Ui Moos
Monthly
Stack buffer overflow in the uMS graphical operator tool of MOOS ui-moos through commit 50b9c6c allows an unauthenticated network attacker to achieve code execution on an operator workstation by injecting excessively long client or variable names into the MOOSDB pub-sub middleware. When the operator subsequently selects a malicious process list entry or pokes an oversized variable through the uMS interface, unchecked sprintf calls in ScopeTabPane.cpp and ScopeGrid.cpp overflow fixed 1024-byte stack buffers, enabling memory corruption and control-flow hijack. The upstream fix (PR #5, commit a6ebc0bc) is confirmed by direct patch diff evidence replacing all three vulnerable sprintf calls with snprintf; no public exploit code or KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis.
Stack buffer overflow in the uMS graphical operator tool of MOOS ui-moos through commit 50b9c6c allows an unauthenticated network attacker to achieve code execution on an operator workstation by injecting excessively long client or variable names into the MOOSDB pub-sub middleware. When the operator subsequently selects a malicious process list entry or pokes an oversized variable through the uMS interface, unchecked sprintf calls in ScopeTabPane.cpp and ScopeGrid.cpp overflow fixed 1024-byte stack buffers, enabling memory corruption and control-flow hijack. The upstream fix (PR #5, commit a6ebc0bc) is confirmed by direct patch diff evidence replacing all three vulnerable sprintf calls with snprintf; no public exploit code or KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis.