Leont
Monthly
Heap buffer overflow in Crypt::SysRandom::XS before version 0.010 allows denial of service through negative length parameter validation bypass in the random_bytes() function. When negative values are passed to the function, integer wraparound causes incorrect memory allocation and unbounded writes to heap memory, triggering application crashes. Exploitation requires attacker control over the length argument, which in typical usage is hardcoded, limiting practical attack scenarios.
Heap out-of-bounds reads and writes in Perl's regular expression engine through version 5.45.1 arise from a signed 32-bit integer overflow when computing the superlinear cache size in S_regmatch. When a subject string of approximately 286,331,153 bytes is matched against a pattern containing 15 or more WHILEM-participating nodes, the bit-count product overflows to 14, producing a two-byte cache allocation that is then indexed far beyond its bounds. A caller passing attacker-controlled input of this size to such a pattern can crash the Perl process or corrupt heap memory; no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV.
Heap out-of-bounds read in Crypt::Argon2 for Perl (versions 0.017 through 0.030) exposes applications to process crash or heap memory leakage when argon2_verify is called with an empty encoded hash string. The defect is a size_t integer underflow: the auto-detect variant of argon2_verify subtracts 1 from encoded_len without a zero-check, wrapping to SIZE_MAX and causing memchr to scan up to SIZE_MAX bytes of adjacent heap memory. No public exploit has been identified and no CISA KEV listing exists; EPSS is 0.03% (9th percentile), consistent with the SSVC assessment of exploitation status 'none'.
Heap buffer overflow in Crypt::SysRandom::XS before version 0.010 allows denial of service through negative length parameter validation bypass in the random_bytes() function. When negative values are passed to the function, integer wraparound causes incorrect memory allocation and unbounded writes to heap memory, triggering application crashes. Exploitation requires attacker control over the length argument, which in typical usage is hardcoded, limiting practical attack scenarios.
Heap out-of-bounds reads and writes in Perl's regular expression engine through version 5.45.1 arise from a signed 32-bit integer overflow when computing the superlinear cache size in S_regmatch. When a subject string of approximately 286,331,153 bytes is matched against a pattern containing 15 or more WHILEM-participating nodes, the bit-count product overflows to 14, producing a two-byte cache allocation that is then indexed far beyond its bounds. A caller passing attacker-controlled input of this size to such a pattern can crash the Perl process or corrupt heap memory; no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV.
Heap out-of-bounds read in Crypt::Argon2 for Perl (versions 0.017 through 0.030) exposes applications to process crash or heap memory leakage when argon2_verify is called with an empty encoded hash string. The defect is a size_t integer underflow: the auto-detect variant of argon2_verify subtracts 1 from encoded_len without a zero-check, wrapping to SIZE_MAX and causing memchr to scan up to SIZE_MAX bytes of adjacent heap memory. No public exploit has been identified and no CISA KEV listing exists; EPSS is 0.03% (9th percentile), consistent with the SSVC assessment of exploitation status 'none'.