What is the CVSS score of CVE-2021-21295?

CVE-2021-21295 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 5.9 (Medium). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 18.9%.

Is there a patch available for CVE-2021-21295?

Yes, a patch is available for CVE-2021-21295. Update the affected software to the latest version immediately.

Netty CVE-2021-21295

MEDIUM

HTTP Request/Response Smuggling (CWE-444)

2021-03-09 security-advisories@github.com

Request Smuggling Information Disclosure Netty Oncommand Api Services Oncommand Workflow Automation Debian Linux Quarkus Kudu Zookeeper Communications Cloud Native Core Policy

5.9

CVSS 3.1 · NVD

Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY

5.9 MEDIUM

AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorNVD

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

High

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

None

Integrity

High

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

CVE Published

Mar 09, 2021 - 19:15 nvd

MEDIUM 5.9

DescriptionNVD

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by Http2MultiplexHandler as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (HttpRequest, HttpContent, etc.) via Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: HTTP2MultiplexCodec or Http2FrameCodec is used, Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom ChannelInboundHandler that is put in the ChannelPipeline behind Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec.

AnalysisAI

Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. Rated medium severity (CVSS 5.9), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, no authentication required. This HTTP Request/Response Smuggling vulnerability could allow attackers to manipulate HTTP request interpretation between frontend and backend servers.

Technical ContextAI

This vulnerability is classified as HTTP Request/Response Smuggling (CWE-444), which allows attackers to manipulate HTTP request interpretation between frontend and backend servers. Netty is an open-source, asynchronous event-driven network application framework for rapid development of maintainable high performance protocol servers & clients. In Netty (io.netty:netty-codec-http2) before version 4.1.60.Final there is a vulnerability that enables request smuggling. If a Content-Length header is present in the original HTTP/2 request, the field is not validated by Http2MultiplexHandler as it is propagated up. This is fine as long as the request is not proxied through as HTTP/1.1. If the request comes in as an HTTP/2 stream, gets converted into the HTTP/1.1 domain objects (HttpRequest, HttpContent, etc.) via Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec and then sent up to the child channel's pipeline and proxied through a remote peer as HTTP/1.1 this may result in request smuggling. In a proxy case, users may assume the content-length is validated somehow, which is not the case. If the request is forwarded to a backend channel that is a HTTP/1.1 connection, the Content-Length now has meaning and needs to be checked. An attacker can smuggle requests inside the body as it gets downgraded from HTTP/2 to HTTP/1.1. For an example attack refer to the linked GitHub Advisory. Users are only affected if all of this is true: HTTP2MultiplexCodec or Http2FrameCodec is used, Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec is used to convert to HTTP/1.1 objects, and these HTTP/1.1 objects are forwarded to another remote peer. This has been patched in 4.1.60.Final As a workaround, the user can do the validation by themselves by implementing a custom ChannelInboundHandler that is put in the ChannelPipeline behind Http2StreamFrameToHttpObjectCodec. Affected products include: Netty, Netapp Oncommand Api Services, Netapp Oncommand Workflow Automation, Debian Debian Linux, Quarkus. Version information: version 4.1.60..

RemediationAI

A vendor patch is available. Apply the latest security update as soon as possible. Enforce strict HTTP parsing, normalize requests at proxy layer, use HTTP/2 end-to-end, reject ambiguous headers.