Migration Toolkit For Applications 8
Monthly
Jinja2 template injection in Ansible Operator Plugins (CWE-1336) lets an authenticated Kubernetes user who can create or modify a custom resource reconciled by an affected Ansible-based operator execute embedded Jinja2 expressions inside the operator pod, achieving remote code execution and escalating to the operator's service account. Because these operators typically hold cluster-wide RBAC, successful exploitation crosses a privilege boundary (CVSS 3.1 base 8.5, AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H), affecting components of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2, Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2, the Migration Toolkit for Applications/Containers/Virtualization, OpenShift Service Mesh 3 and related Red Hat OpenShift and OpenStack streams. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) were identified at time of analysis; the high attack complexity reflects the prerequisite that the targeted operator must pass attacker-controllable CR spec values into Jinja2 templating without sanitization. This is a genuinely high-priority flaw rather than a CVSS-inflated one, but with an important authentication caveat: purely anonymous or read-only users cannot trigger it.
Symlink-following file overwrite on the Ansible control node is possible in ansible-core when a user runs `ansible-galaxy collection install` against a crafted collection tarball, because the archive extractor validates member paths with lexical normalization (os.path.abspath) instead of resolving symlinks (os.path.realpath) and performs no containment check on symlink-typed directory members before creating them, letting chained symlink entries redirect a subsequent file member outside the destination directory. The flaw (CWE-59, CVSS 8.8, vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2020-10691 and requires the victim to actively install the malicious collection, so an attacker can write arbitrary files with the privileges of the ansible-galaxy user and potentially achieve code execution on the control node. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV; affected deployments include ansible-core 2.x as shipped in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 and numerous other Red Hat products, and no patched version is identified in the supplied intelligence, which currently cites only the Red Hat CVE page and Bugzilla 2531646.
The antchfx/xpath component in Debian is vulnerable to denial of service when processing specially crafted Boolean XPath expressions, which trigger an infinite loop in the logicalQuery.Select function consuming 100% CPU resources. Unauthenticated remote attackers can exploit this over the network without user interaction to disable affected systems. No patch is currently available.
The system CA trust store shipped in Red Hat's ca-certificates RPM packages includes eMudhra root authorities that signed intermediate CA certificates protected by weak private keys, so a man-in-the-middle attacker who can intercept traffic and who can factor or guess those keys could mint certificates for arbitrary hostnames that TLS clients using the system trust store would accept (CVSS 6.8, CWE-295). Affected platforms span Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 through 10 plus a long list of layered products such as OpenShift Container Platform 4, Satellite 6, Quay 3, Advanced Cluster Management, and the cert-manager and logging operators. Attackers need a privileged network position and a victim client that actually initiates a TLS connection validated against the system store, so this is a trust-anchoring and impersonation problem rather than a remotely reachable code-execution flaw; there is no availability impact and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis. Because individual intermediate certificates cannot be selectively distrusted across every consumer of the system store, Red Hat is removing the parent root CAs outright, which is the crux of the remediation.
Jinja2 template injection in Ansible Operator Plugins (CWE-1336) lets an authenticated Kubernetes user who can create or modify a custom resource reconciled by an affected Ansible-based operator execute embedded Jinja2 expressions inside the operator pod, achieving remote code execution and escalating to the operator's service account. Because these operators typically hold cluster-wide RBAC, successful exploitation crosses a privilege boundary (CVSS 3.1 base 8.5, AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H), affecting components of Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2, Red Hat Advanced Cluster Management for Kubernetes 2, the Migration Toolkit for Applications/Containers/Virtualization, OpenShift Service Mesh 3 and related Red Hat OpenShift and OpenStack streams. No public exploit code and no confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) were identified at time of analysis; the high attack complexity reflects the prerequisite that the targeted operator must pass attacker-controllable CR spec values into Jinja2 templating without sanitization. This is a genuinely high-priority flaw rather than a CVSS-inflated one, but with an important authentication caveat: purely anonymous or read-only users cannot trigger it.
Symlink-following file overwrite on the Ansible control node is possible in ansible-core when a user runs `ansible-galaxy collection install` against a crafted collection tarball, because the archive extractor validates member paths with lexical normalization (os.path.abspath) instead of resolving symlinks (os.path.realpath) and performs no containment check on symlink-typed directory members before creating them, letting chained symlink entries redirect a subsequent file member outside the destination directory. The flaw (CWE-59, CVSS 8.8, vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H) is a bypass of the fix for CVE-2020-10691 and requires the victim to actively install the malicious collection, so an attacker can write arbitrary files with the privileges of the ansible-galaxy user and potentially achieve code execution on the control node. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis and the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV; affected deployments include ansible-core 2.x as shipped in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2 and numerous other Red Hat products, and no patched version is identified in the supplied intelligence, which currently cites only the Red Hat CVE page and Bugzilla 2531646.
The antchfx/xpath component in Debian is vulnerable to denial of service when processing specially crafted Boolean XPath expressions, which trigger an infinite loop in the logicalQuery.Select function consuming 100% CPU resources. Unauthenticated remote attackers can exploit this over the network without user interaction to disable affected systems. No patch is currently available.
The system CA trust store shipped in Red Hat's ca-certificates RPM packages includes eMudhra root authorities that signed intermediate CA certificates protected by weak private keys, so a man-in-the-middle attacker who can intercept traffic and who can factor or guess those keys could mint certificates for arbitrary hostnames that TLS clients using the system trust store would accept (CVSS 6.8, CWE-295). Affected platforms span Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 through 10 plus a long list of layered products such as OpenShift Container Platform 4, Satellite 6, Quay 3, Advanced Cluster Management, and the cert-manager and logging operators. Attackers need a privileged network position and a victim client that actually initiates a TLS connection validated against the system store, so this is a trust-anchoring and impersonation problem rather than a remotely reachable code-execution flaw; there is no availability impact and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis. Because individual intermediate certificates cannot be selectively distrusted across every consumer of the system store, Red Hat is removing the parent root CAs outright, which is the crux of the remediation.