Labbench
Monthly
Deserialization of untrusted data in labbench before 0.46.1 allows arbitrary code execution when a user loads a crafted .p or .pickle file through read() or read_relational(). The library's auto-format dispatch selected pandas.read_pickle on the file extension alone, so a malicious pickle file - or a relational data archive containing one - runs attacker-controlled code with the permissions of the loading user. Exploitation requires user interaction (the victim must open the supplied file), the vector is local rather than network-facing, and no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis; the vendor fixed the behavior in 0.46.1 by refusing pickle auto-loading unless the LABBENCH_AUTOLOAD_PICKLE environment variable is explicitly set.
Deserialization of untrusted data in labbench before 0.46.1 allows arbitrary code execution when a user loads a crafted .p or .pickle file through read() or read_relational(). The library's auto-format dispatch selected pandas.read_pickle on the file extension alone, so a malicious pickle file - or a relational data archive containing one - runs attacker-controlled code with the permissions of the loading user. Exploitation requires user interaction (the victim must open the supplied file), the vector is local rather than network-facing, and no public exploit has been identified at time of analysis; the vendor fixed the behavior in 0.46.1 by refusing pickle auto-loading unless the LABBENCH_AUTOLOAD_PICKLE environment variable is explicitly set.