Snowflake Connector For Net
Monthly
Workload Identity Federation authentication in all major Snowflake client drivers transmits cloud attestation tokens to the configured host without first verifying that host is a recognized Snowflake endpoint, enabling token exfiltration and replay. An attacker who can modify connection configuration redirects the driver to an attacker-controlled server, which receives a freshly minted cloud workload-identity token that can be replayed against real Snowflake accounts for the token's remaining lifetime. On Azure, the attack surface is wider: the driver also fetches a Managed Identity access token scoped to an arbitrary Azure resource chosen by the attacker, extending potential impact beyond Snowflake to any Azure service that workload identity can reach. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but vendor-confirmed patches were released September 3, 2026 across all eight affected driver packages.
Snowflake client drivers that implement the `authenticator=externalbrowser` single sign-on flow expose a local loopback HTTP callback listener that reflects an arbitrary request's Origin header into its CORS response and accepts the first token-bearing request during the login window without checking a login-bound CSRF state value. An attacker who can reach that listener while a victim is mid-login and wins the race to deliver the first token-bearing request can submit a forged IdP callback, causing the authentication attempt to fail; there is no token theft, authentication bypass, or data disclosure, so the CVSS 6.5 score is driven entirely by availability impact (C:N/I:N/A:H) with user interaction required (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R). Affected are unpatched releases of the Python connector, Go driver, JDBC (including FIPS and thin artifacts), Node.js, .NET, ODBC, PHP PDO drivers, and libsnowflakeclient; fixed versions are published for each and users must upgrade manually, and no public exploit code has been identified at the time of analysis.
Workload Identity Federation authentication in all major Snowflake client drivers transmits cloud attestation tokens to the configured host without first verifying that host is a recognized Snowflake endpoint, enabling token exfiltration and replay. An attacker who can modify connection configuration redirects the driver to an attacker-controlled server, which receives a freshly minted cloud workload-identity token that can be replayed against real Snowflake accounts for the token's remaining lifetime. On Azure, the attack surface is wider: the driver also fetches a Managed Identity access token scoped to an arbitrary Azure resource chosen by the attacker, extending potential impact beyond Snowflake to any Azure service that workload identity can reach. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but vendor-confirmed patches were released September 3, 2026 across all eight affected driver packages.
Snowflake client drivers that implement the `authenticator=externalbrowser` single sign-on flow expose a local loopback HTTP callback listener that reflects an arbitrary request's Origin header into its CORS response and accepts the first token-bearing request during the login window without checking a login-bound CSRF state value. An attacker who can reach that listener while a victim is mid-login and wins the race to deliver the first token-bearing request can submit a forged IdP callback, causing the authentication attempt to fail; there is no token theft, authentication bypass, or data disclosure, so the CVSS 6.5 score is driven entirely by availability impact (C:N/I:N/A:H) with user interaction required (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:R). Affected are unpatched releases of the Python connector, Go driver, JDBC (including FIPS and thin artifacts), Node.js, .NET, ODBC, PHP PDO drivers, and libsnowflakeclient; fixed versions are published for each and users must upgrade manually, and no public exploit code has been identified at the time of analysis.