Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
The ArchiverSpaApi ASP.NET application uses a hard-coded JWT signing key. An unauthenticated remote attacker can generate and use a verifiable JWT token to access protected ArchiverSpaApi URL endpoints.
AnalysisAI
Critical authentication bypass vulnerability in ArchiverSpaApi ASP.NET applications caused by hard-coded JWT signing keys. An unauthenticated remote attacker can forge valid JWT tokens to bypass authentication and gain unauthorized access to protected API endpoints, potentially leading to data exfiltration, modification, or denial of service. The CVSS 8.1 score reflects high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact, though the attack complexity is rated as high, suggesting some technical prerequisites.
Technical ContextAI
ArchiverSpaApi is an ASP.NET web application that implements JWT (JSON Web Token) authentication for API endpoint protection. The vulnerability stems from CWE-798 (Use of Hard-Coded Credentials), where the application uses a static, non-random JWT signing key embedded in source code or configuration. JWT relies on asymmetric or symmetric cryptographic signing to ensure token authenticity and integrity. When the signing key is hard-coded and discoverable (through reverse engineering, source code exposure, or publicly documented), attackers can use standard JWT libraries to craft tokens with valid signatures that the application will trust. The ASP.NET framework's JWT validation middleware will accept these forged tokens if the signing key matches, completely bypassing role-based access control and authentication checks. CPE context indicates this affects ArchiverSpaApi deployments across ASP.NET platforms (likely CPE:2.3:a:*:archiverspaapi:*:*:*:*:*:asp.net:*:* or similar variants).
RemediationAI
IMMEDIATE: (1) Identify the hard-coded JWT signing key in ArchiverSpaApi source code, configuration files (appsettings.json, web.config), or compiled assemblies via decompilation. (2) Revoke all existing JWT tokens immediately (reduce token TTL or maintain a revocation list). (3) Generate a new, cryptographically random signing key (minimum 256 bits for HMAC-SHA256; 2048+ bits for RSA). (4) Deploy updated ArchiverSpaApi version with configurable JWT signing key sourced from secure credential store (Azure Key Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, HashiCorp Vault). (5) Implement environment-specific key rotation. WORKAROUNDS pending patch: Restrict network access to ArchiverSpaApi via firewall/WAF, implement IP whitelisting, disable JWT endpoints if not actively used, or run behind OAuth 2.0 proxy that validates tokens independently. SHORT-TERM: Monitor for token forgery attempts (abnormal claims, unexpected issuer/audience values). LONG-TERM: Implement JWKS (JSON Web Key Set) endpoints for key distribution and establish key rotation policies. Vendor advisories should be consulted at ArchiverSpaApi publisher's security page (specific URL not provided in source data).
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2025-17816