S2N Tls
Monthly
Silent record suppression in AWS s2n-tls affects all TLS 1.3 connections (both client and server roles) because the AEAD implementation hardcodes the outer content_type (0x17) in the additional authenticated data instead of authenticating the actual wire byte, leaving that field outside the integrity tag. An active on-path attacker can selectively drop individual application_data records without either endpoint detecting tampering, causing HTTP request/response desynchronization or undetectable data loss on write-heavy workloads. Reported internally by Amazon (AMZN); no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and it is not listed in CISA KEV.
Memory leak in Amazon s2n-tls's QUIC transport parameters handler exposes server-side QUIC deployments to gradual heap exhaustion by unauthenticated remote clients. The flaw is rooted in incorrect allocator use during TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest (HRR) flows - a standard protocol exchange that can be deliberately forced by clients advertising key share groups the server will reject - causing up to approximately 64 KB of unreachable memory per handshake. No active exploitation or public exploit code has been identified; vendor-confirmed patch v1.7.6 is available.
Silent record suppression in AWS s2n-tls affects all TLS 1.3 connections (both client and server roles) because the AEAD implementation hardcodes the outer content_type (0x17) in the additional authenticated data instead of authenticating the actual wire byte, leaving that field outside the integrity tag. An active on-path attacker can selectively drop individual application_data records without either endpoint detecting tampering, causing HTTP request/response desynchronization or undetectable data loss on write-heavy workloads. Reported internally by Amazon (AMZN); no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and it is not listed in CISA KEV.
Memory leak in Amazon s2n-tls's QUIC transport parameters handler exposes server-side QUIC deployments to gradual heap exhaustion by unauthenticated remote clients. The flaw is rooted in incorrect allocator use during TLS 1.3 HelloRetryRequest (HRR) flows - a standard protocol exchange that can be deliberately forced by clients advertising key share groups the server will reject - causing up to approximately 64 KB of unreachable memory per handshake. No active exploitation or public exploit code has been identified; vendor-confirmed patch v1.7.6 is available.