Tinyagi
Monthly
File inclusion in TinyAGI 0.0.20 exposes server-side files to remote unauthenticated attackers through the buildSystemPrompt function in packages/server/src/routes/agents.ts. Exploitation requires no privileges or user interaction, and a publicly available proof-of-concept exists via GitHub issue #283. No patch has been released - the vendor has not responded to the responsible disclosure despite being notified through the project's issue tracker.
Missing authorization in TinyAGI 0.0.20's Message API Endpoint allows remote unauthenticated attackers to invoke the processMessage function without any access control enforcement, yielding limited but real confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. A publicly available proof-of-concept exploit is referenced in GitHub issue #284, and the project maintainer has not responded to the responsible disclosure, leaving no patch available at time of analysis. The combination of unauthenticated network exploitability, live POC, and vendor silence makes this a material risk for any deployment exposing the endpoint to untrusted networks.
File inclusion via unsanitized path input in TinyAGI 0.0.20's Message API Endpoint exposes server-side files to remote unauthenticated attackers. The vulnerable surface is the `collectFiles` function in `packages/core/src/response.ts`, which accepts externally controlled file paths without adequate validation (CWE-73). Publicly available exploit code exists via GitHub issue #282, and the project maintainer had not issued a patch or response at time of disclosure - compounding risk for any internet-exposed deployments.
File inclusion in TinyAGI 0.0.20 exposes server-side files to remote unauthenticated attackers through the buildSystemPrompt function in packages/server/src/routes/agents.ts. Exploitation requires no privileges or user interaction, and a publicly available proof-of-concept exists via GitHub issue #283. No patch has been released - the vendor has not responded to the responsible disclosure despite being notified through the project's issue tracker.
Missing authorization in TinyAGI 0.0.20's Message API Endpoint allows remote unauthenticated attackers to invoke the processMessage function without any access control enforcement, yielding limited but real confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact. A publicly available proof-of-concept exploit is referenced in GitHub issue #284, and the project maintainer has not responded to the responsible disclosure, leaving no patch available at time of analysis. The combination of unauthenticated network exploitability, live POC, and vendor silence makes this a material risk for any deployment exposing the endpoint to untrusted networks.
File inclusion via unsanitized path input in TinyAGI 0.0.20's Message API Endpoint exposes server-side files to remote unauthenticated attackers. The vulnerable surface is the `collectFiles` function in `packages/core/src/response.ts`, which accepts externally controlled file paths without adequate validation (CWE-73). Publicly available exploit code exists via GitHub issue #282, and the project maintainer had not issued a patch or response at time of disclosure - compounding risk for any internet-exposed deployments.