Videollama2
Monthly
Improper validation of an integrity check value in VideoLLaMA2's model-loading routine (load_pretrained_model in videollama2/model/__init__.py) allows a tampered model artifact to be accepted when an operator loads a model from an attacker-influenced path supplied through the _name_or_path argument. Versions 1.0 and 1.1 are affected; because the flaw lives in a library function rather than an always-on service, exploitation requires passive user interaction - someone must actively initiate a load from the hostile source - and impact is bounded to low integrity and low availability with no confidentiality effect. A public reference to the issue exists (the upstream GitHub issue report), but it is not verified as working exploit code, there is no CISA KEV listing, and EPSS is 0.15% (4th percentile), so all available signals point to a low real-world priority and a monitor-level decision.
Improper validation of an integrity check value in VideoLLaMA2's model-loading routine (load_pretrained_model in videollama2/model/__init__.py) allows a tampered model artifact to be accepted when an operator loads a model from an attacker-influenced path supplied through the _name_or_path argument. Versions 1.0 and 1.1 are affected; because the flaw lives in a library function rather than an always-on service, exploitation requires passive user interaction - someone must actively initiate a load from the hostile source - and impact is bounded to low integrity and low availability with no confidentiality effect. A public reference to the issue exists (the upstream GitHub issue report), but it is not verified as working exploit code, there is no CISA KEV listing, and EPSS is 0.15% (4th percentile), so all available signals point to a low real-world priority and a monitor-level decision.