Projen
CVE-2021-21423
HIGH
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
|
| Impact | CVSS score of 8.1 (HIGH). Attack characteristics: network attack vector, low complexity, low privileges required, no user interaction not required. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | This vulnerability can be exploited remotely over the network. Successful exploitation could compromise the high-severity affected system. |
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Alert meAnalysisAI
projen is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as package.json, tsconfig.json, .gitignore, GitHub Workflows, eslint, jest, and more, from a. Rated high severity (CVSS 8.1), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, low attack complexity.
RemediationAI
A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Apply vendor patches when available. Implement network segmentation and monitoring as interim mitigations.
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in npm, pypi
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
This vulnerability is classified under CWE-527. projen is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as package.json, tsconfig.json, .gitignore, GitHub Workflows, eslint, jest, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen's NodeProject project type (including any project type derived from it) include a .github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the "main" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the "main" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including @projen rebuild on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an issue_comment event, and thus always executes with a GITHUB_TOKEN belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by pull_request events, which always execute with a GITHUB_TOKEN belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically main or master) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed GITHUB_TOKEN would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch. Affected products include: Projen Project Projen.
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Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N
Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorNVD
DescriptionNVD
projen is a project generation tool that synthesizes project configuration files such as package.json, tsconfig.json, .gitignore, GitHub Workflows, eslint, jest, and more, from a well-typed definition written in JavaScript. Users of projen's NodeProject project type (including any project type derived from it) include a .github/workflows/rebuild-bot.yml workflow that may allow any GitHub user to trigger execution of un-trusted code in the context of the "main" repository (as opposed to that of a fork). In some situations, such untrusted code may potentially be able to commit to the "main" repository. The rebuild-bot workflow is triggered by comments including @projen rebuild on pull-request to trigger a re-build of the projen project, and updating the pull request with the updated files. This workflow is triggered by an issue_comment event, and thus always executes with a GITHUB_TOKEN belonging to the repository into which the pull-request is made (this is in contrast with workflows triggered by pull_request events, which always execute with a GITHUB_TOKEN belonging to the repository from which the pull-request is made). Repositories that do not have branch protection configured on their default branch (typically main or master) could possibly allow an untrusted user to gain access to secrets configured on the repository (such as NPM tokens, etc). Branch protection prohibits this escalation, as the managed GITHUB_TOKEN would not be able to modify the contents of a protected branch and affected workflows must be defined on the default branch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
GitHub
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Privilege escalation occurs when an attacker leverages flaws in access control mechanisms to gain permissions beyond what they were originally granted.
Exploit-DB