Zeroclaw
Monthly
Arbitrary file write during plugin installation in ZeroClaw before 0.8.5 (when built with the plugins-wasm feature) lets attackers place files outside the plugins directory by supplying a crafted manifest.toml whose wasm_path field contains '..' or absolute/root/drive-prefix components; overwriting shell startup files or similar executed content yields code execution under the victim's account. The attack is local (AV:L) and unauthenticated per the assessed vector (PR:N), but it requires user interaction (UI:P/UI:R) - the victim must be persuaded to install the attacker-supplied plugin package - and only functions when plugin signature verification is left in its default Disabled mode, making the path check the sole gate. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation were identified at time of analysis, and the vendor has released a fix in v0.8.5.
Arbitrary file write during plugin installation in ZeroClaw before 0.8.5 (when built with the plugins-wasm feature) lets attackers place files outside the plugins directory by supplying a crafted manifest.toml whose wasm_path field contains '..' or absolute/root/drive-prefix components; overwriting shell startup files or similar executed content yields code execution under the victim's account. The attack is local (AV:L) and unauthenticated per the assessed vector (PR:N), but it requires user interaction (UI:P/UI:R) - the victim must be persuaded to install the attacker-supplied plugin package - and only functions when plugin signature verification is left in its default Disabled mode, making the path check the sole gate. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation were identified at time of analysis, and the vendor has released a fix in v0.8.5.