Whichllm
Monthly
Code injection in whichllm's run and snippet CLI commands allows a network-positioned attacker who controls a HuggingFace repository to achieve full arbitrary code execution on any victim's machine by publishing a repository containing a crafted GGUF filename with Python metacharacters. The script generation function in cli.py interpolates the HuggingFace Hub API siblings rfilename field directly into dynamically generated Python source without escaping, enabling a string-literal breakout that fires injected code before any model download occurs. No active exploitation is confirmed in CISA KEV and no public proof-of-concept is referenced; vendor-released patch v0.5.16 is available and directly remediates the root cause.
Code injection in whichllm's run and snippet CLI commands allows a network-positioned attacker who controls a HuggingFace repository to achieve full arbitrary code execution on any victim's machine by publishing a repository containing a crafted GGUF filename with Python metacharacters. The script generation function in cli.py interpolates the HuggingFace Hub API siblings rfilename field directly into dynamically generated Python source without escaping, enabling a string-literal breakout that fires injected code before any model download occurs. No active exploitation is confirmed in CISA KEV and no public proof-of-concept is referenced; vendor-released patch v0.5.16 is available and directly remediates the root cause.