Stale session cookies keep working in x-ui 0.3.2, so an attacker who already holds an administrator cookie issued before a credential change retains full access to the management panel even after the username or password has been rotated. The root cause is CWE-613 (insufficient session expiration): the complete user object is stored in a client-side signed cookie and authentication only verifies that a user object can be deserialized from it, with no re-validation against the database and no session-version or revocation check. Exploitation requires prior possession of a valid admin cookie (the assessed CVSS vector is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N, score 4.8, and does not permit a fresh unauthenticated login without a cookie); EPSS is 0.19% (8th percentile), there is no CISA KEV entry, no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and no vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis, so credential rotation alone cannot be relied on as containment.
Stored cross-site scripting in Tautulli versions prior to 2.17.2 allows a caller who already holds Tautulli administrator privileges or a valid Tautulli API key to persist crafted JavaScript inside the newsletter 'cron' field, which is then executed in the browser of an administrator who simply opens the newsletter configuration modal. The payload is stored in the newsletters table and keeps firing after API-key or credential rotation until the affected newsletter entry is manually deleted, giving the flaw a persistence property that outlives routine remediation. Exploitation requires high privilege to plant the value and a separate administrator interaction to trigger it, so no public exploit code has been identified and the practical risk is low; both the upstream advisory and the vendor release v2.17.2 confirm this is a genuine but low-urgency issue rather than a remotely exploitable, unauthenticated attack.
Stored cross-site scripting in Joplin (including Joplin Server deployments) before 3.7.2 lets a low-privileged authenticated Server user publish a crafted HTML note as a public share whose javascript: link passes the renderer's internal-resource validation. Exploitation is heavily constrained: the victim must middle-click or use 'Open in new tab' on the link and be running an older or non-hardened browser, because current Chrome and Firefox block javascript: new-tab navigation, and ordinary left-click is already blocked; if execution succeeds while the victim is signed in, script runs in the Joplin Server origin and can read page-visible content and issue authenticated same-origin requests. Rated CVSS 4.4 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N), no public exploit code identified at time of analysis and no confirmed active exploitation (not in CISA KEV); a vendor-released patch (3.7.2) is available.
Argument injection in Proxmox Mail Gateway's pmg-api package changelog retrieval functionality lets an attacker with an authenticated high-privileged session, or an attacker who can induce a logged-in PMG administrator to make a CSRF-style request, supply malicious arguments to the underlying apt-get command. The issue is classified as CWE-88 and tracked at CVSS 4.4 with high attack complexity, required administrative privileges, low confidentiality and integrity impact, and a scope change; no public exploit identified at time of analysis. Exploitation is limited to Proxmox Mail Gateway deployments and, in the CSRF variant, requires administrator interaction, making real-world risk low-to-moderate despite the network attack vector.
InvenTree versions prior to 1.4.0 expose business data through the report and label print endpoints because POST /api/report/print/ and POST /api/report/label/print/ authenticate the caller but never invoke users.permissions.check_user_permission against the target model's view role. Any authenticated account - including one with no roles or only unrelated roles - can enumerate object primary keys and render them through the default templates InvenTree ships for major business models, then retrieve the resulting artifact from DataOutput, obtaining purchase, sales, part, bill-of-materials, stock, build, supplier, customer, pricing, and inventory data that the corresponding detail APIs would correctly deny. Fixed in 1.4.0; no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation was identified at time of analysis, and the EPSS-style risk is modest because valid credentials are required and impact is limited to confidentiality (CVSS 4.3, CWE-639).
InvenTree versions prior to 1.4.0 expose the machine restart endpoint POST /api/machine/{pk}/restart/ to any authenticated user, allowing an account holding only low-privilege roles such as STOCK to force registry.restart_machine() against any registered machine. A successful request resets the target machine's status and interrupts active printing, scanning, or other hardware operations, giving an authenticated attacker (PR:L per the assessed vector) a network-reachable denial-of-service against configured machine integrations. Impact is limited to availability (C:N/I:N/A:L, CVSS 4.3); there is no data exposure or modification, and no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation was identified at time of analysis. Deployments with no registered machines have no exploitable surface.
Path traversal in Joplin Server's transcription proxy endpoints lets an authenticated user on instances configured with TRANSCRIBE_ENABLED=true escape the intended /transcribe/ URL prefix and reach neighboring endpoints on the transcription backend, potentially exposing internal administrative, health, or configuration data. The flaw affects versions prior to 3.7.7; because the CVSS vector is CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N, the attacker must already hold a valid authenticated server session and the only demonstrated impact is limited confidentiality loss - this is a low-to-moderate real-world risk that maps well to its 4.3 score rather than an inflated rating. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, no CISA KEV listing, and exploitation additionally requires a reachable transcription backend (TRANSCRIBE_BASE_URL) with adjacent internal endpoints worth reading.
Broken object-level authorization in InvenTree versions prior to 1.4.0 lets any authenticated user, including an account with no assigned roles, read the staged import data and column mappings belonging to another user's DataImportSession by supplying that session's identifier to the /api/importer/row/ or /api/importer/mapping/ endpoints. The impact is confidentiality-only (CVSS 4.4 base, assessed as 4.3: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) and requires a valid login plus knowledge or enumeration of a victim's session ID on an instance where another user has an active import in progress; no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and the flaw is not confirmed actively exploited (CISA KEV). The vendor's threat model treats authenticated instance users as trusted, so the realistic exposure is between distrustful co-tenants of the same instance rather than remote outsiders, and version 1.4.0 resolves it.
Server-side request forgery in MaxKB 2.10.3-lts and earlier allows an authenticated low-privileged workspace user (CVSS PR:L, no user interaction) to make the MaxKB server issue arbitrary HTTP requests by supplying a URL to the knowledge-base web-document import or synchronization crawler, whose Fork.fork routine calls requests.get with certificate verification disabled and no scheme, loopback, link-local, private, or reserved-address filtering. Because the fetched response body is stored as imported document content, the attacker can read the responses of reachable internal HTTP services or cloud instance metadata (e.g. AWS/GCP IMDS) rather than merely triggering blind requests, making this a full-read SSRF with confidentiality impact. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no CISA KEV listing; the vendor advisory (GHSA-ffxw-frpx-8rww) reports no fixed version, so exploitation requires valid workspace credentials and reachability of interesting internal targets from the MaxKB host.
IP allow-list enforcement in Warpgate 0.23.0 through 0.27.2 is bypassed for HTTP API token authentication: when a user has allowed_ip_ranges configured, a presented X-Warpgate-Token is still resolved into a fully authorized RequestAuthorization::UserToken regardless of the source address, so a leaked, phished, or exfiltrated token can be used from a prohibited network location. Impact is limited to confidentiality of what the token-holding user could already read through the HTTP API (CVSS 4.3, C:L/I:N/A:N) - HTTP target proxying and the SSH, MySQL, PostgreSQL, RDP, VNC, and Kubernetes paths do not accept this token flow, and deployments without allowed_ip_ranges are unaffected. The issue is a remote, authenticated weakness (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N) with no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and it is fixed in Warpgate 0.27.3.
Information disclosure in Apache Airflow's `/assets/events` REST endpoint lets an authenticated user who holds asset-read permission enumerate asset events - source Dag ID, task ID, run ID, timestamps, and total existence counts via pagination - for Dags they have no authorization to read. The endpoint applied no per-Dag readability filter, and because the same filter was missing from the count query, `total_entries` alone revealed the existence of hidden Dags. Affected deployments are apache-airflow versions prior to 3.3.2, and the exposure matters only where per-Dag access control is used to separate teams or tenants; in single-tenant deployments every user is already authorized to see all Dags, so nothing new is disclosed. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and there is no confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV), so this is a modest-severity broken-authorization flaw rather than a high-urgency issue. Vendor-released patch: apache-airflow 3.3.2.
GoCD servers running versions prior to 26.1.0 expose an authorization flaw in the internal UI /jobStatus.json endpoint that lets any authenticated user (CVSS PR:L) enumerate sequential, server-assigned job IDs and read job metadata - job names, state, progress timestamps, assigned agent IP addresses/UUIDs, and the associated stage and pipeline - for pipelines they are not permitted to view. The API fails to verify that the requested job ID actually belongs to the pipeline and stage named in the request (CWE-639), so the disclosure is bounded to metadata only: console output, artifacts, commands, variables, environment data, and configuration are not returned, and the CVSS 3.1 score is consequently 4.3 (low). The issue is fixed in GoCD 26.1.0; no public exploit code was identified and the flaw is not listed in CISA KEV, so there is no indication of active exploitation at time of analysis.
Joplin Server prior to 3.7.7 lets an authenticated low-privileged user who holds a *pending* (not yet accepted) folder-share invitation write new items directly into that shared folder, because ItemModel.checkIfAllowed() accepts any share_users row for the caller without requiring ShareUserStatus.Accepted. The injected content is then pushed out to the share owner and already-accepted participants by ShareModel.updateSharedItems3() before the attacker ever accepts the invitation, giving unauthorized content injection into another user's notebook. The flaw requires the invitation precondition, so it is not exploitable against arbitrary shares or default configurations with no pending invite; impact is integrity-only (CVSS 3.1 base 4.3, C:N/I:L/A:N, PR:L), no public exploit code was identified at time of analysis, and the issue is fixed in 3.7.7.
Principal confusion in Apache Airflow 3.3.0 and 3.3.1 causes core-API requests that carry both a `_token` session cookie and an explicit `Authorization: Bearer` (or OAuth2) credential to execute - and be recorded in the audit log - as the cookie's principal instead of the identity the client explicitly presented, inverting the intended bearer-over-cookie precedence. Exploitation is not automatic: the attacker must first plant a valid `_token` session cookie of their own into the victim's browser or client (for example by cookie tossing from a sibling subdomain, XSS in a separate application sharing the parent domain, or a shared workstation), and the victim's request must simultaneously carry an explicit credential, so only Airflow UI deployments hosted on a domain shared with other applications are reachable this way. The assessed outcome is misattributed audit records and principal confusion (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/C:N/I:L/A:N) rather than direct privilege escalation, and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis.
Chat-record management routes in 1Panel-dev MaxKB 2.10.2-lts and earlier authorize only the application_id supplied in the request path, then load chat data using globally scoped chat_id and chat_record_id values without confirming that the chat actually belongs to that application, so a low-privileged authenticated user in the same workspace can read a victim's persisted chat records by re-homing a known chat_id under an application they own. Impact is limited (CVSS 4.2, C:L/I:L), the attack is network-reachable but requires an authenticated normal account in the victim's workspace and prior knowledge or enumeration of valid global chat identifiers, which is the dominant practical hurdle. A second variant uses the add_knowledge flow, available to any user with an owned knowledge base and document, to copy victim answers while overwriting the victim record's improve_paragraph_id_list. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis and no fixed version was available as of review; despite the supplied 'Authentication Bypass' tag, this is an object-level authorization/IDOR defect rather than a true auth bypass.
Self-hosted draw.io deployments running the Docker or WAR build prior to 30.2.7 can have a victim's browser session silently bound to the attacker's own cloud-storage identity, because the OAuth callback handler skips verification of the state token against the session cookie whenever IS_GAE is false. An attacker who completes a legitimate authorization for their own account can then induce a victim to open a crafted callback URL, causing subsequent Google Drive, OneDrive, GitHub, GitLab, or Dropbox actions to be performed under the attacker's identity (CVSS 4.2, CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R, CWE-352); the impact is session integrity loss and misattribution rather than disclosure of the victim's existing cloud files, and no public exploit identified at time of analysis. The hosted SaaS at app.diagrams.net and any Google App Engine build set IS_GAE=true and are unaffected.
Server-side request forgery in Hatchet versions prior to 0.91.1 lets an authenticated tenant of the platform coerce the SNS ingest service into issuing an outbound HTTP request to an arbitrary URL, because the SNS UnsubscribeConfirmation handler calls http.Get() against the payload's UnsubscribeURL even though that field is excluded from the AWS signature verification performed by BuildSignature(). Successful exploitation allows the server to reach internal-only endpoints such as the EC2 Instance Metadata Service, internal HTTP APIs, and other services on the deployment's network, with the practical payoff limited to information disclosure (for example, potentially exposing IAM credentials) rather than code execution or data modification. Exploitation requires the SNS integration to be enabled and reachable and the attacker to already hold a Hatchet tenant account; there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and no confirmable tracking in CISA KEV.
Isochronous OUT stream handling in usbredir can leave a stream's single transfer buffer permanently unsubmitted when a transfer count of 1 is used, which defeats the bounds check in usbredirhost_iso_packet() and lets a usbredir peer write beyond the end of the packet descriptor array on every subsequent isochronous packet. The flaw is an out-of-bounds write (CWE-787) affecting usbredir as shipped in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 through 10, and the published CVSS:3.1 vector (AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H, score 4.1) reflects a local, high-complexity, privileged trigger path whose dominant impact is availability loss rather than code execution. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the bug is not listed as confirmed actively exploited (CISA KEV); the realistic risk is materially lower than the raw memory-corruption classification suggests.