Wolfengine
Monthly
Nonce reuse in wolfEngine's AES-CCM implementation for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 allows a network-positioned adversary to recover plaintext across records and forge authentication tags within a session. The root defect is that wolfEngine reads the explicit CCM nonce from the uninitialized record input buffer rather than deriving it from the TLS sequence number in the Additional Authenticated Data, producing a constant nonce for every record under the same key. Exposure is sharply constrained: AES-CCM cipher suites must be explicitly selected (non-default), only wolfEngine is affected (wolfProvider is not), and TLS 1.3 is entirely outside scope. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis; the vendor-released fix is wolfEngine 1.4.1.
AES-GCM nonce reuse in wolfEngine before 1.4.1 allows a network-positioned passive adversary to fully recover encrypted plaintext and forge authentication tags across all TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 sessions. The 8-byte explicit nonce is generated once at TLS write-key setup and never incremented per record, meaning every GCM record within a connection shares an identical (key, nonce) pair - a catastrophic misuse of authenticated encryption. AES-CCM cipher suites, TLS 1.3, and non-TLS uses of AES-GCM are explicitly unaffected; no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Nonce reuse in wolfEngine's AES-CCM implementation for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 allows a network-positioned adversary to recover plaintext across records and forge authentication tags within a session. The root defect is that wolfEngine reads the explicit CCM nonce from the uninitialized record input buffer rather than deriving it from the TLS sequence number in the Additional Authenticated Data, producing a constant nonce for every record under the same key. Exposure is sharply constrained: AES-CCM cipher suites must be explicitly selected (non-default), only wolfEngine is affected (wolfProvider is not), and TLS 1.3 is entirely outside scope. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis; the vendor-released fix is wolfEngine 1.4.1.
AES-GCM nonce reuse in wolfEngine before 1.4.1 allows a network-positioned passive adversary to fully recover encrypted plaintext and forge authentication tags across all TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 sessions. The 8-byte explicit nonce is generated once at TLS write-key setup and never incremented per record, meaning every GCM record within a connection shares an identical (key, nonce) pair - a catastrophic misuse of authenticated encryption. AES-CCM cipher suites, TLS 1.3, and non-TLS uses of AES-GCM are explicitly unaffected; no public exploit identified at time of analysis.