In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Avoid integer underflow with ffs in EOP ring size calc The low 6 bits of cp_hqd_eop_control store the base-2 logarithm of the EOP ring size. This was calculated as ffs(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / sizeof(unsigned int)) - 1 - 1 But ffs can in theory return 1 or 0, so this could underflow (although in practice the ring buffer size cannot be less than 4096). Change this to ffs(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / sizeof(unsigned int) / 4) using properties of logarithms. (cherry picked from commit 4f18c56630383c14bfc6b2d65f88f2f895d2121a)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() advances to the fragment containing @offset with an unbounded loop: while (offset >= walk->past + walk->frags[walk->fragi].len) walk->past += walk->frags[walk->fragi++].len; walk->fragi is advanced and walk->frags[walk->fragi] is dereferenced without ever checking fragi against walk->nr_frags. When the requested offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk's fragments, fragi runs past nr_frags and off the end of the fixed-size on-stack frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory. The two callers behave differently: iptfs_skb_add_frags() already guards against this with if (!walk->nr_frags || offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset) return len; but iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() has no such guard and calls iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() unconditionally, so it performs the out-of-range walk. Its own "fragi < walk->nr_frags" bound check runs only afterwards, too late to prevent the read. This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG) payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives iptfs_reassem_cont() -> iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345 iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:392 iptfs_skb_can_add_frags+0x155/0x310 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:420 iptfs_reassem_cont+0xcf8/0x1140 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:902 iptfs_input_ordered+0x552/0x670 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1280 iptfs_input+0x3d6/0xde0 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1741 xfrm_input+0x282f/0x6140 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:700 xfrm4_esp_rcv+0x93/0x120 net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c:104 ip_rcv+0x278/0x2d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612 Give iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() the same up-front guard that iptfs_skb_add_frags() already has, so the walk is never entered with an out-of-range offset. When it triggers, the caller falls back to the existing linearize-and-copy path, which is safe.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: fix runt reassembly panic from short inner tot_len When the start of an inner packet is split across two outer packets such that fewer than 4 bytes land at the end of the first one, __input_process_payload() saves those bytes as a runt and skips the iplen/iphlen validation performed for in-place packets. When the continuation packet arrives, iptfs_reassem_cont() only requires the declared inner length to be >= sizeof(ra_runt) (6) before allocating the reassembly skb with that attacker-controlled length. However, __iptfs_iphlen() always returns the fixed minimum IP header size (20 for IPv4, 40 for IPv6), so for an inner IPv4 tot_len in [6, 19] the header-completion copy writes past the declared packet length, and the subsequent "ipremain -= copylen" underflows to ~4GB, leaving the payload copy length bounded only by blkoff (up to 64KB). At runtime the skb_put() tailroom check turns this into skb_over_panic(), i.e. an unprivileged kernel panic (DoS), reachable locally via userns+netns IPTFS SAs and remotely against IPTFS VPN gateways when the decrypted outer skb is linear (e.g. AF_PACKET taps, tun/tap delivery). Align the runt path with the normal path by requiring the declared inner length to cover at least the IP header size. This also subsumes the previous >= sizeof(ra_runt) check, since the minimum IP header is always larger than the runt buffer. This issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at Tencent Yunding Lab.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/bnxt_re: check create_singlethread_workqueue() in DCB setup bnxt_re_init_dcb_wq() ignores a failed allocation. The async DCB handler later calls queue_work() on the NULL pointer.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rtrs: guard against null kobj name In the client, if `init_path()` errors, the callee tries to clean up with `rtrs_clt_close_conns()`. However, this can lead to calling the event tracing code with `clt_path->kobj->name` being `NULL` and thus causing a null pointer dereference when trying to copy from it. This just adds a guard to check that the name is not `NULL` before copying from it. The server appears to have a similar pattern.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/erdma: Use IRQ-safe XArray helpers for QP and CQ tables Locked QP and CQ lookups from EQ interrupts can deadlock with create-path XArray updates. If an interrupt arrives while the create path holds the plain xa_lock, the lookup spins forever trying to acquire the same lock. Use IRQ-safe XArray helpers for all QP and CQ create-path updates, including the GSI QP store and error paths. Initialize both arrays with XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ so sleeping allocations preserve interrupt state.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/shrinker: Take a runtime PM ref before shrinking non-system memory __xe_shrinker_walk() walks the SYSTEM and TT LRUs without a runtime PM reference. Shrinking a bo outside system memory invalidates its GPU mappings, which needs the device resumed, so while it is runtime suspended the page table zap trips an assert and the TLB invalidation returns -ENODEV: WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c:770 at xe_bo_move_notify+0x1fc/0x450 [xe] xe_bo_shrink+0x20f/0x2b0 [xe] __xe_shrinker_walk+0x174/0x410 [xe] xe_shrinker_scan+0x10c/0x1e0 [xe] do_shrink_slab+0x176/0x7e0 drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0x9c/0xf0 Take a reference before walking a memory type other than XE_PL_SYSTEM and stop there if it cannot be acquired. Reuse the shrinker's existing acquire path, which resumes the device directly where reclaim allows that and otherwise queues the PM worker for a later scan. Stop the walk once the scan target is met, so a satisfied scan does not wake the device. System memory is still reclaimed while the device is suspended. Gate this on xe_device_is_l2_flush_optimized(), the same condition under which xe_bo_trigger_rebind() issues the invalidation for a non-fault-mode vm, so reclaim is unaffected elsewhere. The System CCS copy already has its own reference in xe_bo_shrink(). Only a non-fault-mode vm can reach this, since a fault-mode vm requires LR mode and that holds a runtime PM reference for the vm's lifetime. Reproduced with igt@xe_madvise@dontneed-before-exec while the GPU is runtime suspended. v2: simplify needs_rpm check. (Matt) retarget Fixes tag since the issue occurs with the non-fault-mode path added by 4e7ebff69aed. v3: handle this in xe_shrinker.c instead of xe_bo.c (Thomas) v4: stop the walk once the scan target is met. (Sashiko) v5: rebase on the freed page accounting fix. (Sashiko) v6: reuse the shrinker acquire path so runtime pm can be resumed directly instead of always queueing a worker. (Thomas) v7: replace xe_pm_runtime_put() with xe_shrinker_runtime_pm_put(). (Thomas) (cherry picked from commit 628f92b28bf4c371c10207daf6fc4caee0c0db2e)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix queuing tx_work after workqueue is drained hci_send_acl(), hci_send_sco() and hci_send_iso() queue hdev->tx_work unconditionally. They can run from the L2CAP/SCO/ISO socket send path while hci_dev_close_sync() is draining hdev->workqueue (HCIDEVDOWN racing with a socket write). Since that queue_work() is not chained work from the tx_work worker itself, __queue_work() sees the queue marked __WQ_DRAINING, warns "cannot queue %ps on wq %s", and drops the work: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5985 at kernel/workqueue.c:2352 __queue_work Call Trace: queue_work_on l2cap_chan_send l2cap_sock_sendmsg ... hci_dev_close_sync() already sets HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE before draining, but only hci_cmd_work() and handle_cmd_cnt_and_timer() check it before queuing. Route the tx_work producers through the same guard via a shared hci_sched_tx() helper.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/i2c: Disable IRQ on unbind Currently, struct xe_i2c is freed before SGUnit IRQ is disabled in unbind path, leaving a potential UAF in case I2C IRQ is hit during this small window. Explicitly disable I2C IRQ in xe_i2c_remove() and fix this. (cherry picked from commit 8ba5c8b8ab3fd362267c11df2cd5a90ee46f6e24)
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() from the dev_fill_forward_path() loop check ipip_fill_forward_path() and ip6_tnl_fill_forward_path() look up the route to the tunnel's remote endpoint and set ctx->dev to its device, which is the tunnel itself when that route resolves back to the tunnel. dev_fill_forward_path() then makes no progress and trips WARN_ON_ONCE(last_dev == ctx->dev) as soon as a flowtable tries to offload a flow through the tunnel. That routing loop is a configuration any CAP_NET_ADMIN user can set up, and ip_tunnel_xmit() and ip6_tnl_xmit() already treat it as a tx error, so remove the warning and just fail the walk, as commit 008e7a7c293b ("net: remove WARN_ON_ONCE when accessing forward path array") did for the path stack overflow.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix null pointer access in is_include_guest_event() A typical module unload occurring event when there is an active perf connection leads to freeing of the pmu pointer. The call log is something like: .. __pmu_detach_event pmu_detach_event pmu_detach_events perf_pmu_unregister .. __pmu_detach_event() sets event->pmu to null. When the perf connection finally is closed, the following stack trace is observed: Oops: general protection fault, kernel NULL pointer dereference ... RIP: 0010:_free_event+0x3e/0x370 ... Call Trace: ... perf_event_release_kernel+0x260/0x2d0 perf_release+0x12/0x20 A call to mediated_pmu_unaccount_event() inside _free_event() is the root cause of this crash. Adding a check inside is_include_guest_event() ensures we don't accidentally access a null pmu ptr. In addition to this, we will now call mediated_pmu_unaccount_event() before clearing the pmu ptr so that nr_include_guest_events counts are maintained correctly.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix handling of NFSEXP_PNFS in the netlink codepath The rework of how block layouts were checked moved the check for NFSEXP_PNFS out of nfsd4_setup_layout_type() and into the callers. That patch didn't account for the new call in nfsd4_setup_layout_type().
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-buf: Fix silent overflow for phys vec to sgt In case MMIO size is bigger than 4G and peer2peer DMA goes through host bridge, we trigger a code path that assigns the total linked IOVA (which is greater than 4G) to mapped_len. Previously, `mapped_len` was declared as 32-bit `unsigned int`. When accumulating `size_t` lengths, this leads to a silent wrap-around. This truncation causes truncated lengths to be passed to functions like `fill_sg_entry()`. Fix this by changing `mapped_len` to `size_t` (64-bit). While at it, fix similar potential overflow issues in `calc_sg_nents` by using `check_add_overflow()` for `nents` and using `unsigned int` for the loop iterator in `fill_sg_entry` to match.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shrinker: fix bogus set_shrinker_bit() with cgroup.memory=nokmem With cgroup.memory=nokmem, shrinker_memcg_alloc() bails out early and never allocates an id, so shrinker->id keeps the 0 it got from the kzalloc() in shrinker_alloc(). __list_lru_init() then copies that 0 into lru->shrinker_id, where it looks like a valid bit index. Nothing calls expand_shrinker_info() on nokmem either, so shrinker_nr_max stays 0 and every memcg ends up with an empty map (map_nr_max == 0). deferred_split_folio() hands a real memcg to __list_lru_add() regardless of whether the lru is memcg aware, so the first THP queued in a cgroup does set_shrinker_bit(memcg, nid, 0) and trips the bounds check: WARNING: mm/shrinker.c:212 at set_shrinker_bit+0x7d/0x90, CPU#126 Call Trace: <TASK> deferred_split_folio+0x18c/0x220 map_anon_folio_pmd_nopf+0xdd/0x130 map_anon_folio_pmd_pf+0x14/0xb0 do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x1a1/0x620 __handle_mm_fault+0xea9/0x10d0 handle_mm_fault+0xe5/0x320 do_user_addr_fault+0x1cc/0x870 exc_page_fault+0x81/0x1b0 asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 </TASK> Harmless, the WARN_ON_ONCE() is what keeps the out of bounds unit[] read from happening, but the id should not look valid in the first place. Clear it before returning. Two other spots could paper over this: drop the id in __list_lru_init() when nokmem turns memcg_aware off, or make deferred_split_folio() pass NULL like list_lru_add_obj() does. Both leave shrinker->id lying around for the next caller, so fix it where the id is handed out.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Fix NULL sched deref in kfunc sub-sched error paths When the root scheduler has sub-scheds attached, the COMPAT kfunc wrappers scx_bpf_select_cpu_and() and scx_bpf_dsq_insert_vtime() refuse the call and report to @p's scheduler: scx_error(scx_task_sched(p), "... must be used"); The wrappers are reachable with tasks that have no scheduler. scx_bpf_select_cpu_and() is in the select_cpu kfunc group, which scx_kfunc_context_filter() opens to BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL programs; scx_bpf_dsq_insert_vtime() is in the enqueue_dispatch group, which ops.enqueue() and ops.dispatch() may call with any KF_RCU task -- the group has no kf_tasks validation, and scx_dsq_insert_preamble() checks task ownership with scx_task_on_sched() precisely because @p may be an arbitrary task. scx_task_sched(p) is p->scx.sched, which is NULL for tasks past sched_ext_dead() -- which clears it via scx_disable_and_exit_task() on exit -- and for idle tasks, which the enable paths skip as they are never scheduled through SCX. It is also an rcu_dereference_protected() that expects @p's pi_lock or rq lock, which neither wrapper holds. Passing NULL to scx_error() reaches scx_vexit(), which dereferences sch->exit_info, oopsing the kernel. One concrete trigger exercised while developing the fix: a BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL program calling the select_cpu_and wrapper on an exited-but-not-reaped task while a sub-scheduler was attached (its pid stays findable while the zombie is unreaped; faulting instruction is the scx_vexit() prologue "mov r15,[rdi+0x398]" with RDI=NULL and 0x398 the offset of sch->exit_info): sched_ext: BPF scheduler "kfunc_subsched_null" enabled sched_ext: BPF sub-scheduler "kfunc_subsched_null" enabled sched_ext: Unassociated program run_select_cpu_ (id 76) BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000398 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 8201 Comm: kfunc_test_runn Tainted: G W RIP: 0010:scx_vexit+0x25/0xa0 Code: ... <4c> 8b bf 98 03 00 00 ... CR2: 0000000000000398 Call Trace: <TASK> __scx_exit+0x4f/0x70 scx_bpf_select_cpu_and+0xab/0xb0 bpf_prog_430ed61a7b66e03a_run_select_cpu_and+0x9c/0xe7 ? __x64_sys_bpf+0x2c/0x40 bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x130/0x2f0 __sys_bpf+0x930/0x10d0 ? __x64_sys_bpf+0x2c/0x40 __x64_sys_bpf+0x2c/0x40 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0x460 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK> Read @p's scheduler under RCU instead, which the wrappers can do from their guard(rcu)(): fault it when it can be determined, and when it can't be determined -- @p is a task past sched_ext_dead() or an idle task -- there is nothing obviously wrong to report, so just refuse the call as before without faulting any scheduler. These COMPAT wrappers are scheduled for eventual removal once the deprecation grace period elapses, but until then -- and regardless of their removal timeline -- they must not oops the kernel on a task they are handed.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Close the pre-enable ops error claim window scx_alloc_and_add_sched() publishes ops->priv before scx_root_enable_workfn() switches the state to SCX_ENABLING. An error claimed via scx_bpf_error_bstr() from an associated BPF program in that window is consumed by scx_disable_workfn(), which takes the pre-enable shortcut in scx_root_disable(). The shortcut returns without any teardown and restores SCX_DISABLED with an unconditional scx_set_enable_state() xchg racing the enable workfn's own transition. The enable then completes with the claim consumed: the scheduler stays up but can never be disabled again, and bpf_scx_unreg() frees it while still in use, resulting in a use-after-free. Both WARN_ON_ONCE()s fire back to back: WARNING: kernel/sched/ext/ext.c:7522 at scx_root_enable_workfn+0xeec/0x1be0, CPU#3: scx_enable_help/276 WARNING: kernel/sched/ext/ext.c:6398 at scx_root_disable+0xb50/0xdb8, CPU#0: sched_ext_helpe/664 scx_root_enable_workfn() switches to SCX_ENABLING before the scheduler allocation, so ops->priv is never visible while SCX_DISABLED. The allocation failure path restores SCX_DISABLED.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: avoid out-of-bounds read for empty PREQ elements ieee80211_mesh_preq_size_ok() derives the location of the PREQ bottom fields before checking whether the element contains even the fixed header. ieee80211_mesh_hwmp_preq_get_bottom() reads the flags byte to account for the optional Address Extension field. Consequently, an empty PREQ element causes a one-byte read beyond its declared payload. Move the helper call after both size checks, so the bottom fields are only accessed when they are present.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Skip KFD mapping clear before initialization amdgpu_amdkfd_clear_kfd_mapping() assumes that a non-NULL kfd_dev has a fully populated node array. This is not true when KFD device initialization fails after probe. For example, kgd2kfd_device_init() sets num_nodes before checking PCIe atomics support. On Polaris systems without the required atomics, it returns before allocating nodes[0], but the kfd_dev remains attached to the amdgpu device. A later GPU reset then dereferences nodes[0]->id. Require the authoritative KFD initialization flag before walking the node array, matching the existing KFD reset and teardown paths. (cherry picked from commit 4ac1835823c47903fbb278bbf474773c46f59edc)
ModSecurity's t:removeComments transformation can be bypassed because it mishandles the character following a comment terminator, letting crafted input evade rules that rely on this normalization step. The issue affects ModSecurity deployments whose rulesets invoke t:removeComments, such as configurations derived from the OWASP Core Rule Set, with real impact only when an exploitable downstream sink (for example SQL injection, XSS, or command injection) was otherwise blocked by the bypassed rule. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; the assessed vector is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N, indicating low integrity impact with no confidentiality or availability impact.
Improper error handling in the @rxGlobal component's PCRE2 integration allows a match-limit error returned by the regex engine to be misinterpreted as a successful match (fail-open), so any application that uses an @rxGlobal regex result as a security decision - an allow/deny filter, an input validator, or an authorization pattern - can have that control bypassed by an unauthenticated remote attacker who supplies input expensive enough to exhaust PCRE2's match limit. The same error-handling path does not safely reject invalid patterns, so a malformed pattern reaching the engine can crash the process handling the request. The assessed vector is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L: exploitation is network-reachable and unauthenticated, but the high attack complexity and the strictly conditional, low integrity and availability impact reflect that the flaw only matters where the regex result drives a security decision and that the attacker must first defeat match-limit tuning. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and exact affected versions were not confirmed from the available data.
Filename-based upload restrictions can be bypassed in applications that parse multipart/form-data uploads and enforce security-relevant filename rules using only the standard Content-Disposition 'filename' parameter, because the RFC 2231 extended 'filename*' parameter can carry a different, restricted value that a downstream component may consume instead. Tracked as GHSA-5pww-8rfg-9crf and reported through the vendor:ubuntu channel, the issue carries a limited-integrity impact profile (independent assessment CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N), meaning an unauthenticated network attacker can influence which file name value is acted upon but cannot read data or cause denial of service. No affected product, version range, CPE, patch, or public exploit information was supplied, so exploitation is assessed as no public exploit identified at time of analysis.