Optee Os
Monthly
Integer overflow in OP-TEE OS's AES-GCM implementation silently corrupts authentication tag computation when a single operation processes more than 512 megabytes of payload or Additional Authenticated Data (AAD), affecting all deployments running versions 3.0.0 through 4.10.x on Arm TrustZone platforms. The overflow causes the GHASH length counters to wrap, meaning the GCM authentication tag is derived from incorrect bit-length values - defeating AES-GCM's core integrity guarantee without any runtime error or exception. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the practical impact for systems using OP-TEE for high-value integrity assurance (DRM, secure key storage, attestation) is significant when large payloads traverse the TEE boundary.
Subkey rollback protection in OP-TEE OS versions 3.20.0 through 4.10.x is completely non-functional due to a missing field assignment in the Trusted Application loading pipeline, allowing revoked or downgraded subkeys to authenticate TAs without detection. A locally authenticated attacker who can supply TA binaries to the REE filesystem loader can bypass the entire key-chain revocation model, loading previously invalidated trusted code into the TrustZone secure world. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and this is not listed in CISA KEV, but the integrity impact is categorical - the rollback database never advances, permanently defeating the control for any deployment relying on subkey-based TA signing chains.
Heap exhaustion in OP-TEE OS (versions 3.3.0 through 4.10.x) allows a low-privileged normal-world local caller to progressively degrade and ultimately deny service to all trusted applications running in the secure world. The root cause is a missing bitmask application in `cleanup_shm_refs()` that causes `mobj_reg_shm` reference objects to accumulate indefinitely on internal lists without being released. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and EPSS data was not supplied; however, the flaw is structurally straightforward to trigger through normal TEE invocation with non-contiguous shared memory parameters, making it feasible for any process with TEE access to exhaust the secure heap over time.
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption in OP-TEE's Hisilicon HPRE hardware accelerator driver exposes a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle, allowing a local attacker to recover RSA plaintext by adaptively querying the oracle. Affected are optee_os versions 4.5.0 through 4.10.x built with Hisilicon HPRE support (CFG_HISILICON_ACC_V3=y) on Arm TrustZone-based platforms. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing exists; exploitation is constrained by local access requirements and the high query volume characteristic of Bleichenbacher-class attacks.
RSA-OAEP decryption in OP-TEE OS versions 3.9.0 through 4.10.x exposes a Manger-style padding oracle via the NXP CAAM hardware crypto driver, enabling local low-privileged attackers to recover RSA-OAEP plaintext through approximately 1,000-2,000 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries. The flaw arises from non-constant-time memcmp() usage during label hash verification combined with multiple distinguishable error paths that leak oracle-exploitable timing and response information. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis, and exploitation is constrained to NXP CAAM-equipped platforms with the RSA driver enabled.
RSA-OAEP decryption in OP-TEE OS versions 4.5.0 through 4.10.x exposes a Manger-style padding oracle via the Hisilicon HPRE hardware crypto driver, enabling a local attacker to recover RSA-OAEP plaintext through approximately 1000-2000 adaptive chosen ciphertext queries. The root cause is a non-constant-time `memcmp()` used for label hash verification combined with distinguishable error paths - classic CWE-208 timing side-channel conditions. Impact is heavily constrained by a non-default build requirement: only Hisilicon D06 (plat-d06) hardware built with `CFG_HISILICON_ACC_V3=y` is exposed, and no public exploit or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis.
Stack exhaustion via unbounded recursion in the OP-TEE PKCS#11 Trusted Application allows a local low-privileged user to crash the TA, causing a denial of service within the TrustZone secure world. Affected versions span 3.10.0 through 4.10.x of optee_os running on Arm Cortex-A platforms with TrustZone enabled. No active exploitation has been identified; this is a DoS-only issue with no confidentiality or integrity impact, and a patched release (4.11.0) is available.
Heap overflow in OP-TEE's ARM Crypto Extensions SHA-3 implementation corrupts TEE kernel memory across all platforms built with CFG_CRYPTO_WITH_CE82=y (ARMv8.2+ SHA3 extensions). The off-by-one error in the accelerated SHA-3 path overwrites memory beyond the hash state buffer, potentially corrupting all TEE kernel heap memory that follows. Affected versions span 3.21.0 through 4.11.0, and no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, though the memory corruption primitive is significant in the context of a secure enclave.
Integer overflow in OP-TEE OS's AES-GCM implementation silently corrupts authentication tag computation when a single operation processes more than 512 megabytes of payload or Additional Authenticated Data (AAD), affecting all deployments running versions 3.0.0 through 4.10.x on Arm TrustZone platforms. The overflow causes the GHASH length counters to wrap, meaning the GCM authentication tag is derived from incorrect bit-length values - defeating AES-GCM's core integrity guarantee without any runtime error or exception. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the practical impact for systems using OP-TEE for high-value integrity assurance (DRM, secure key storage, attestation) is significant when large payloads traverse the TEE boundary.
Subkey rollback protection in OP-TEE OS versions 3.20.0 through 4.10.x is completely non-functional due to a missing field assignment in the Trusted Application loading pipeline, allowing revoked or downgraded subkeys to authenticate TAs without detection. A locally authenticated attacker who can supply TA binaries to the REE filesystem loader can bypass the entire key-chain revocation model, loading previously invalidated trusted code into the TrustZone secure world. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and this is not listed in CISA KEV, but the integrity impact is categorical - the rollback database never advances, permanently defeating the control for any deployment relying on subkey-based TA signing chains.
Heap exhaustion in OP-TEE OS (versions 3.3.0 through 4.10.x) allows a low-privileged normal-world local caller to progressively degrade and ultimately deny service to all trusted applications running in the secure world. The root cause is a missing bitmask application in `cleanup_shm_refs()` that causes `mobj_reg_shm` reference objects to accumulate indefinitely on internal lists without being released. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and EPSS data was not supplied; however, the flaw is structurally straightforward to trigger through normal TEE invocation with non-contiguous shared memory parameters, making it feasible for any process with TEE access to exhaust the secure heap over time.
RSA PKCS#1 v1.5 decryption in OP-TEE's Hisilicon HPRE hardware accelerator driver exposes a Bleichenbacher-style padding oracle, allowing a local attacker to recover RSA plaintext by adaptively querying the oracle. Affected are optee_os versions 4.5.0 through 4.10.x built with Hisilicon HPRE support (CFG_HISILICON_ACC_V3=y) on Arm TrustZone-based platforms. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing exists; exploitation is constrained by local access requirements and the high query volume characteristic of Bleichenbacher-class attacks.
RSA-OAEP decryption in OP-TEE OS versions 3.9.0 through 4.10.x exposes a Manger-style padding oracle via the NXP CAAM hardware crypto driver, enabling local low-privileged attackers to recover RSA-OAEP plaintext through approximately 1,000-2,000 adaptive chosen-ciphertext queries. The flaw arises from non-constant-time memcmp() usage during label hash verification combined with multiple distinguishable error paths that leak oracle-exploitable timing and response information. No public exploit code or CISA KEV listing has been identified at time of analysis, and exploitation is constrained to NXP CAAM-equipped platforms with the RSA driver enabled.
RSA-OAEP decryption in OP-TEE OS versions 4.5.0 through 4.10.x exposes a Manger-style padding oracle via the Hisilicon HPRE hardware crypto driver, enabling a local attacker to recover RSA-OAEP plaintext through approximately 1000-2000 adaptive chosen ciphertext queries. The root cause is a non-constant-time `memcmp()` used for label hash verification combined with distinguishable error paths - classic CWE-208 timing side-channel conditions. Impact is heavily constrained by a non-default build requirement: only Hisilicon D06 (plat-d06) hardware built with `CFG_HISILICON_ACC_V3=y` is exposed, and no public exploit or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis.
Stack exhaustion via unbounded recursion in the OP-TEE PKCS#11 Trusted Application allows a local low-privileged user to crash the TA, causing a denial of service within the TrustZone secure world. Affected versions span 3.10.0 through 4.10.x of optee_os running on Arm Cortex-A platforms with TrustZone enabled. No active exploitation has been identified; this is a DoS-only issue with no confidentiality or integrity impact, and a patched release (4.11.0) is available.
Heap overflow in OP-TEE's ARM Crypto Extensions SHA-3 implementation corrupts TEE kernel memory across all platforms built with CFG_CRYPTO_WITH_CE82=y (ARMv8.2+ SHA3 extensions). The off-by-one error in the accelerated SHA-3 path overwrites memory beyond the hash state buffer, potentially corrupting all TEE kernel heap memory that follows. Affected versions span 3.21.0 through 4.11.0, and no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, though the memory corruption primitive is significant in the context of a secure enclave.