Playwrightcapture
Monthly
Cross-user state leakage in Lookyloo's PlaywrightCapture Python library allows one capture operation to inherit sensitive data from another when multiple Capture objects run within the same Python process. Because capture-specific settings (HTTP headers, cookies, browser storage, HTTP credentials, proxy, user-agent, geolocation) were stored as mutable class-level rather than instance-level variables, a concurrent or subsequent capture in a multi-user deployment can disclose or reuse another user's authentication cookies, credentials, and captured request data. Exploitation requires low privileges (PR:L, a legitimate user of a shared deployment); a vendor patch exists (commit 1e354b9) and no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Server-side request forgery in PlaywrightCapture's favicon retrieval function allows a remote attacker to cause the PlaywrightCapture host to issue HTTP requests to internal or loopback-addressed services by exploiting a redirect-bypass in the aiohttp HTTP client. When the `only_global_lookup` configuration is active, the library validates the user-supplied favicon URL before the first request but does not re-validate URLs generated by automatic HTTP redirects, allowing a publicly reachable attacker-controlled URL to redirect to restricted destinations such as 127.0.0.1 or internal network services. Depending on what internal HTTP services are reachable from the PlaywrightCapture host and how favicon response content is surfaced, this enables internal network probing and potential information disclosure. A patch is available via the upstream Lookyloo repository; no active exploitation has been identified.
PlaywrightCapture's only_global_lookup SSRF protection is bypassed during favicon retrieval, allowing an attacker who can supply a web page for processing to direct the capture host's aiohttp HTTP client against loopback addresses, private IP ranges, or internal DNS names. The bypass arises because favicon URLs parsed from rendered HTML were fetched via a separate aiohttp.ClientSession that did not consult the same IP and hostname validation logic applied to browser-routed Playwright requests. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; a patch is available via upstream commit.
Cross-user state leakage in Lookyloo's PlaywrightCapture Python library allows one capture operation to inherit sensitive data from another when multiple Capture objects run within the same Python process. Because capture-specific settings (HTTP headers, cookies, browser storage, HTTP credentials, proxy, user-agent, geolocation) were stored as mutable class-level rather than instance-level variables, a concurrent or subsequent capture in a multi-user deployment can disclose or reuse another user's authentication cookies, credentials, and captured request data. Exploitation requires low privileges (PR:L, a legitimate user of a shared deployment); a vendor patch exists (commit 1e354b9) and no public exploit identified at time of analysis.
Server-side request forgery in PlaywrightCapture's favicon retrieval function allows a remote attacker to cause the PlaywrightCapture host to issue HTTP requests to internal or loopback-addressed services by exploiting a redirect-bypass in the aiohttp HTTP client. When the `only_global_lookup` configuration is active, the library validates the user-supplied favicon URL before the first request but does not re-validate URLs generated by automatic HTTP redirects, allowing a publicly reachable attacker-controlled URL to redirect to restricted destinations such as 127.0.0.1 or internal network services. Depending on what internal HTTP services are reachable from the PlaywrightCapture host and how favicon response content is surfaced, this enables internal network probing and potential information disclosure. A patch is available via the upstream Lookyloo repository; no active exploitation has been identified.
PlaywrightCapture's only_global_lookup SSRF protection is bypassed during favicon retrieval, allowing an attacker who can supply a web page for processing to direct the capture host's aiohttp HTTP client against loopback addresses, private IP ranges, or internal DNS names. The bypass arises because favicon URLs parsed from rendered HTML were fetched via a separate aiohttp.ClientSession that did not consult the same IP and hostname validation logic applied to browser-routed Playwright requests. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; a patch is available via upstream commit.