Ms Swift
Monthly
Server-side request forgery in ms-swift 4.5.2 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to weaponize the server's multimodal media fetching logic against internal infrastructure. The OpenAI-compatible deploy API accepts image_url, audio_url, and video_url parameters that are passed to vision_utils.py without URL validation or redirect filtering, enabling arbitrary outbound requests to cloud metadata services (e.g., AWS IMDSv1 at 169.254.169.254), internal APIs, and network-adjacent services. No public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis, but the unauthenticated network-accessible attack surface and high confidentiality impact make this a significant risk for any internet-exposed ms-swift deployment.
Cache key collision in modelscope ms-swift up to 4.2.0 allows a local, low-privileged attacker to cause PIL image integrity failures via the Template._save_pil_image function in swift/template/base.py. The root cause is that the image cache key was computed by hashing only raw pixel bytes (image.tobytes()), without incorporating image metadata such as dimensions or color mode - meaning two structurally different images (e.g., 120×80 vs 80×120) sharing identical byte payloads produce the same SHA-256 cache key and thus collide to the same cached file path. No public exploit identified at time of analysis beyond the publicly disclosed proof-of-concept; no active exploitation confirmed (not listed in CISA KEV).
Server-side request forgery in ms-swift 4.5.2 allows unauthenticated remote attackers to weaponize the server's multimodal media fetching logic against internal infrastructure. The OpenAI-compatible deploy API accepts image_url, audio_url, and video_url parameters that are passed to vision_utils.py without URL validation or redirect filtering, enabling arbitrary outbound requests to cloud metadata services (e.g., AWS IMDSv1 at 169.254.169.254), internal APIs, and network-adjacent services. No public exploit code or active exploitation has been identified at time of analysis, but the unauthenticated network-accessible attack surface and high confidentiality impact make this a significant risk for any internet-exposed ms-swift deployment.
Cache key collision in modelscope ms-swift up to 4.2.0 allows a local, low-privileged attacker to cause PIL image integrity failures via the Template._save_pil_image function in swift/template/base.py. The root cause is that the image cache key was computed by hashing only raw pixel bytes (image.tobytes()), without incorporating image metadata such as dimensions or color mode - meaning two structurally different images (e.g., 120×80 vs 80×120) sharing identical byte payloads produce the same SHA-256 cache key and thus collide to the same cached file path. No public exploit identified at time of analysis beyond the publicly disclosed proof-of-concept; no active exploitation confirmed (not listed in CISA KEV).