Yeti
Monthly
Path traversal in YETI's DFIQ import/export pipeline allows a low-privileged authenticated user to write attacker-controlled YAML content outside the intended temporary archive directory. Importing a DFIQ object whose `uuid` field carries traversal sequences through POST /api/v2/dfiq/from_yaml, then calling POST /api/v2/dfiq/to_archive, causes the service to create a `.yaml` file at an arbitrary path the YETI service account can write; the primitive is write-only and the filename suffix is forced. YETI releases prior to 2.5.1 are affected, the vendor advisory includes a proof-of-concept that was reproduced against an authorized lab instance, and there is no CISA KEV listing indicating active exploitation in real deployments.
Authenticated path traversal in Yeti (YETI threat-intelligence platform) prior to 2.5.1 lets a low-privileged, non-admin user read and write arbitrary files as the service account. The ExportTask 'name' field is converted into a storage file name without stripping path separators or '..' segments, so a task named with traversal sequences is joined straight onto the configured local export directory; retrieving the export content returns the traversed file, and running the export writes attacker-controlled output to an attacker-chosen writable path. Exploitation requires a valid account (no admin role), the default local file storage backend, and service-account filesystem permissions on the target paths; universal code execution is not established, and no public exploit code or active exploitation is reported at time of analysis.
Unauthenticated information disclosure in Yeti Platform (yeti-platform/yeti) before 2.5.1: the audit router is mounted on the FastAPI application without the Depends(auth.get_current_active_user) gate that every other router enforces, so a remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the /api/v2 API (default port 8000) can read the entire TimelineLog audit trail. Because the route uses a wildcard {id:path} parameter, an empty, partial, or specific path segment returns all matching records, exposing analyst usernames, object identifiers, and full before-and-after details of threat-intelligence objects such as IP addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes. The advisory publishes reproduction steps validated against a live Docker deployment, but there is no KEV listing and no confirmed active exploitation; the flaw is read-only (no integrity or availability impact) and is remediated in version 2.5.1.
Authenticated AQL injection in YETI 2.5.0 and earlier lets any low-privileged analyst account push attacker-controlled subexpressions into ArangoDB queries through the `sorting` and `filter_aliases` fields accepted by the search API, giving that user a cross-collection read primitive and a parser-level error oracle. Exploitation requires only a valid non-admin account and default search functionality - no administrator role or special configuration - so realistic risk centers on insiders or compromised analyst credentials, and impact is bounded to read/search contexts (arbitrary database writes were not established). The GitHub advisory documents working request payloads that were verified only against the reporter's authorized local lab instance; it is not confirmed as active in the wild, but the public PoC reference lowers the effort needed to reproduce it and a fix is available upstream.
Authenticated users with only read access can delete RBAC relationships in Yeti through 2.11.0, revoking owner grants and locking legitimate owners out of objects. The flaw resides in the DELETE /api/v2/rbac/{id} endpoint, which omits a caller-permission check (CWE-862). No public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis; the assessed CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H) indicates high integrity and availability impact with no confidentiality loss, consistent with a genuine but bounded risk.
Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.5), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, no authentication required, low attack complexity. Public exploit code available.
Path traversal in YETI's DFIQ import/export pipeline allows a low-privileged authenticated user to write attacker-controlled YAML content outside the intended temporary archive directory. Importing a DFIQ object whose `uuid` field carries traversal sequences through POST /api/v2/dfiq/from_yaml, then calling POST /api/v2/dfiq/to_archive, causes the service to create a `.yaml` file at an arbitrary path the YETI service account can write; the primitive is write-only and the filename suffix is forced. YETI releases prior to 2.5.1 are affected, the vendor advisory includes a proof-of-concept that was reproduced against an authorized lab instance, and there is no CISA KEV listing indicating active exploitation in real deployments.
Authenticated path traversal in Yeti (YETI threat-intelligence platform) prior to 2.5.1 lets a low-privileged, non-admin user read and write arbitrary files as the service account. The ExportTask 'name' field is converted into a storage file name without stripping path separators or '..' segments, so a task named with traversal sequences is joined straight onto the configured local export directory; retrieving the export content returns the traversed file, and running the export writes attacker-controlled output to an attacker-chosen writable path. Exploitation requires a valid account (no admin role), the default local file storage backend, and service-account filesystem permissions on the target paths; universal code execution is not established, and no public exploit code or active exploitation is reported at time of analysis.
Unauthenticated information disclosure in Yeti Platform (yeti-platform/yeti) before 2.5.1: the audit router is mounted on the FastAPI application without the Depends(auth.get_current_active_user) gate that every other router enforces, so a remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach the /api/v2 API (default port 8000) can read the entire TimelineLog audit trail. Because the route uses a wildcard {id:path} parameter, an empty, partial, or specific path segment returns all matching records, exposing analyst usernames, object identifiers, and full before-and-after details of threat-intelligence objects such as IP addresses, domains, URLs, and file hashes. The advisory publishes reproduction steps validated against a live Docker deployment, but there is no KEV listing and no confirmed active exploitation; the flaw is read-only (no integrity or availability impact) and is remediated in version 2.5.1.
Authenticated AQL injection in YETI 2.5.0 and earlier lets any low-privileged analyst account push attacker-controlled subexpressions into ArangoDB queries through the `sorting` and `filter_aliases` fields accepted by the search API, giving that user a cross-collection read primitive and a parser-level error oracle. Exploitation requires only a valid non-admin account and default search functionality - no administrator role or special configuration - so realistic risk centers on insiders or compromised analyst credentials, and impact is bounded to read/search contexts (arbitrary database writes were not established). The GitHub advisory documents working request payloads that were verified only against the reporter's authorized local lab instance; it is not confirmed as active in the wild, but the public PoC reference lowers the effort needed to reproduce it and a fix is available upstream.
Authenticated users with only read access can delete RBAC relationships in Yeti through 2.11.0, revoking owner grants and locking legitimate owners out of objects. The flaw resides in the DELETE /api/v2/rbac/{id} endpoint, which omits a caller-permission check (CWE-862). No public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis; the assessed CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H) indicates high integrity and availability impact with no confidentiality loss, consistent with a genuine but bounded risk.
Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.5), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, no authentication required, low attack complexity. Public exploit code available.