Shine Lan X Firmware
Monthly
Physical attackers with brief hands-on access to a Growatt ShineLan-X communication dongle can attach an SWD hardware debug probe to the device's on-board debug pads, halt the microcontroller, and read firmware memory to extract embedded secrets, credentials, and internal domain names. The Serial Wire Debug interface is enabled by default with no debug lock or authentication, so once physical access is obtained no credentials or user interaction are required (CVSS 8.6 under CVSS 4.0, vector AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact and scope change). Risk is therefore concentrated on dongles deployed in physically reachable or publicly exposed installations; EPSS is low at 0.32% (23rd percentile), and no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) has been identified at time of analysis.
Growatt ShineLan-X communication dongles contain an undocumented backup account with hardcoded credentials, enabling adjacent-network attackers to bypass authentication and gain high-impact access to the device's Setting Center. Exploitation requires the attacker to be on the same local or adjacent network segment and to use the built-in backdoor account; no legitimate credentials or user interaction are needed, but Internet-exposed exploitation is not expected by default. No public exploit code has been identified and CISA KEV does not list active exploitation; EPSS is low at 0.32%, though the assessed impact is severe for reachable devices.
Stored cross-site scripting in the Plant Name field of the Growatt ShineLan-X datalogger web interface allows an authenticated attacker to persist an HTML/JavaScript payload that executes in the browser of any user who later opens the plant management page, enabling session/token theft and unauthorized UI actions against that device instance. Exploitation requires a valid low-privilege account on the ShineLan-X management UI (CVSS PR:L) and submission of the Plant Name value via a direct POST; the assessed impact is confined to the browser context of users of that specific datalogger rather than code execution on the device itself. At time of analysis there is confirmed KEV listing: no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and EPSS is 0.16% (5th percentile), indicating low predicted exploitation activity.
Stored cross-site scripting in the Growatt ShineLAN-X communication module's local configuration web server allows an attacker who already holds low-privileged access to that interface to plant a JavaScript payload in the communication module's settings center, where it is persisted and later executed in the browser of any legitimate user - typically a higher-privileged administrator - who views the affected page. Because the injected script runs in the context of the device's own web origin, successful exploitation can compromise data handled by that origin on the victim's behalf. There is no confirmed active exploitation (CVE is not in CISA KEV) and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis; EPSS is low at 0.16% (4th percentile), and our independent assessment scores the issue as CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N - a real but non-urgent issue rather than a top-priority emergency.
File replacement in Growatt ShineLan-X firmware is possible for adjacent-network attackers who recover hard-coded FTP credentials from the firmware image and use them to upload malicious files, because firmware signature verification is not enforced. Affected are Growatt ShineLan-X devices running the vulnerable firmware; exploitation requires network adjacency to the FTP service (same LAN, broadcast domain, or deployment network) and possession of the static credentials, but no prior authenticated account or user interaction is required. No public exploit was identified at time of analysis, and EPSS is low (0.32%, 23rd percentile), but this remains a genuine high-priority issue because it can lead to high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact across the device and connected systems.
Physical attackers with brief hands-on access to a Growatt ShineLan-X communication dongle can attach an SWD hardware debug probe to the device's on-board debug pads, halt the microcontroller, and read firmware memory to extract embedded secrets, credentials, and internal domain names. The Serial Wire Debug interface is enabled by default with no debug lock or authentication, so once physical access is obtained no credentials or user interaction are required (CVSS 8.6 under CVSS 4.0, vector AV:P/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact and scope change). Risk is therefore concentrated on dongles deployed in physically reachable or publicly exposed installations; EPSS is low at 0.32% (23rd percentile), and no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) has been identified at time of analysis.
Growatt ShineLan-X communication dongles contain an undocumented backup account with hardcoded credentials, enabling adjacent-network attackers to bypass authentication and gain high-impact access to the device's Setting Center. Exploitation requires the attacker to be on the same local or adjacent network segment and to use the built-in backdoor account; no legitimate credentials or user interaction are needed, but Internet-exposed exploitation is not expected by default. No public exploit code has been identified and CISA KEV does not list active exploitation; EPSS is low at 0.32%, though the assessed impact is severe for reachable devices.
Stored cross-site scripting in the Plant Name field of the Growatt ShineLan-X datalogger web interface allows an authenticated attacker to persist an HTML/JavaScript payload that executes in the browser of any user who later opens the plant management page, enabling session/token theft and unauthorized UI actions against that device instance. Exploitation requires a valid low-privilege account on the ShineLan-X management UI (CVSS PR:L) and submission of the Plant Name value via a direct POST; the assessed impact is confined to the browser context of users of that specific datalogger rather than code execution on the device itself. At time of analysis there is confirmed KEV listing: no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and EPSS is 0.16% (5th percentile), indicating low predicted exploitation activity.
Stored cross-site scripting in the Growatt ShineLAN-X communication module's local configuration web server allows an attacker who already holds low-privileged access to that interface to plant a JavaScript payload in the communication module's settings center, where it is persisted and later executed in the browser of any legitimate user - typically a higher-privileged administrator - who views the affected page. Because the injected script runs in the context of the device's own web origin, successful exploitation can compromise data handled by that origin on the victim's behalf. There is no confirmed active exploitation (CVE is not in CISA KEV) and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis; EPSS is low at 0.16% (4th percentile), and our independent assessment scores the issue as CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N - a real but non-urgent issue rather than a top-priority emergency.
File replacement in Growatt ShineLan-X firmware is possible for adjacent-network attackers who recover hard-coded FTP credentials from the firmware image and use them to upload malicious files, because firmware signature verification is not enforced. Affected are Growatt ShineLan-X devices running the vulnerable firmware; exploitation requires network adjacency to the FTP service (same LAN, broadcast domain, or deployment network) and possession of the static credentials, but no prior authenticated account or user interaction is required. No public exploit was identified at time of analysis, and EPSS is low (0.32%, 23rd percentile), but this remains a genuine high-priority issue because it can lead to high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact across the device and connected systems.