Redamon
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Unauthenticated server-side request forgery in RedAmon through 7.0.1 allows any attacker who can reach the agent API to make the server issue outbound requests to attacker-chosen URLs via POST /tradecraft/verify, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254, with the fetched content returned to the attacker through the model-generated summary. The defect is that the validate_url routine inspects only the initially submitted hostname, so a public URL that returns an HTTP redirect or uses DNS rebinding to resolve into internal address space after the check bypasses the validation entirely (CWE-918). No authentication is required (PR:N per both the CVE 4.0 vector and the independent CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N assessment), the assessed impact is confidentiality-only, and no public exploit code was identified at time of analysis. The practical limiting factor is network reachability of the RedAmon agent API, and the cloud-metadata impact additionally depends on the deployment having a reachable metadata service or sensitive internal endpoints from the server.
Unauthenticated server-side request forgery in RedAmon through 7.0.1 allows any attacker who can reach the agent API to make the server issue outbound requests to attacker-chosen URLs via POST /tradecraft/verify, including internal services and cloud metadata endpoints such as 169.254.169.254, with the fetched content returned to the attacker through the model-generated summary. The defect is that the validate_url routine inspects only the initially submitted hostname, so a public URL that returns an HTTP redirect or uses DNS rebinding to resolve into internal address space after the check bypasses the validation entirely (CWE-918). No authentication is required (PR:N per both the CVE 4.0 vector and the independent CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N assessment), the assessed impact is confidentiality-only, and no public exploit code was identified at time of analysis. The practical limiting factor is network reachability of the RedAmon agent API, and the cloud-metadata impact additionally depends on the deployment having a reachable metadata service or sensitive internal endpoints from the server.