Nodemailer
Monthly
SMTP command injection in Nodemailer before 8.0.4 lets attackers smuggle arbitrary SMTP verbs (notably RCPT TO) into outgoing mail by planting CRLF characters in the envelope.size value, silently adding attacker-controlled recipients or otherwise manipulating the MAIL FROM dialogue. Only applications that pass a custom envelope object and expose its size property to untrusted input are affected, since Nodemailer's default auto-constructed envelope never sets size. A working proof-of-concept is published in the GHSA advisory; there is no public exploit identified beyond that PoC and no evidence of active exploitation.
SMTP command injection in Nodemailer (npm) versions up to and including 8.0.4 allows an attacker who can influence the transport `name` configuration option to inject arbitrary SMTP commands by embedding CRLF sequences in the value. The EHLO, HELO, and LHLO commands are constructed via direct string concatenation in lib/smtp-connection/index.js without sanitization, enabling unauthorized email sending, spoofing, and phishing through the configured SMTP relay. A proof-of-concept is publicly available in the GHSA advisory; no KEV listing is present, indicating exploitation has not been confirmed at mass scale at time of analysis.
TLS certificate verification is disabled by hardcoded `rejectUnauthorized: false` in Nodemailer's internal HTTPS fetch client (lib/fetch/index.js), exposing OAuth2 token exchanges to machine-in-the-middle interception in all versions prior to 8.0.8. Any attacker with a MITM position on the network path between a Nodemailer-based application and its OAuth2 token endpoint can silently capture OAuth client secrets, refresh tokens, and access tokens from connections that appear valid to the application. A reporter-verified proof-of-concept demonstrating the full interception flow against a self-signed HTTPS OAuth endpoint exists; no confirmed active exploitation in CISA KEV at time of analysis.
CRLF injection in Nodemailer's List-* header construction allows any application-level user with control over list comment parameters to inject arbitrary RFC822 message headers into outbound emails. Versions up to and including 8.0.8 of the npm package are affected; the fix is available in 8.0.9. No active exploitation has been confirmed (not in CISA KEV) and no public exploit code has been identified, making this a medium-severity issue with practical impact confined to applications that expose the list comment API surface to untrusted input.
Nodemailer's jsonTransport transport fails to enforce disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess controls during message normalization in all versions prior to 8.0.9, allowing attackers with control over message content fields to read local filesystem content or trigger outbound SSRF-style HTTP requests. Applications that use jsonTransport as a safe serializer or queue payload generator while trusting those access-control options as a security boundary are the primary affected population. No public exploit code has been identified and the CVE is not in CISA KEV, but the flaw's mechanics are straightforward and fully documented in the GHSA advisory.
Sandbox bypass in nodemailer <= 9.0.0 exposes arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF to any authenticated application user whose input reaches the message-level `raw` option. The `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` flags - intended to sandbox untrusted message data - are correctly threaded through all other content node builders but are silently omitted when a `MimeNode` is constructed for a `raw` message in `lib/mail-composer/index.js:34-35`, leaving the raw path completely unrestricted. Exfiltrated file contents or HTTP response bodies are delivered as the actual RFC822 message via every supported transport (SMTP, SES, sendmail, stream, JSON) to an attacker-controlled recipient. A local PoC is confirmed per GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f; no KEV listing and no EPSS data are available.
The package nodemailer before 6.6.1 are vulnerable to HTTP Header Injection if unsanitized user input that may contain newlines and carriage returns is passed into an address object. Rated high severity (CVSS 8.8), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, no authentication required, low attack complexity. Public exploit code available.
This affects the package nodemailer before 6.4.16. Rated critical severity (CVSS 9.8), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, no authentication required, low attack complexity. Public exploit code available.
SMTP command injection in Nodemailer before 8.0.4 lets attackers smuggle arbitrary SMTP verbs (notably RCPT TO) into outgoing mail by planting CRLF characters in the envelope.size value, silently adding attacker-controlled recipients or otherwise manipulating the MAIL FROM dialogue. Only applications that pass a custom envelope object and expose its size property to untrusted input are affected, since Nodemailer's default auto-constructed envelope never sets size. A working proof-of-concept is published in the GHSA advisory; there is no public exploit identified beyond that PoC and no evidence of active exploitation.
SMTP command injection in Nodemailer (npm) versions up to and including 8.0.4 allows an attacker who can influence the transport `name` configuration option to inject arbitrary SMTP commands by embedding CRLF sequences in the value. The EHLO, HELO, and LHLO commands are constructed via direct string concatenation in lib/smtp-connection/index.js without sanitization, enabling unauthorized email sending, spoofing, and phishing through the configured SMTP relay. A proof-of-concept is publicly available in the GHSA advisory; no KEV listing is present, indicating exploitation has not been confirmed at mass scale at time of analysis.
TLS certificate verification is disabled by hardcoded `rejectUnauthorized: false` in Nodemailer's internal HTTPS fetch client (lib/fetch/index.js), exposing OAuth2 token exchanges to machine-in-the-middle interception in all versions prior to 8.0.8. Any attacker with a MITM position on the network path between a Nodemailer-based application and its OAuth2 token endpoint can silently capture OAuth client secrets, refresh tokens, and access tokens from connections that appear valid to the application. A reporter-verified proof-of-concept demonstrating the full interception flow against a self-signed HTTPS OAuth endpoint exists; no confirmed active exploitation in CISA KEV at time of analysis.
CRLF injection in Nodemailer's List-* header construction allows any application-level user with control over list comment parameters to inject arbitrary RFC822 message headers into outbound emails. Versions up to and including 8.0.8 of the npm package are affected; the fix is available in 8.0.9. No active exploitation has been confirmed (not in CISA KEV) and no public exploit code has been identified, making this a medium-severity issue with practical impact confined to applications that expose the list comment API surface to untrusted input.
Nodemailer's jsonTransport transport fails to enforce disableFileAccess and disableUrlAccess controls during message normalization in all versions prior to 8.0.9, allowing attackers with control over message content fields to read local filesystem content or trigger outbound SSRF-style HTTP requests. Applications that use jsonTransport as a safe serializer or queue payload generator while trusting those access-control options as a security boundary are the primary affected population. No public exploit code has been identified and the CVE is not in CISA KEV, but the flaw's mechanics are straightforward and fully documented in the GHSA advisory.
Sandbox bypass in nodemailer <= 9.0.0 exposes arbitrary file read and full-response SSRF to any authenticated application user whose input reaches the message-level `raw` option. The `disableFileAccess` and `disableUrlAccess` flags - intended to sandbox untrusted message data - are correctly threaded through all other content node builders but are silently omitted when a `MimeNode` is constructed for a `raw` message in `lib/mail-composer/index.js:34-35`, leaving the raw path completely unrestricted. Exfiltrated file contents or HTTP response bodies are delivered as the actual RFC822 message via every supported transport (SMTP, SES, sendmail, stream, JSON) to an attacker-controlled recipient. A local PoC is confirmed per GHSA-p6gq-j5cr-w38f; no KEV listing and no EPSS data are available.
The package nodemailer before 6.6.1 are vulnerable to HTTP Header Injection if unsanitized user input that may contain newlines and carriage returns is passed into an address object. Rated high severity (CVSS 8.8), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, no authentication required, low attack complexity. Public exploit code available.
This affects the package nodemailer before 6.4.16. Rated critical severity (CVSS 9.8), this vulnerability is remotely exploitable, no authentication required, low attack complexity. Public exploit code available.