Omniroute
Monthly
Remote code execution in OmniRoute AI gateway 3.8.49 and earlier lets attackers run arbitrary commands in the server container via the POST /api/acp/agents custom ACP agent endpoint. The endpoint accepts attacker-controlled 'binary' and 'versionCommand' values and passes them to execFileSync after only a self-consistency (binary-match) check, so a matching interpreter carrying an eval-style argument (e.g. node -e, python -c) executes as code without any shell metacharacter. Because api/acp/ is excluded from the authentication-required prefixes, exploitation is remote and anonymous whenever requireLogin=false or during the fresh-instance bootstrap window; no fixed version exists and no public exploit is identified, though the GitHub advisory documents the PoC shape.
Remote code execution in OmniRoute AI gateway 3.8.49 and earlier lets attackers run arbitrary commands in the server container via the POST /api/acp/agents custom ACP agent endpoint. The endpoint accepts attacker-controlled 'binary' and 'versionCommand' values and passes them to execFileSync after only a self-consistency (binary-match) check, so a matching interpreter carrying an eval-style argument (e.g. node -e, python -c) executes as code without any shell metacharacter. Because api/acp/ is excluded from the authentication-required prefixes, exploitation is remote and anonymous whenever requireLogin=false or during the fresh-instance bootstrap window; no fixed version exists and no public exploit is identified, though the GitHub advisory documents the PoC shape.