Red Hat Openshift For Windows Containers
Monthly
Credential theft in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform's Windows Machine Config Operator (WMCO) allows adjacent-network attackers to intercept SSH sessions to Windows worker nodes and steal WICD and kubelet bootstrap credentials. WMCO fails to verify the remote SSH host key when configuring Windows nodes, enabling a man-in-the-middle attacker positioned on the cluster network to capture credentials sufficient to assume Windows node identities. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is not in CISA KEV.
Privilege escalation in the Windows Machine Config Operator (WMCO) for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform allows a compromised Windows worker node holding WICD credentials to obtain a cluster-administrator client certificate. The WICD CSR auto-approver checks for the system:wicd-nodes organization but fails to reject additional organization values such as system:masters, enabling full cluster takeover. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV.
The system CA trust store shipped in Red Hat's ca-certificates RPM packages includes eMudhra root authorities that signed intermediate CA certificates protected by weak private keys, so a man-in-the-middle attacker who can intercept traffic and who can factor or guess those keys could mint certificates for arbitrary hostnames that TLS clients using the system trust store would accept (CVSS 6.8, CWE-295). Affected platforms span Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 through 10 plus a long list of layered products such as OpenShift Container Platform 4, Satellite 6, Quay 3, Advanced Cluster Management, and the cert-manager and logging operators. Attackers need a privileged network position and a victim client that actually initiates a TLS connection validated against the system store, so this is a trust-anchoring and impersonation problem rather than a remotely reachable code-execution flaw; there is no availability impact and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis. Because individual intermediate certificates cannot be selectively distrusted across every consumer of the system store, Red Hat is removing the parent root CAs outright, which is the crux of the remediation.
Credential theft in Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform's Windows Machine Config Operator (WMCO) allows adjacent-network attackers to intercept SSH sessions to Windows worker nodes and steal WICD and kubelet bootstrap credentials. WMCO fails to verify the remote SSH host key when configuring Windows nodes, enabling a man-in-the-middle attacker positioned on the cluster network to capture credentials sufficient to assume Windows node identities. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is not in CISA KEV.
Privilege escalation in the Windows Machine Config Operator (WMCO) for Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform allows a compromised Windows worker node holding WICD credentials to obtain a cluster-administrator client certificate. The WICD CSR auto-approver checks for the system:wicd-nodes organization but fails to reject additional organization values such as system:masters, enabling full cluster takeover. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV.
The system CA trust store shipped in Red Hat's ca-certificates RPM packages includes eMudhra root authorities that signed intermediate CA certificates protected by weak private keys, so a man-in-the-middle attacker who can intercept traffic and who can factor or guess those keys could mint certificates for arbitrary hostnames that TLS clients using the system trust store would accept (CVSS 6.8, CWE-295). Affected platforms span Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 through 10 plus a long list of layered products such as OpenShift Container Platform 4, Satellite 6, Quay 3, Advanced Cluster Management, and the cert-manager and logging operators. Attackers need a privileged network position and a victim client that actually initiates a TLS connection validated against the system store, so this is a trust-anchoring and impersonation problem rather than a remotely reachable code-execution flaw; there is no availability impact and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis. Because individual intermediate certificates cannot be selectively distrusted across every consumer of the system store, Red Hat is removing the parent root CAs outright, which is the crux of the remediation.