Pybddisasm
Monthly
Uninitialized-memory handling in the pybddisasm Python bindings can cause nd_to_text to turn an uninitialized output buffer into a Python return value when the underlying text conversion fails, potentially disclosing residual process memory or crashing the interpreter. The issue is locally scoped (AV:L) and requires low privileges (PR:L); exploitation depends on an application embedding the unmaintained package, passing input that makes conversion fail, and then returning or otherwise using the failed output. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the package is no longer maintained, so no vendor patch is expected and migration away from pybddisasm is the effective remediation.
pybddisasm 0.3.0 and earlier can disclose residual process memory to any consuming application that reads an INSTRUX object returned by a failed instruction decode. The four decode entry points leave the returned object uninitialized when decoding fails, including failures caused by invalid parameters, so an application that surfaces those members after a failure may expose leftover heap or stack contents; a caller that checks the decode status first is unaffected. The package is unmaintained with no fixed release, the vector is local and privilege-gated with confidentiality-only impact, and no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis.
A use-after-free in the pybddisasm Python bindings lets a local, low-privileged consumer of the library read freed heap memory or crash the Python interpreter when it keeps a reference to an element of an INSTRUX array member (such as an entry in the operands/ND_OPERAND list) after the owning INSTRUX object has been destroyed, because the child element does not keep the parent allocation alive. All versions of Bitdefender's pybddisasm package are affected (CPE cpe:2.3:a:bitdefender:pybddisasm:*), and the package is no longer maintained, so no vendor-released patch was identified at time of analysis. The trigger depends on the host application's own object-lifetime handling rather than on network input: no public exploit was identified at time of analysis, and the outcome is bounded to a likely process crash (availability) with only a limited memory-disclosure path (C:L), making this a medium-severity, low-urgency issue rather than a top priority.
Use-after-free in the unmaintained pybddisasm Python bindings lets a local, low-privileged process crash the Python interpreter or potentially read freed process memory when an application retains a structure-valued INSTRUX member reference after the parent object is freed. Exploitation requires a specific application coding pattern - obtaining a member object, letting the parent INSTRUX allocation be released, then accessing the stale member - and there is no remote or unauthenticated path. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, the package is no longer maintained, and the practical impact is limited by the narrow trigger and the library's small footprint.
Out-of-bounds reads in the pybddisasm Python bindings for the Bitdefender disassembler can expose up to roughly 15 bytes of adjacent process memory when an integrating application decodes a buffer that is shorter than the length it declares. nd_decode may read up to 15 bytes regardless of the actual Python buffer length, while nd_decode_ex, nd_decode_ex2, and nd_decode_with_context pass a caller-supplied size to the decoder without checking it against the real buffer, and nd_get_instrux_bytes then returns a fixed 16-byte list that can carry the leaked bytes. Exploitation is not self-contained: it requires a host application to make these calls with mismatched buffer/length arguments and to surface the decoded bytes to an attacker, and the affected package is no longer maintained, so fix responsibility falls to integrators. All quantitative signals point to a modest, non-urgent issue; no public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation were identified at time of analysis.
Uninitialized-memory handling in the pybddisasm Python bindings can cause nd_to_text to turn an uninitialized output buffer into a Python return value when the underlying text conversion fails, potentially disclosing residual process memory or crashing the interpreter. The issue is locally scoped (AV:L) and requires low privileges (PR:L); exploitation depends on an application embedding the unmaintained package, passing input that makes conversion fail, and then returning or otherwise using the failed output. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the package is no longer maintained, so no vendor patch is expected and migration away from pybddisasm is the effective remediation.
pybddisasm 0.3.0 and earlier can disclose residual process memory to any consuming application that reads an INSTRUX object returned by a failed instruction decode. The four decode entry points leave the returned object uninitialized when decoding fails, including failures caused by invalid parameters, so an application that surfaces those members after a failure may expose leftover heap or stack contents; a caller that checks the decode status first is unaffected. The package is unmaintained with no fixed release, the vector is local and privilege-gated with confidentiality-only impact, and no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis.
A use-after-free in the pybddisasm Python bindings lets a local, low-privileged consumer of the library read freed heap memory or crash the Python interpreter when it keeps a reference to an element of an INSTRUX array member (such as an entry in the operands/ND_OPERAND list) after the owning INSTRUX object has been destroyed, because the child element does not keep the parent allocation alive. All versions of Bitdefender's pybddisasm package are affected (CPE cpe:2.3:a:bitdefender:pybddisasm:*), and the package is no longer maintained, so no vendor-released patch was identified at time of analysis. The trigger depends on the host application's own object-lifetime handling rather than on network input: no public exploit was identified at time of analysis, and the outcome is bounded to a likely process crash (availability) with only a limited memory-disclosure path (C:L), making this a medium-severity, low-urgency issue rather than a top priority.
Use-after-free in the unmaintained pybddisasm Python bindings lets a local, low-privileged process crash the Python interpreter or potentially read freed process memory when an application retains a structure-valued INSTRUX member reference after the parent object is freed. Exploitation requires a specific application coding pattern - obtaining a member object, letting the parent INSTRUX allocation be released, then accessing the stale member - and there is no remote or unauthenticated path. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, the package is no longer maintained, and the practical impact is limited by the narrow trigger and the library's small footprint.
Out-of-bounds reads in the pybddisasm Python bindings for the Bitdefender disassembler can expose up to roughly 15 bytes of adjacent process memory when an integrating application decodes a buffer that is shorter than the length it declares. nd_decode may read up to 15 bytes regardless of the actual Python buffer length, while nd_decode_ex, nd_decode_ex2, and nd_decode_with_context pass a caller-supplied size to the decoder without checking it against the real buffer, and nd_get_instrux_bytes then returns a fixed 16-byte list that can carry the leaked bytes. Exploitation is not self-contained: it requires a host application to make these calls with mismatched buffer/length arguments and to surface the decoded bytes to an attacker, and the affected package is no longer maintained, so fix responsibility falls to integrators. All quantitative signals point to a modest, non-urgent issue; no public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation were identified at time of analysis.