conflicting: the secret value ('FooBar') is visible in the open-source repository, so while no packaged exploit exists, the exploitation material is effectively public, which the low EPSS does not fully capture. The limiting factor dominates the assessment: the advisory states Reviewbot 'is not commonly enabled in standard Allstar setups,' so the population of exploitable deployments is small. Net: a real authentication-bypass flaw that is trivial to exploit where present, but a low aggregate priority because the affected component is rarely deployed and impact is confined to repository-workflow integrity. One data discrepancy to note: the input tag 'Information Disclosure' contradicts the CVSS vector (VC:N) and the vendor advisory, which explicitly scope the impact to integrity, not confidentiality.

Exploit ScenarioDerived

An attacker locates an internet-reachable Allstar Reviewbot webhook endpoint and crafts webhook requests signed with the hard-coded shared secret compiled into the binary (visible in the open-source repo as 'FooBar'). Because signature verification succeeds, Reviewbot accepts the forged requests as authentic and triggers review automations - posting comments or reviews, influencing required checks, or otherwise manipulating repository signals. No public exploit was identified at time of analysis, but the secret's presence in source code makes exploitation straightforward and requires no authentication.

This Month Plan within 30 days. Why: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9).
Patch available 0.4% exploitation probability (EPSS)

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AnalysisAIv1 – Oct 08, 2026

Webhook authentication bypass in the Allstar Reviewbot component (Allstar releases prior to v4.5) lets an unauthenticated remote attacker forge inbound GitHub webhook requests, because the component validates signatures against a hard-coded, shared secret ('FooBar') compiled into the binary rather than a configurable value. Attackers who can reach the Reviewbot endpoint can trigger review actions, post automated comments/reviews, and otherwise manipulate repository workflow signals - integrity is impacted (CVSS 3.1 I:H) with no confidentiality or availability effect. Impact is gated by deployment: Reviewbot is not enabled in standard Allstar setups and the endpoint must be network-reachable; deployments on v4.5+ or without Reviewbot exposed are unaffected. No public exploit code and no CISA KEV entry were identified at time of analysis, and EPSS is low at 0.40% (32nd percentile), consistent with the narrow, non-default deployment precondition.

RemediationAI

Upgrade Allstar to v4.5 or later, which no longer compiles a shared default secret into the Reviewbot binary and correctly honors operator-supplied secrets; the fix is available at commit e004ecb540d63ca6f5b1689b41af6c0040a82c73 (PR #713) and documented in advisory GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr (https://github.com/ossf/allstar/security/advisories/GHSA-33f4-mjch-7fpr). If upgrading immediately is not possible, the single most effective action is to not expose the Reviewbot endpoint: leave the component disabled (it is off by default) or remove any public ingress/DNS/load-balancer route to its webhook port so only the GitHub webhook source is able to reach it - restricting inbound traffic to GitHub's published hook IP ranges or placing the endpoint behind an authenticated reverse proxy mitigates the bypass, at the cost of added operational complexity and possible dropped legitimate deliveries if GitHub adds ranges. Any operator who ran a pre-v4.5 Reviewbot deployment on the network should treat the shared secret as compromised and, after upgrading, rotate the GitHub App's webhook secret and private key so previously forged-request windows cannot be replayed; note that rotating credentials alone does not fix the pre-4.5 binary and must be paired with the upgrade to v4.5+. Auditing repository history, bot comments, and workflow logs for unexpected Reviewbot activity is advisable to detect any integrity manipulation that occurred while the endpoint was exposed.

Affected Packages

go github.com/ossf/allstar fix: 0.0.0-20250721181116-e004ecb540d6

Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)

Affects your stack

Affects 1 package in go

Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.

Technical ContextAI · show details

Allstar is an OpenSSF GitHub App that sets and enforces security policies on repositories. Its Reviewbot subcomponent runs as a Go service that receives GitHub webhook HTTP callbacks and verifies their HMAC signatures before acting on them. The root cause is CWE-453 (Insecure Default Variable Initialization): the signing secret was initialized to a constant, defaultSecretToken = "FooBar", in cmd/reviewbot/main.go, declared as a const and therefore embedded in the compiled binary. Although a SECRET_TOKEN environment variable and a --secret-token flag existed, the flag handler compared the provided value against the default and only applied it when different, and the environment-variable path could be silently overridden by the default-config step; more importantly the constant was never intended to be shipped as a working secret. The result was that every deployment of the Reviewbot code path used the same predictable secret unless an operator edited the source and rebuilt - a step that is undocumented and easy to miss. Because the secret is public knowledge and the endpoint performs no other authentication, signature verification provides no actual barrier. The upstream fix (PR #713, commit e004ecb540d63ca6f5b1689b41af6c0040a82c73) removes the hard-coded default handling from the Reviewbot entrypoint and configuration parsing. The vulnerable code lives in the Go module go/github.com/ossf/allstar prior to pseudo-version 0.0.0-20250721181116-e004ecb540d6.

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Severity by source

Vendor (github) PRIMARY 4.6 MEDIUM
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:U
vuln.today AI 5.9 MEDIUM

Unauthenticated and network-reachable (PR:N/AV:N) using a publicly known secret, but AC:H reflects the required non-default condition that Reviewbot be deployed and exposed; impact is integrity-only (I:H, C:N/A:N).

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (github).

CVSS VectorVendor: github

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Attack Requirements
Present
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Vulnerable system: Confidentiality
None
Vulnerable system: Integrity
High
Vulnerable system: Availability
None
Subsequent system: Confidentiality
None
Subsequent system: Integrity
None
Subsequent system: Availability
None

DescriptionCVE.org

Allstar is a GitHub App to set and enforce security policies. In versions prior to 4.5, a vulnerability in Allstar’s Reviewbot component caused inbound webhook requests to be validated against a hard-coded, shared secret. The value used for the secret token was compiled into the Allstar binary and could not be configured at runtime. In practice, this meant that every deployment using Reviewbot would validate requests with the same secret unless the operator modified source code and rebuilt the component - an expectation that is not documented and is easy to miss. All Allstar releases prior to v4.5 that include the Reviewbot code path are affected. Deployments on v4.5 and later are not affected. Those who have not enabled or exposed the Reviewbot endpoint are not exposed to this issue.

Threat Intelligence Overview

EPSS Score
0.4%
Top 68% exploitable
Prevalence
Rare
niche OSSF security tool; Reviewbot component rarely enabled per vendor
Data Quality
4 sources
Confidence: Medium

How this decision was reached

The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.

SignalValue
Severity MEDIUM
CISA KEV No
Public POC No
EPSS 0.4%
Patch available Yes
Active threat No
Deciding rule
MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9)
What every action level means
Emergency Immediate action required. Criteria: CRITICAL + in CISA KEV (actively exploited) without patch, OR CRITICAL + EPSS > 30% without patch, OR CRITICAL + active threat signals without patch.
Act Now Prioritize within 24-48h. Criteria: in KEV with patch available, OR CRITICAL + public POC, OR HIGH + EPSS > 10%, OR CRITICAL + active threat, OR any CRITICAL severity.
This Week Schedule remediation this week. Criteria: HIGH severity (CVSS 7.0-8.9). Patch within normal change window.
This Month Plan within 30 days. Criteria: MEDIUM severity (CVSS 4.0-6.9), lower exploitation probability. Include in regular patch cycle.
Monitor Track and reassess. Criteria: LOW severity (CVSS 0.1-3.9), minimal exploitation risk. No immediate action needed.

SSVC AssessmentENISA

SSVC Decision· derived
Scheduled
Exploitation· derived
None
System Exposure· derived
Open
Automatable· derived
Yes
Human Impact· derived
Medium

Priority Score

23
Low Medium High Critical
KEV: 0
EPSS: 0
CVSS: +23
PoC: 0
Weaponized: 0
Threat intel: 0
Gov advisory: 0

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