Vocos
Monthly
Unsafe dynamic class instantiation in Vocos allows arbitrary code execution when a user loads a model from an attacker-controlled Hugging Face repository. The library's `Vocos.from_pretrained` fetches a remote `config.yaml` from a caller-supplied repository and passes it directly to `instantiate_class`, which imports and calls any Python callable named in the configuration without an allowlist. Any user who loads a Vocos model from a repository they do not fully trust is exposed to full code execution in their Python process. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the attack path requires minimal sophistication given the direct code path from remote config to `__import__`/`getattr`/call.
Unsafe dynamic class instantiation in Vocos allows arbitrary code execution when a user loads a model from an attacker-controlled Hugging Face repository. The library's `Vocos.from_pretrained` fetches a remote `config.yaml` from a caller-supplied repository and passes it directly to `instantiate_class`, which imports and calls any Python callable named in the configuration without an allowlist. Any user who loads a Vocos model from a repository they do not fully trust is exposed to full code execution in their Python process. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the attack path requires minimal sophistication given the direct code path from remote config to `__import__`/`getattr`/call.