Libstrophe
Monthly
Stack-based buffer overflow in libstrophe through 0.14.0 allows a malicious or compromised XMPP server to crash or corrupt the stack of a connecting client during SCRAM SASL authentication: a server-first-message whose base64 s= (salt) attribute decodes to more than 124 bytes overruns the fixed 128-byte stack buffer in SCRAM_Hi(). Only clients that perform SCRAM authentication and connect out to an attacker-controlled or compromised server are exposed, so the flaw is client-side and requires the victim to initiate the connection rather than exposing an attack surface at scale. Impact is predominantly denial of service (process abort), with limited stack memory overwrite possible only in NDEBUG builds where the guarding assertion is compiled out; no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) is identified at time of analysis, though a technical write-up of the flaw is publicly available.
Stack-based buffer overflow in libstrophe through 0.14.0 allows a malicious or compromised XMPP server to crash or corrupt the stack of a connecting client during SCRAM SASL authentication: a server-first-message whose base64 s= (salt) attribute decodes to more than 124 bytes overruns the fixed 128-byte stack buffer in SCRAM_Hi(). Only clients that perform SCRAM authentication and connect out to an attacker-controlled or compromised server are exposed, so the flaw is client-side and requires the victim to initiate the connection rather than exposing an attack surface at scale. Impact is predominantly denial of service (process abort), with limited stack memory overwrite possible only in NDEBUG builds where the guarding assertion is compiled out; no public exploit code or confirmed active exploitation (CISA KEV) is identified at time of analysis, though a technical write-up of the flaw is publicly available.