Presenton
Monthly
Presenton's Electron desktop build, in versions up to and including 0.9.11-beta, exposes private application files through its internal HTTP services because those services run with authentication disabled and without a per-launch credential, letting a client that can reach them read configuration, database, log and export-task data under /app_data. Only the desktop (PRESENTON_ELECTRON=true) deployment mode is affected, and because the Next.js/FastAPI servers are loopback/internal services, practical reachability likely depends on a co-located local client or a browser-based cross-origin/cross-port path rather than arbitrary internet access; the impact is confidentiality-only and limited. A public PoC reference exists; it is not verified as working exploit code, and there is no confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV). Vuln.today priority places this in the current monthly remediation cycle rather than an emergency response.
Authentication bypass in Presenton's bundled MCP server exposes server and Docker deployments to unauthenticated remote exploitation via the unprotected /mcp endpoint. When operators configure session authentication using AUTH_USERNAME/AUTH_PASSWORD, nginx enforces access control on all paths except /mcp, which is absent from the auth_request gate - and the MCP server compounds this by auto-minting valid internal session tokens for the configured user on any incoming request. An unauthenticated remote attacker can therefore invoke MCP tools such as generate_presentation as if fully authenticated, consuming the operator's LLM API keys and writing arbitrary presentations to the instance. A publicly available proof-of-concept exists; no active exploitation confirmed in CISA KEV.
Presenton's Electron desktop build, in versions up to and including 0.9.11-beta, exposes private application files through its internal HTTP services because those services run with authentication disabled and without a per-launch credential, letting a client that can reach them read configuration, database, log and export-task data under /app_data. Only the desktop (PRESENTON_ELECTRON=true) deployment mode is affected, and because the Next.js/FastAPI servers are loopback/internal services, practical reachability likely depends on a co-located local client or a browser-based cross-origin/cross-port path rather than arbitrary internet access; the impact is confidentiality-only and limited. A public PoC reference exists; it is not verified as working exploit code, and there is no confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV). Vuln.today priority places this in the current monthly remediation cycle rather than an emergency response.
Authentication bypass in Presenton's bundled MCP server exposes server and Docker deployments to unauthenticated remote exploitation via the unprotected /mcp endpoint. When operators configure session authentication using AUTH_USERNAME/AUTH_PASSWORD, nginx enforces access control on all paths except /mcp, which is absent from the auth_request gate - and the MCP server compounds this by auto-minting valid internal session tokens for the configured user on any incoming request. An unauthenticated remote attacker can therefore invoke MCP tools such as generate_presentation as if fully authenticated, consuming the operator's LLM API keys and writing arbitrary presentations to the instance. A publicly available proof-of-concept exists; no active exploitation confirmed in CISA KEV.