Misp Stix
Monthly
Parser state isolation failure in misp-stix corrupts MISP event generation when the same parser instance is reused across independent STIX 1 and STIX 2 document conversions, causing retained artifacts - including galaxy clusters, passive DNS records, package titles, dates, and timestamps - from a prior document to contaminate subsequently generated MISP events. Applications directly consuming the misp-stix API with long-lived parser instances are at risk; the standard entry points that instantiate a fresh parser per file are not affected. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and the CVSS 4.0 AT:P precondition metric confirms exploitation depends on a non-default deployment pattern compounded by attacker influence over document processing order.
Denial-of-service in misp-stix allows remote attackers to terminate long-running MISP importer processes or exhaust host memory and CPU by submitting malformed or oversized STIX 1 or STIX 2 documents. Two distinct conditions combine: parsing failures invoked sys.exit(), which raises SystemExit - a BaseException subclass that bypasses standard except Exception handlers in callers - causing unconditional process termination instead of a recoverable error; and the library materialized full document content in memory before applying any size or validity checks, with processing costs of 2-7x the raw input size enabling resource exhaustion. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; upstream fix commits are available on GitHub.
Path traversal in the misp-stix Python library allows an attacker who can supply crafted STIX 2 content to escape the configured object-template directory during PyMISP template resolution, reading arbitrary files accessible to the conversion process and copying their contents into converted MISP objects. All MISP deployments performing STIX 2 import or MISP-to-STIX 2 export via misp-stix are affected, with the flaw carrying a CVSS 4.0 score of 8.8. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis, but the vulnerability's persistent re-triggering pathway - where a poisoned MISP event is later re-exported by a higher-privilege process - represents a privilege-escalation risk beyond what the base score alone reflects.
STIX document import in misp-stix through version 2026.7.8 allows an unauthenticated attacker who can supply a crafted STIX bundle to inject arbitrary MISP attribute metadata - including distribution level, sharing_group_id, and classification tags - into the importing MISP instance. The import pipeline trusted attacker-controlled STIX fields (tool labels for STIX2, document title for STIX1) to decide whether content originated from MISP itself, and then passed the complete x_misp_attributes dictionary without field filtering directly into attribute creation. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis; patch commits are available upstream from the MISP project.
Parser state isolation failure in misp-stix corrupts MISP event generation when the same parser instance is reused across independent STIX 1 and STIX 2 document conversions, causing retained artifacts - including galaxy clusters, passive DNS records, package titles, dates, and timestamps - from a prior document to contaminate subsequently generated MISP events. Applications directly consuming the misp-stix API with long-lived parser instances are at risk; the standard entry points that instantiate a fresh parser per file are not affected. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and the CVSS 4.0 AT:P precondition metric confirms exploitation depends on a non-default deployment pattern compounded by attacker influence over document processing order.
Denial-of-service in misp-stix allows remote attackers to terminate long-running MISP importer processes or exhaust host memory and CPU by submitting malformed or oversized STIX 1 or STIX 2 documents. Two distinct conditions combine: parsing failures invoked sys.exit(), which raises SystemExit - a BaseException subclass that bypasses standard except Exception handlers in callers - causing unconditional process termination instead of a recoverable error; and the library materialized full document content in memory before applying any size or validity checks, with processing costs of 2-7x the raw input size enabling resource exhaustion. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; upstream fix commits are available on GitHub.
Path traversal in the misp-stix Python library allows an attacker who can supply crafted STIX 2 content to escape the configured object-template directory during PyMISP template resolution, reading arbitrary files accessible to the conversion process and copying their contents into converted MISP objects. All MISP deployments performing STIX 2 import or MISP-to-STIX 2 export via misp-stix are affected, with the flaw carrying a CVSS 4.0 score of 8.8. No public exploit or CISA KEV listing exists at time of analysis, but the vulnerability's persistent re-triggering pathway - where a poisoned MISP event is later re-exported by a higher-privilege process - represents a privilege-escalation risk beyond what the base score alone reflects.
STIX document import in misp-stix through version 2026.7.8 allows an unauthenticated attacker who can supply a crafted STIX bundle to inject arbitrary MISP attribute metadata - including distribution level, sharing_group_id, and classification tags - into the importing MISP instance. The import pipeline trusted attacker-controlled STIX fields (tool labels for STIX2, document title for STIX1) to decide whether content originated from MISP itself, and then passed the complete x_misp_attributes dictionary without field filtering directly into attribute creation. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis; patch commits are available upstream from the MISP project.